SECCION Crisis monetaria: US/EURO, dolar vs otras monedas

Gráfico del tipo de cambio del Dólar Americano al Euro - Desde dic 1, 2008 a dic 31, 2008

Evolucion del dolar contra el euro

US Dollar to Euro Exchange Rate Graph - Jan 7, 2004 to Jan 5, 2009

V. SECCION: M. PRIMAS

1. SECCION:materias primas en linea:precios


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METALES A 30 DIAS click sobre la imagen
(click sur l´image)

3. PRIX DU CUIVRE

  Cobre a 30 d [Most Recent Quotes from www.kitco.com]

4. ARGENT/SILVER/PLATA

5. GOLD/OR/ORO

6. precio zinc

7. prix du plomb

8. nickel price

10. PRIX essence






petrole on line

Find out how to invest in energy stocks at EnergyAndCapital.com.

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26 ene 2009

FRANCE:LE MODELE FRANCAIS

JEAN-MARC VITTORI

Le moment français

[ 27/01/09  ]

Toutes les étoiles s'alignent. La France redevient un modèle. D'aucuns se prennent à rêver de nouveau à un pays guidant glorieusement la planète vers un avenir meilleur... A en croire l'économiste allemand Holger Schmieding travaillant pour Bank of America, la France est même « le dernier modèle debout » (1), le seul à ne pas avoir été démoli par le surendettement à l'anglo-saxonne ou l'excès de rigueur du système rhénan. Si le monde ne nous envie pas, le monde nous copie. L'interventionnisme des pouvoirs publics devient la norme. Tous les grands pays convergent vers une France championne de la dépense publique (53 % du PIB). Américains et Britanniques nationalisent leurs banques, comme le firent le général de Gaulle en 1945 et François Mitterrand en 1981. Le constructeur General Motors pourrait lui aussi basculer dans le secteur public, tout comme Renault il y a plus de six décennies. Beaucoup d'étrangers découvrent que notre protection sociale n'est pas seulement un fardeau désuet, mais aussi une protection - sociale de surcroît. L'Etat devient partout le sauveur suprême vers lequel convergent tous les regards, comme c'est le cas en France depuis des siècles.

Poursuivons l'alignement des étoiles. Des Français dirigent les institutions internationales au coeur de la tourmente : Dominique Strauss-Kahn est au Fonds monétaire international (dont l'économiste en chef, Olivier Blanchard, est aussi français), Jean-Claude Trichet à la Banque centrale européenne et Pascal Lamy à l'Organisation mondiale du commerce. La France était le seul pays à avoir des économistes ayant constitué une « école de la régulation », et maintenant les dirigeants du monde entier n'ont plus que ce mot-là à la bouche. D'autres économistes français sont parmi les plus réputés au monde en matière de réglementation financière et d'économie publique (certains d'entre eux participeront d'ailleurs demain à une conférence de haut niveau à Bercy).

Enfin, tout au bout de la constellation, une étoile ou plutôt une star brille d'un éclat tout particulier : c'est le président de la République, Nicolas Sarkozy. Sa présidence de l'Union européenne fin 2008 a marqué les esprits. Il a réclamé et obtenu la conférence financière de Washington. Ce sommet restera dans l'histoire comme un virage décisif, celui de la montée en puissance du G20, qui rassemble non seulement les vieux pays industriels mais aussi les grandes nations émergentes. Il marque aussi l'aspiration à une vraie gouvernance mondiale, là encore une vieille idée française. Jean-Claude Trichet le disait bien avant de partir pour Francfort : « Les Français voudraient être les architectes du monde. »

Il y a tout de même une bizarrerie dans ce moment bleu-blanc-rouge : on n'entend aucun cocorico. Il paraît peu vraisemblable que l'ampleur de la crise économique et financière mondiale puisse calmer le coq gaulois. L'explication de cette rare modestie est donc ailleurs. Dans la crainte, d'abord : même si une France mieux protégée que ses grands voisins devrait subir un coup de frein moins violent sur son activité économique, elle va tout de même souffrir dans les mois à venir, et sa légèreté budgétaire d'hier lui donnera moins de latitude d'action demain. Dans le doute, ensuite : même si beaucoup de Français sont fiers de leur modèle, ils sont conscients de ses faiblesses. Et ils sont bien placés pour savoir que la nationalisation n'est pas la panacée.

