PERU: Un contralor que nace muerto,OTRA MIRADA

		Editorial N°10, 15/05/2009
		Un contralor que nace muerto
		El nombramiento al caballazo de Fuad Khoury como Contralor General de la República por el Congreso no soluciona sino que agrava la situación de descabezamiento de una institución fundamental para la democracia peruana. Que apristas, fujimoristas y Unidad Nacional se hayan negado no sólo a nombrar una Comisión Evaluadora para ver la candidatura, sino, peor aún, siquiera a invitar al señor Khoury a la Comisión Permanente del Congreso para interrogarlo, revela la voluntad de esta mayoría parlamentaria de renunciar a su papel fiscalizador en el tema y allanarse a los deseos del Poder Ejecutivo. La derecha y los medios que controla, manejados desde Palacio, han soltado la especie en las últimas semanas que “un grupo de congresistas incapaces” bloqueaban por gusto la designación de un nuevo Contralor poniendo requisitos sin sentido. Este trabajo mediático previo es el que ha abierto camino a la imposición de la mayoría señalada, violando los procedimientos que se habían seguido en ocasiones anteriores. Se evita así debatir el problema de fondo que es la negativa del Presidente de la República a cumplir su promesa electoral de que el Contralor debiera nombrarlo la oposición. Pero, como a los principales grupos de oposición el Presidente los califica de “anti sistema”, insiste en desconocerlos y continuamente busca invisibilizarlos, se ha olvidado de su promesa. Peor aún, dejada de lado la promesa electoral se ha negado también a buscar el consenso, pidiéndoles opinión solo a los grupos de derecha e ignorando a los demás. Por ello, el celo de los congresistas no oficialistas en la evaluación de los candidatos presentados por el gobierno. Las consecuencias de esta acción gubernamental son enormes. Antes que nada, le quitan legitimidad al nuevo Contralor. El Señor Fuad Khoury al ostentar un nombramiento políticamente viciado en su origen, carece de la autoridad para ejercer como Contralor General de la República. Es más, la falta de legitimidad lo hace un vasallo de Alan García y su círculo de íntimos, dependiendo su vida en el cargo de la voluntad de los mismos. Así ¿quién le va a creer lo que diga o haga? Nadie que no esté comprometido con el poder de turno. Ah, ¿y la Contraloría? Bien gracias.

PERU: Exportaciones a China, - 17% en el primer trimestre

Exportaciones a China registraron una caída del 17% en el primer trimestre

15:44 | Los envíos ascendieron a US$754 millones. Los minerales y harina de pescado fueron los principales productos exportados

La crisis económica sigue afectando a la economía peruana, los envíos a uno de los principales mercados, el chino, sufrieron una contracción del 17%, reportó la Asociación de Exportadores (Ádex).

El país asiático ocupó el tercer lugar del ránking de países de destino durante el primer trimestre del año con US$ 754’000.000, por debajo de Suiza US$ 942’000.000 y Estados Unidos con US$ 905, según el sistema de Inteligencia Comercial Adex Data Trade.

Precisaron que los envíos tradicionales ascendieron a US$ 715’000.000 (95% del total), mientras que las no tradicionales (con valor agregado) US$ 39’440.000.

En el caso de los tradicionales, los productos con mayor acogida fueron los minerales y la harina de pescado.

Pese a la a la negativa situación, el politólogo estadounidense y reconocido promotor de la economía china, Pan Wei, afirmó que el TLC que Perú firmó con ese país ayudará a revertir la situación.

Pan Wei participará el jueves de un seminario organizado por Ádex para entender y aprovechar los beneficios que tendrá nuestro país con la firma del tratado.

PÈRU: EX JEFE INEI, SOBREDIMENSIONAN PBI en 2 pps

En la siguiente entrevista Farid Matuk advierte que el INEI viene sobredimensionando en 2 puntos las cifras de crecimiento y bajando las cifras de pobreza desde el 2008 para favorecer al gobierno. Califica de mentiroso a Renán Quispe e indica que la estimación mensual del PBI es una farsa inventada en el primer gobierno del presidente Alan García, con la finalidad de exhibir sus presuntos éxitos.

Un sondeo de la agencia Reuters prevé un crecimiento de 2.3% para marzo y el MEF estima 3.9% para el mismo periodo. ¿Cuánto considera usted sería el PBI para marzo?

En realidad no veo un mayor crecimiento para marzo. Es que el crecimiento viene siendo manipulado o sobreestimado por parte del gobierno, alrededor de 2 puntos, desde el 2008.