N'importe quelle entreprise aurait du mal à fonctionner avec des syndicats ressemblant à ceux de la SNCF. Ou avec le dynamisme de certains postiers derrière leur guichet. Ou avec la rapidité de décision de la préfectorale. Ou avec la discipline des agents de l'ANPE récemment fondus dans le Pôle emploi. Ou avec les 35 heures à la sauce hôpital. Ou avec un équilibre des couvertures santé et retraite piloté par la Sécu. Autrement dit, le modèle public français, vers lequel le monde entier semble basculer pour échapper aux rigueurs de la crise, n'est pas un modèle. C'est d'ailleurs la raison pour laquelle le triomphe apparent des idées françaises n'est qu'un moment. Dès que le pire sera passé, dès que le vent de l'optimisme se lèvera, dès que l'envie d'entreprendre reviendra, les étoiles reprendront leur course et le moment français n'aura été qu'une étrange malice de l'histoire.

FUTURE OF FINANCE:INTERVIEW THECONOMIST

A special report on the future of finance

Greed—and fear

Jan 22nd 2009
From The Economist print edition

The golden age of finance collapsed under its own contradictions. Edward Carr (interviewed here) asks why it went wrong and what to do next


Illustration by S. Kambayashi

THE monument to Soviet central planning was supposed to have been a heap of surplus left boots without any right ones to match them. The great bull market of the past quarter century is commemorated by millions of empty houses without anyone to buy them. Gosplan drafted workers into grim factories even if their talents would have been better suited elsewhere. Finance beguiled the bright and ambitious and put them to work in the trading rooms of Wall Street and the City of London. Much of their effort was wasted. You can only guess at what else they might have achieved.

When the financial system fails, everyone suffers. Over the past 22 months the shock has spread from American housing, sector by sector, economy by economy. Some markets have seized up; others are being pounded by volatility. Everywhere good businesses are going bankrupt and jobs are being destroyed. For the first time since 1991 global average income per head is falling. Even as growth in emerging markets has come to a halt, the rich economies look set to shrink. Alan Greenspan, who as chairman of America’s Federal Reserve oversaw the boom, calls the collapse “a once-in-a-half-century, probably once-in-a-century type of event”. Financial markets promised prosperity; instead they have brought hardship.

Financial services are in ruins. Perhaps half of all hedge funds will go out of business. Without government aid, so would many banks. Britain has suffered its first bank-run since Disraeli was prime minister in the 1870s. America has stumbled from one rescue to the next. The Wall Street grandees have been humbled. Hundreds of thousands of people in financial services will lose their jobs; many millions of their clients have lost their savings.

For a quarter of a century finance basked in a golden age. Financial globalisation spread capital more widely, markets evolved, businesses were able to finance new ventures and ordinary people had unprecedented access to borrowing and foreign exchange. Modern finance improved countless lives.

But more recently something went awry. Through insurance and saving, financial services are supposed to offer shelter from life’s reverses. Instead, financiers grew rich even as their industry put everyone’s prosperity in danger. Financial services are supposed to bring together borrowers and savers. But as lending markets have retreated, borrowers have been stranded without credit and savers have seen their pensions and investments melt away. Financial markets are supposed to be a machine for amassing capital and determining who gets to use it and for what. How could they have been so wrong?

Finance is increasingly fragile. Barry Eichengreen of the University of California at Berkeley and Michael Bordo of Rutgers University identify 139 financial crises between 1973 and 1997 (of which 44 took place in high-income countries), compared with a total of only 38 between 1945 and 1971. Crises are twice as common as they were before 1914, the authors conclude.

The paradox is that financial markets can function again only if this lesson is partly forgotten. Financial transactions are a series of promises. You hand your money to a bank, which promises to pay it back when you ask; you invest in a company, which promises you a share of its future profits. Money itself is just a collective agreement that a piece of paper can always be exchanged for goods or services.

Imagine, for a second, how finance began, with small loans within families and between trusted friends. As the circle of lenders and borrowers grew, financial transactions were able to muster larger sums and to spread risk, even as promises became harder to enforce. Paul Seabright, an economist at the University of Toulouse in France, observes that trust in a modern economy has evolved to the miraculous point where people give complete strangers sums of money they would not dream of entrusting to their next-door neighbours. From that a further miracle follows, for trust is what raises the billions of dollars that fund modern industry.

Trust’s slow accumulation pushes financial markets forward; its shattering betrayal batters them back. Sometimes this is through bad faith, as when Bernie Madoff, a grand fund manager, allegedly made his investors $50 billion poorer, or mortgage-sellers tempted naive borrowers. But promises made in good faith can be broken too. Indeed, honest failure is even more corrosive of trust than outright criminality. Everyone understands that now.

New order

The failure of finance will affect ideology, too. Many people find capitalism’s central planner hard to put up with at the best of times. Free markets shun seemingly worthy causes, whereas the frivolous or apparently undeserving are rewarded. Look at the financial-services industry itself. In America middle-class pay has stalled in recent years but financiers have figured prominently among the tiny number of people who have captured much of the extra income. For as long as the world economy was growing fast, financial markets commanded grudging allegiance. Yet the same financiers who preached the necessity of free markets on the way up have since depended on taxpayers to save their industry at a cost of trillions of dollars.

Financiers will find the arguments for free markets harder to make now that they have lost the benefit of the doubt. Charles Kindleberger’s classic study, “Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises”, updated by Robert Aliber in 2005, suggests that financial instability feeds on itself. Japanese savings fled their own bust and sloshed first into the Nordic countries and then into Asia, which suffered contagion in 1997.

Some see today’s disaster as a result of that Asian crash. Asian nations—especially China—have been determined to be part of global capital markets but not to run current-account deficits which would leave them vulnerable to sudden currency outflows. So they have been happy to see their money go abroad. In the phrase of Martin Wolf, an economic columnist at the Financial Times, they “smoke but do not inhale”.

In 2006 America’s current-account deficit peaked at 6% of its GDP (see chart 1). Between 2000 and 2008 the country received over $5.7 trillion from abroad to invest, equivalent to over 40% of its 2007 GDP. Over the same period Britain and Ireland absorbed around a fifth of their 2007 GDPs and Spain a vast 50%. The financial system had the job of recycling the money to borrowers. Inevitably, credit became cheaper and savings declined. In America savings fell from around 10% of disposable income in the 1970s to 1% after 2005.

Not everyone agrees about the cause of this torrent of foreign capital. Although some blame Asian saving, others point to Western extravagance. But there is little doubt about the consequences. All four of the debtor countries in the chart enjoyed housing booms. Jeffry Frieden, a political economist at Harvard University, says about three-quarters of credit booms financed from abroad end up in crashes.

And yet financial services were not so much a victim of the inflows of foreign capital as an eager accomplice. The question is why financial systems are so liable to turn foreign credit into ruinous busts. In particular, why did America, home to the world’s most advanced financial system, turn foreign credit into the world’s most serious post-war bust?

The suspicion is that American know-how and talent made the disaster worse. Of all the financial instruments to have failed, newfangled collateralised-debt obligations (CDOs) have turned out to be among the most devastating. One way of thinking about CDOs, says Raghuram Rajan, a professor at the University of Chicago, is as a mechanism for converting mortgage securities and corporate bonds from huge, illiquid assets owned by local investors into liquid financial instruments that could be flogged across the world. Philip Lane, of Trinity College Dublin, thinks that sophisticated American financial services combined dangerously with relatively unsophisticated financial services elsewhere.

Never again, etc

If the price of sophistication is instability, something is wrong. You might conclude that the thing to do is to shackle finance as it was shackled in the 1950s and 60s. If ever there were a moment for this, it would be now. It takes a big upheaval to open the way for radical reform. The structure of financial regulation in America still bears the mark of ideas forged in the Depression.

Reform is certainly needed, yet, for all the excesses and instability of finance, a complete clampdown would be a mistake. For one thing, remember the remarkable prosperity of the past 25 years. Finance deserves some of the credit for that. Note, too, that finance has always been plagued by crises, whether the system is open or closed, simple or sophisticated. Attempts to regulate finance to make it safe often lead to dangerous distortions as clever financiers work around the rules. If there were a simple way to prevent crises altogether, it would already be the foundation stone of financial regulation.

In fact, the aim should be neither to banish finance nor to punish it, but to create a system that supports economic growth through the best mix of state-imposed stability and private initiative. Modern finance is flawed, unstable and prone to excess. But think of those boots and those wasted lives: planned markets are flawed, unstable and excessive too.

Le Monde.fr : Le recul de l'activité mondiale et la baisse des matières premières frappent le Brésil

Le Monde.fr

Cette information du Monde.fr vous est envoyée par ggarcianunez@gmail.com.

bresil

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Le recul de l'activité mondiale et la baisse des matières premières frappent le Brésil
LE MONDE | 26.01.09 | 14h30

es patrons et les dirigeants syndicaux brésiliens se réjouissent d'une décision qu'ils appelaient de leurs voeux pour relancer la croissance et contenir le chômage : la baisse d'un point du taux directeur de la banque centrale, qui passe à 12,75 %.


Accédez à l'intégralité de cet article sur Lemonde.fr
http://www.lemonde.fr/la-crise-financiere/article/2009/01/26/le-recul-de-l-activite-mondiale-et-la-baisse-des-matieres-premieres-frappent-le-bresil_1146572_1101386.html





Copyright Le Monde 2009
Droits de reproduction et de diffusion réservés

KOWEIT:SOMMET ARABE

Les pays arabes lancent leur premier sommet économique  

Arnaud Rodier, envoyé spécial à Koweït
19/01/2009 | Mise à jour : 07:19
Commentaires  6 | Ajouter à ma sélection
Le ministre des Finances du Koweït, Mustafa al-Chamali, cherche à préparer la future croissance des pays arabes.
Le ministre des Finances du Koweït, Mustafa al-Chamali, cherche à préparer la future croissance des pays arabes. Crédits photo : AFP

Le Koweït accueille les chefs d'État du monde arabe pour définir une politique économique et sociale commune.