¿Cómo se dio esta manipulación de las cifras?
Mediante el cambio de metodología, de la acertada fórmula económica a la actual encuesta. La manipulación se dio gradualmente o de a pocos hasta el 2007. Pero desde el 2008 a la fecha la sobreestimación de la cifras fue pareja en 2 puntos. El sobredimensionarlas les tomó año y medio al gobierno, ya que no podían hacer el maquillaje de manera tan escandalosa. Entonces desde el 2008 a todas las cifras presentadas por el INEI tenemos que restarle 2 puntos y así obtendremos el verdadero resultado.

¿Cómo hacía antes el INEI su estadística?
La diferencia central es que antes el INEI publicaba las hojas de cálculo que permitían a cualquier persona verificar la veracidad de los resultados. Entonces cuando en el 2006 se retira la metodología de la Web, advertí mediante una columna en un diario local que se venía algo torcido por parte del gobierno. Y el tiempo me dio la razón.

¿Qué permitía las hojas de cálculo?
Permitía una transparencia de la información. Antes las estimaciones que hacían el INEI ya sea del sector transporte y comercio se obtenían mediante cálculos matemáticos realizados en una hoja de Excel, ahora estas estimaciones vienen de una encuesta secreta que nadie las ha visto.

Justamente Quispe calificó esa metodología matemática como obsoleta, bajo ese argumento cambió la metodología a la encuesta.
Entonces por qué se mordió la lengua tres años. Si fuera verdad que la metodología es obsoleta y se dio cuenta el 2006, porque no lo dijo en ese entonces que la metodología es errónea, porque se quedó callado… porque es una mentira. Es así que cuando lo descubren en falta, inventan una cuarta para ocultar la manipulación de las cifras.

Pero Renán Quispe reconoció el cambio de la metodología del INEI
Si, pero tres años después de haberse realizado y debido a la presión de la opinión pública. Como dice el refrán en la boca del mentiroso lo cierto se hace dudoso, ya que él (Renán Quispe) podría haber dicho que el cambio de la fórmula matemática a la actual y secreta encuesta es para mejorar el estudio del INEI, pero no lo dijo.

¿A qué se debe esta poca transparencia en la información por parte del INEI?
El INEI viene manipulando las cifras con la finalidad de crear un falso crecimiento o un falso éxito del gobierno. Lo que tenemos ahora es que el INEI está alterando las cifras de crecimiento económico y de reducción de pobreza, con la finalidad de que luzcan como éxitos resultados de crecimiento económico que son iguales a los de los anteriores gobiernos de Toledo y Fujimori. Por lo tanto, no existe tal logro por parte del gobierno de turno, los índices de crecimiento y pobreza son similares a los de la década de los 80 años. Los valores presentados por el INEI son desproporcionados o incoherentes con la realidad.

Entonces ahora los peruanos tenemos un INEI parcializado
Así es, tenemos una oficina de estadística poco transparente que se ha convertido en un organismo de propaganda de los supuestos éxitos del gobierno y eso es una falla institucional. Lamentablemente el Instituto ha confundido sus funciones y cree que sólo tiene que dar buenas noticias, cuando debe entender que si hay inflación es problema del Banco Central, si hay desempleo es problema del Ministerio de Trabajo, si la economía no crece es problema del Ministerio de Economía. Si la información es perjudicial o beneficiosa, eso no es problema del INEI.

¿Usted cuestiona la medición mensual que hace el INEI del PBI?
Sí, porque es una farsa, una fantasía inventada por el primer gobierno del presidente García para su vanagloria. Sólo Canadá y Finlandia, dos de las naciones más desarrolladas pueden medir mensualmente el PBI. Ni EE.UU. y los países de Europa lo pueden hacer debido a su complejidad, a sus altos costos e inversión.

Entonces la supuesta medición del PBI mensual ¿qué es?
No es nada. Lo que nos muestra mensualmente el INEI no es nada, el PBI mensual es un baño de florecimiento o una lectura de cartas.

¿Qué realmente mide mensualmente el INEI?
La supuesta medición mensual del PBI no es más que la medición física de un 30% de la economía. Es decir, la producción total, cuántas toneladas o unidades físicas de cobre, harina de pescado, entre otros, ha vendido. Pero estas unidades físicas no me permiten determinar el valor agregado del producto o el PBI. Una cosa es producción física, cantidad de diarios vendidos y otro el valor agregado o la utilidad neta. El primero es fácil de conseguir, el segundo es complejo de informar. Es diferente preguntarle al dueño de una empresa por la cantidad de productos que vendió mensualmente y otra pedirle ¿cuanto ganó?, ahí demoraría en brindarte la información ya que tendría que descontar todos sus gastos, como costos operativos, pago a la municipalidad y el sueldo de los trabajadores de la empresa.