C'est un sommet sans précédent qui s'ouvre lundi matin, pour deux jours, à Koweït. Pour la première fois de leur histoire, les chefs d'État et de gouvernement des pays arabes se retrouvent pour jeter les bases d'une politique économique et sociale commune. Un sommet qui se tient dans un contexte tendu, compte tenu de la guerre de Gaza. Mais, exception faite du roi du Maroc, les vingt-deux membres de la Ligue arabe ont répondu présent.

Cela fait deux ans que le Koweït prépare ce sommet. Et aujourd'hui, avec la crise financière, il prend tout son sens. Chute des prix du pétrole, effondrement des cours des Bourses, pénurie alimentaire mondiale... les pays arabes sont touchés de manières diverses.

L'or noir à moins de 40 dollars le baril, contre 147 dollars en juillet, fait trébucher l'Arabie saoudite, dont la croissance devrait tourner entre 0,5 % et 0,9 % cette année. «Une baisse des cours d'un dollar coûte entre 4 milliards et 10 milliards de dollars de pertes de revenu annuel aux pays arabes», estime l'Organisation des pays exportateurs de pétrole. Riyad, tout comme Oman et Dubaï, le paieront par des déficits budgétaires accrus. Or ces pays du Moyen-Orient abritent les fonds souverains les plus important du monde : 900 milliards de dollars pour les Émirats arabes unis, 200 milliards pour le Koweït, 60 milliards pour le Qatar. Des fonds majoritairement investis sur les marchés américains et européens dans lesquels ils n'ont plus confiance et qu'ils sont tentés de placer désormais dans la région.

Parallèlement, les États du Golfe, qui importent 60 % de leur nourriture, ont commencé à acheter des terres à l'étranger. Ils veulent en particulier pousser l'agriculture au Soudan, en Égypte, en Syrie, au Maroc, pour garantir leur sécurité alimentaire. Enfin, les pays arabes font face à d'importants problèmes de démographie et d'emploi. La population, estimée à 300 millions de personnes, va doubler dans les trente prochaines années alors que la région compte 60 millions de chômeurs et qu'il faudrait créer 80 millions de postes d'ici à 2020.

Vers une monnaie unique

Pendant le sommet de Koweït, un fonds de soutien doté d'un capital de 70 milliards de dollars devrait être lancé pour répondre à la crise et une ligne de crédit de 1 milliard de dollars débloquée pour aider le secteur privé. La création d'une grande zone arabe de libre-échange sera également abordée ainsi qu'un projet d'union douanière pour les années 2015-2020. En attendant, une union monétaire et une monnaie unique. Cinq des six pays du Conseil de coopération du Golfe - Oman s'est désolidarisé - la souhaitent aussi rapidement que possible. Le Koweït, dont le dinar, contrairement à ses voisins, n'est plus indexé sur le dollar, veut commencer à la mettre en place dès l'an prochain et souhaite élargir son utilisation. «Nous cherchons des outils pour répondre à l'impact de la crise sur les pays arabes, mais nous voulons surtout permettre à ces pays de préparer sereinement leur future croissance», résume le ministre des Finances du Koweït, Mustafa al-Chamali. Toute la difficulté de ce premier sommet économique consistera à se montrer concret et à ne pas se perdre dans les grandes théories.  


FRANCE:GREVE 29 JANVIER

Grèves : «Jeudi noir»
en perspective le 29 janvier

Marc Landré
26/01/2009 | Mise à jour : 08:40
Commentaires  385 | Ajouter à ma sélection
La grève, qui touchera les transports urbains, les services publics et les entreprises privées, vise à faire plier le gouvernement, accusé de ne pas faire suffisamment pour les Français.
La grève, qui touchera les transports urbains, les services publics et les entreprises privées, vise à faire plier le gouvernement, accusé de ne pas faire suffisamment pour les Français. Crédits photo : Le Figaro

Les syndicats comme l'Elysée prévoient un mouvement très suivi. Les transports, l'Education nationale, les hôpitaux devraient être, entre autres, concernés.

Tout le monde s'accorde à le dire : la mobilisation nationale de jeudi sera un succès. «Il y aura énormément de monde», pronostique Bernard Thibault, le secrétaire général de la CGT, l'une des huit organisations syndicales qui appellent le 29 janvier les Français à descendre dans la rue et à cesser le travail pour réclamer des mesures en faveur de l'emploi et des salaires. «C'est une journée qui se prépare avec un nombre d'appels à des arrêts de travail, dans des entreprises privées comme publiques, sans égal depuis très longtemps.» Son de cloche identique à l'Élysée, où l'on prédit une mobilisation «très forte parce qu'unique et parce qu'elle permettra aux Français de faire échapper la vapeur», estime un conseiller du chef de l'État. Ce sentiment est confirmé par un sondage publié hier dans Le Parisien/Aujourd'hui en France : sept Français sur dix déclarent «soutenir» ou «avoir de la sympathie» pour la mobilisation de jeudi.

Quoi qu'il en soit, c'est un «jeudi noir» auquel les Français s'apprêtent à faire face. Les services publics, entreprises ou professions touchés par un appel à la grève ressemblent à une «liste à la Prévert» qui ne cesse de grossir : la SNCF, la RATP, transports urbains, La Poste, France Télécom, l'Éducation nationale, EDF, Radio France, les fonctionnaires dans leur ensemble, les hôpitaux, GDF Suez, la construction navale, Pôle emploi, les aéroports, France Télévisions, la Banque de France, les banques, les magistrats, les constructeurs automobiles… Sans compter les retraités ou les chômeurs qui veulent aussi en découdre avec le gouvernement. Même les salariés d'Euronext, l'opérateur de la Bourse de Paris, sont appelés à cesser le travail, comme les salariés des remontées mécaniques dans les stations de sport d'hiver ou les pilotes d'hélicoptère, c'est dire !

Nicolas Sarkozy a eu beau faire samedi devant l'UMP les yeux doux aux «travailleurs», abandonnés, selon lui, par le Parti socialiste, et son nouveau général en chef, Xavier Bertrand, insister sur le côté «populaire» du parti présidentiel, la mobilisation sera massive.

«Des mesures urgentes»

Brice Hortefeux, le nouveau ministre du Travail, ne pouvait rêver pire baptême du feu pour célébrer son intronisation comme chef des relations sociales. Sa promesse, la semaine dernière, d'apporter les «ajustements utiles» au service minimum dans les transports a été interprétée par les syndicats comme une nouvelle atteinte au droit de grève et a ajouté à la tension ambiante.

Préparée et annoncée de longue date, cette journée de mobilisation vise à faire plier le gouvernement, accusé par les huit centrales syndicales à l'origine de cette mobilisation, de ne pas faire assez actuellement pour les Français. «Alors qu'ils n'en sont en rien responsables, les salariés, demandeurs d'emploi et retraités sont les premières victimes de cette crise», ont ainsi justifié début janvier, dans une déclaration commune, la CFDT, la CGT, la CFE-CGC, FO, la CFTC alliées de circonstance de la FSU, des Solidaires (SUD) et de l'Unsa. Et les «huit» de réclamer des «mesures urgentes » pour surmonter la crise : conditionner les aides publiques à des « contreparties en matière d'emploi», lier les allégements de cotisations sociales «à la conclusion d'accords salariaux», renoncer aux 30 000 suppressions de postes dans la fonction publique, relancer la consommation «en ciblant les revenus les plus modestes».

Cerise sur le gâteau, les syndicats demandent au gouvernement de «mettre un terme à la spéculation, aux paradis fiscaux, à l'opacité du système financier international et encadrer les mouvements de capitaux.»

Les syndicats ont aussi à cœur de donner «une leçon» à Nicolas Sarkozy qui avait ironisé, il y a un an, que plus personne en France ne se rendait compte quand il y avait une grève. Cette mobilisation ne sera d'ailleurs pas unique. Ses organisateurs ont prévu de se retrouver le 2 février pour décider de la suite à lui donner.

» L'appel unitaire à la grève des syndicats désunis

» La SNCF en campagne contre les grèves surprises

Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis

ECONOMIC VIEW

Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis

Published: January 24, 2009

WHAT’S a nice economy like ours doing in a place like this? As the country descends into what is likely to be its worst postwar recession, Americans are distressed, bewildered and asking serious questions: Didn’t we learn how to avoid such catastrophes decades ago? Has American-style capitalism failed us so badly that it needs a radical overhaul?

David G. Klein

The answers, I believe, are yes and no. Our capitalist system did not condemn us to this fate. Instead, it was largely a series of avoidable — yes, avoidable — human errors. Recognizing and understanding these errors will help us fix the system so that it doesn’t malfunction so badly again. And we can do so without ending capitalism as we know it.

My list of errors has six whoppers, in chronologically order. I omit mistakes that became clear only in hindsight, limiting myself to those where prominent voices advocated a different course at the time. Had these six choices been different, I believe the inevitable bursting of the housing bubble would have caused far less harm.

WILD DERIVATIVES In 1998, when Brooksley E. Born, then chairwoman of theCommodity Futures Trading Commission, sought to extend its regulatory reach into the derivatives world, top officials of the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission squelched the idea. While her specific plan may not have been ideal, does anyone doubt that the financial turmoil would have been less severe if derivatives trading had acquired a zookeeper a decade ago?

SKY-HIGH LEVERAGE The second error came in 2004, when the S.E.C. let securities firms raise their leverage sharply. Before then, leverage of 12 to 1 was typical; afterward, it shot up to more like 33 to 1. What were the S.E.C. and the heads of the firms thinking? Remember, under 33-to-1 leverage, a mere 3 percent decline in asset values wipes out a company. Had leverage stayed at 12 to 1, these firms wouldn’t have grown as big or been as fragile.

A SUBPRIME SURGE The next error came in stages, from 2004 to 2007, as subprime lending grew from a small corner of the mortgage market into a large, dangerous one. Lending standards fell disgracefully, and dubious transactions became common.

Why wasn’t this insanity stopped? There are two answers, and each holds a lesson. One is that bank regulators were asleep at the switch. Entranced by laissez faire-y tales, they ignored warnings from those like Edward M. Gramlich, then a Fed governor, who saw the problem brewing years before the fall.

The other answer is that many of the worst subprime mortgages originated outside the banking system, beyond the reach of any federal regulator. That regulatory hole needs to be plugged.

FIDDLING ON FORECLOSURES The government’s continuing failure to do anything large and serious to limit foreclosures is tragic. The broad contours of the foreclosure tsunami were clear more than a year ago — and people like RepresentativeBarney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Sheila C. Bair, chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, were sounding alarms.

Yet the Treasury and Congress fiddled while homes burned. Why? Free-market ideology, denial and an unwillingness to commit taxpayer funds all played roles. Sadly, the problem should now be much smaller than it is.

LETTING LEHMAN GO The next whopper came in September, when Lehman Brothers, unlike Bear Stearns before it, was allowed to fail. Perhaps it was a case of misjudgment by officials who deemed Lehman neither too big nor too entangled — with other financial institutions — to fail. Or perhaps they wanted to make an offering to the moral-hazard gods. Regardless, everything fell apart after Lehman.

People in the market often say they can make money under any set of rules, as long as they know what they are. Coming just six months after Bear’s rescue, the Lehman decision tossed the presumed rule book out the window. If Bear was too big to fail, how could Lehman, at twice its size, not be? If Bear was too entangled to fail, why was Lehman not?

After Lehman went over the cliff, no financial institution seemed safe. So lending froze, and the economy sank like a stone. It was a colossal error, and many people said so at the time.

TARP’S DETOUR The final major error is mismanagement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the $700 billion bailout fund. As I wrote here last month, decisions of Henry M. Paulson Jr., the former Treasury secretary, about using the TARP’s first $350 billion were an inconsistent mess. Instead of pursuing the TARP’s intended purposes, he used most of the funds to inject capital into banks — which he did poorly.

To illustrate what might have been, consider Fed programs to buy commercial paper and mortgage-backed securities. These facilities do roughly what TARP was supposed to do: buy troubled assets. And they have breathed some life into those moribund markets. The lesson for the new Treasury secretary is clear: use TARP money to buy troubled assets and to mitigate foreclosures.

Six fateful decisions — all made the wrong way. Imagine what the world would be like now if the housing bubble burst but those six things were different: if derivatives were traded on organized exchanges, if leverage were far lower, if subprime lending were smaller and done responsibly, if strong actions to limit foreclosures were taken right away, if Lehman were not allowed to fail, and if the TARP funds were used as directed.

All of this was possible. And if history had gone that way, I believe that the financial world and the economy would look far less grim than they do today.

For this litany of errors, many people in authority owe millions of Americans an apology.Richard A. Clarke, former national security adviser, set a good example when he told the commission investigating the 9/11 attacks that he wanted victims’ families “to know why we failed and what I think we need to do to ensure that nothing like that ever happens again.” I’m waiting for similar words from our financial leaders, both public and private.

Alan S. Blinder is a professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton and former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve. He has advised many Democratic politicians.

NACIONALIZACION BANCA:USA

NEWS ANALYSIS

Nationalization Gets a New, Serious Look

Published: January 25, 2009

WASHINGTON — Only five days into the Obama presidency, members of the new administration and Democratic leaders in Congress are already dancing around one of the most politically delicate questions about the financial bailout: Is the president prepared to nationalize a huge swath of the nation’s banking system?Right now, many banks are reluctant to write off their bad debts, and absorb huge losses, unless they can first raise enough capital to cushion the blow. But they cannot attract that capital without first purging their balance sheets of the toxic assets. Japan’s experience proved the dangers of that downward swirl; the economy stagnated, new lending ground to a halt and the country’s diplomatic clout shrank with its balance sheets.

Related

Rescue of Banks Hints at Nationalization (January 16, 2009)

At Davos, Crisis Culls the Guest List (January 26, 2009)

Room for Debate: Nationalizing the Bank Problem (January 22, 2009)

Times Topics: Credit Crisis -- The Essentials | Economic Stimulus | Nationalization of Banks

 Back Story With The Times’s David E. Sanger

Nationalization could pull the banks out of that dive, at least temporarily, as the government injected capital, hired new managers and ordered a restart to lending. But some Republicans who bit their tongues when President George W. Bushordered huge interventions in the market would charge that Mr. Obama was steering America toward socialism.

Nationalization, said Charles Geisst, a financial historian atManhattan College “is just not a term in the American vocabulary.”

“We think of it,” he continued, “as something foreigners do to us, not something we do.”

It is also something foreigners do to themselves: the British have recently taken a majority stake in the Royal Bank of Scotland.

Some of Mr. Obama’s advisers have asked who the government would get to run the banks. Many of the most experienced executives are tainted by the decisions they made during the age of excess. And how would the government attract the best talent if it demanded that they take minimal pay — a political reality in the current environment?

Another option is for the government to buy the banks’ most toxic assets either through a giant fund, or, more likely, a federally supported bad bank designed to buy up troubled investments. But in that case, taxpayers might well be the losers: They would have all of the banks’ worst assets and none of their performing loans. And unless a deal is worked out to take a larger share of the banks whose bad loans are shuffled off to the government, the taxpayers would not have the chance to benefit by selling the shares back to private investors.

Moreover, cleaning up the banks’ bad assets, without extracting a heavy price for the bank managers, shareholders and their lenders, is exactly what Mr. Summers and Mr. Geithner warned against during the Asian financial crisis.

“We told the Asians that they had to be willing to let banks and companies fail,” said Jeffrey Garten, a professor at the Yale School of Management and a top official in the Clinton administration. “We warned that there was great moral hazard if governments just bailed them out.”

“And now,” he said, “we are doing the polar opposite of our advice.”

Mark Wilson/Getty Images

Speaker Nancy Pelosi has alluded to internal debate over whether large banks should be nationalized, while aides to President Obama have avoided the word and are looking into alternatives.

Related

Rescue of Banks Hints at Nationalization (January 16, 2009)

At Davos, Crisis Culls the Guest List (January 26, 2009)

Room for Debate: Nationalizing the Bank Problem (January 22, 2009)

Times Topics: Credit Crisis -- The Essentials | Economic Stimulus | Nationalization of Banks

 Back Story With The Times’s David E. Sanger

Privately, most members of the Obama economic team concede that the rapid deterioration of the country’s biggest banks, notably Bank of America and Citigroup, is bound to require far larger investments of taxpayer money, atop the more than $300 billion of taxpayer money already poured into those two financial institutions and hundreds of others.

But if hundreds of billions of dollars of new investment is needed to shore up those banks, and perhaps their competitors, what do taxpayers get in return? And how do the risks escalate as government’s role expands from a few bailouts to control over a vast portion of the financial sector of the world’s largest economy?

The Obama administration is making only glancing references to those questions. In an interview Sunday on “This Week” on ABC, the House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, alluded to internal debate when she was asked whether nationalization, or partial nationalization, of the largest banks was a good idea.

“Well, whatever you want to call it,” said Ms. Pelosi, Democrat of California. “If we are strengthening them, then the American people should get some of the upside of that strengthening. Some people call that nationalization.

“I’m not talking about total ownership,” she quickly cautioned — stopping herself by posing a question: “Would we have ever thought we would see the day when we’d be using that terminology? ‘Nationalization of the banks?’ ”

So far, President Obama’s top aides have steered clear of the word entirely, and they are still actively discussing other alternatives, including creating a “bad bank” that would nationalize the worst nonperforming loans by taking them off the hands of financial institutions without actually taking ownership of the banks. Others talk of de facto nationalization, in which the government owns a sizeable chunk of the banks but not a majority, with all that connotes.

That has already happened; taxpayers are now the biggest shareholders in Bank of America, with about 6 percent of the stock, and in Citigroup, with 7.8 percent. But the government’s influence is far larger than those numbers suggest, because it has guaranteed to absorb the losses of some of the two banks’ most toxic assets, a figure that could run into the hundreds of billions of dollars.

Many believe this form of hybrid ownership — part government, part private, with the responsibilities of ownership unclear — will not prove workable.

“The case for full nationalization is far stronger now than it was a few months ago,” said Adam S. Posen, the deputy director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “If you don’t own the majority, you don’t get to fire the management, to wipe out the shareholders, to declare that you are just going to take the losses and start over. It’s the mistake the Japanese made in the ’90s.”

“I would guess that sometime in the next few weeks, President Obama and Tim Geithner,” he said, referring to the nominee for Treasury secretary, “will have to come out and say, ‘It’s much worse than we thought,’ and just bite the bullet.”

So far the Obama administration has signaled that it is trying to avoid that day, and members of its economic team — among them Mr. Geithner and the president’s top economic adviser, Lawrence H. Summers — made the case during the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s that governments make lousy bank managers.

Indeed, the risks of nationalization they warned about then apply equally to the United States now. The first is that nationalization can prove contagious. If the Obama administration took over Bank of America and Citigroup, two of the largest banks in the United States, private investors could decide to flee from the likes of JPMorgan Chase andWells Fargo, or other major banks, fearing they could be next.

Moreover, Mr. Obama’s advisers say they are acutely aware that if the government is perceived as running the banks, the administration would come under enormous political pressure to halt foreclosures or lend money to ailing projects in cities or states with powerful constituencies, which could imperil the effort to steer the banks away from the cliff.

“The nightmare scenarios are endless,” one of the administration’s senior officials said.

The argument in favor of nationalization, even a brief nationalization of a few months or years, is straightforward: It might be the only way to pull America’s largest financial institutions out of the downward spiral that makes it enormously difficult to raise the capital they need to keep operating.



Nationalization Gets a New, Serious Look


(Page 2 of 2)

Right now, many banks are reluctant to write off their bad debts, and absorb huge losses, unless they can first raise enough capital to cushion the blow. But they cannot attract that capital without first purging their balance sheets of the toxic assets. Japan’s experience proved the dangers of that downward swirl; the economy stagnated, new lending ground to a halt and the country’s diplomatic clout shrank with its balance sheets.

Related

Rescue of Banks Hints at Nationalization (January 16, 2009)

At Davos, Crisis Culls the Guest List (January 26, 2009)

Room for Debate: Nationalizing the Bank Problem (January 22, 2009)

Times Topics: Credit Crisis -- The Essentials | Economic Stimulus | Nationalization of Banks

 Back Story With The Times’s David E. Sanger

Nationalization could pull the banks out of that dive, at least temporarily, as the government injected capital, hired new managers and ordered a restart to lending. But some Republicans who bit their tongues when President George W. Bushordered huge interventions in the market would charge that Mr. Obama was steering America toward socialism.

Nationalization, said Charles Geisst, a financial historian atManhattan College “is just not a term in the American vocabulary.”

“We think of it,” he continued, “as something foreigners do to us, not something we do.”

It is also something foreigners do to themselves: the British have recently taken a majority stake in the Royal Bank of Scotland.

Some of Mr. Obama’s advisers have asked who the government would get to run the banks. Many of the most experienced executives are tainted by the decisions they made during the age of excess. And how would the government attract the best talent if it demanded that they take minimal pay — a political reality in the current environment?

Another option is for the government to buy the banks’ most toxic assets either through a giant fund, or, more likely, a federally supported bad bank designed to buy up troubled investments. But in that case, taxpayers might well be the losers: They would have all of the banks’ worst assets and none of their performing loans. And unless a deal is worked out to take a larger share of the banks whose bad loans are shuffled off to the government, the taxpayers would not have the chance to benefit by selling the shares back to private investors.

Moreover, cleaning up the banks’ bad assets, without extracting a heavy price for the bank managers, shareholders and their lenders, is exactly what Mr. Summers and Mr. Geithner warned against during the Asian financial crisis.

“We told the Asians that they had to be willing to let banks and companies fail,” said Jeffrey Garten, a professor at the Yale School of Management and a top official in the Clinton administration. “We warned that there was great moral hazard if governments just bailed them out.”

“And now,” he said, “we are doing the polar opposite of our advice.”

ENTREVISTAS TV CRISIS GLOBAL

NR.: Director, no presidente ---------------------------------------------- Bruno Seminario 1 ------------------------- Bruno Seminario 2 -------------------- FELIX JIMENEZ 1 FELIZ JIMENEZ 2 FELIX JIMENEZ 3, 28 MAYO OSCAR DANCOURT,ex presidente BCR ------------------- Waldo Mendoza, Decano PUCP economia ---------------------- Ingeniero Rafael Vasquez, parlamentario 24 set recordando la crisis, ver entrevista en diario

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