¿Que podría entregar el INEI?
Lo mismo que hace la oficina estadística de Chile que mensualmente reporta la producción total basada en una fracción de la economía, que en el caso peruano sería el 30% (agricultura, pesca, minería, manufactura, luz y agua). Entonces el INEI coherentemente diría que la producción física mensual se incrementó en 5,10 o 20 puntos.

Wilder Mayo Méndez
Redacción

PERU:-7.2 % MARZO 09/08 SEGUN INEI

La economía peruana creció 3,05% en marzo, informó el INEI

11:30 | La cifra muestra una considerable recuperación luego de que en febrero el avance fue de tan solo 0,19%. Ya son 93 los meses de incremento consecutivo de la actividad productiva en el país.

(Reuters).- La economía peruana se recuperó y creció un 3,05% en marzo, cifra mayor al dato esperado por analistas, debido principalmente al empuje de los sectores de construcción y agropecuario, informó el Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI).

La variación del Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) de marzo fue mejor al dato de febrero, cuando avanzó solo 0,19%, la tasa mensual más baja desde junio del 2001.

Sin embargo, el crecimiento económico del tercer mes del año fue menor al 7,2% de marzo del 2008.

El INEI dijo además que, para el primer trimestre del 2009, la economía nacional creció un 2,02%, frente al 10,3% de la expansión registrada en el primer trimestre del año pasado.

El dato del período enero-marzo fue el más bajo desde el tercer trimestre del 2001, según el Banco Central de Reserva (BCR).

En un sondeo de Reuters, analistas habían estimado un crecimiento económico del 2,3% para marzo, y del 1,8% para el primer trimestre del año.

El jefe del INEI, Renán Quispe, dijo que la variación del PIB anualizado a marzo, fue de 7,81%.

Los sectores de mayor crecimiento en el mes fueron el agropecuario y el de construcción, con un avance de 7,27% y 6,3%, respectivamente.

Pero el sector de manufactura, el que más empleo genera en el país, cayó en marzo un 5,4%.

El Gobierno peruano tiene como meta crecer entre 3 y 4% en el 2009, frente al avance de 9,84% del 2008, la tasa de expansión más alta en 14 años.

The undocumented and business survival in the United States

Es una estimada compatriota, saludos,

April 30, 2009

By Myriam Quispe-Agnoli,

The undocumented and business survival in the United States

Based on the severe economic contraction during the past six months, it is obvious why the topic of the economy receives so much attention as the economy directly weighs on the lives of citizens and businesses here and throughout the world. But the weight of the economy can have indirect effects as well, including potentially shifting attention from other policy issues.

For instance, a recent Bloomberg News article describes how economic troubles may affect potential immigration reform legislation.

"The long campaign to overhaul U.S. immigration laws may be derailed for yet another year—this time by the deteriorating economy."

The immigration debate is multifaceted, complex, and, at times, contentious. There are myriad issues to consider when entering into the immigration reform discussion, many of which are best left to the political process to decide. But, as the Bloomberg article describes, there is an important economic component to the immigration discussion. Economists can make a modest contribution to the debate by supplying unbiased research that touches on various aspects of the immigration question.

In that spirit, I offer up the results of research I've done with my colleagues, Julie Hotchkiss of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and David Brown of Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh. Our research looks into the potential impact of undocumented workers on firm survival and is based on confidential information from the state of Georgia, which between 2000 and 2008 experienced the fastest growth in the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States, according to the Department of Homeland Security.

In this research, we find that firms employing undocumented workers enjoy a competitive advantage over firms that do not employ undocumented workers. We also observe that firms engage in herding behavior, i.e., firms will employ undocumented workers if their competitors do. The herding behavior is a natural consequence of competitive pressure: Rival firms' undocumented workforce lowers a firms' survival probability, while a firm's own undocumented workforce strongly enhances that firm's survival prospects.

Our analysis suggests that cost savings enjoyed by firms employing undocumented workers is a result of paying these workers wages that are less than what is paid to comparable documented workers. Because the advantage of hiring undocumented workers is cost-related, herding behavior and competitive effects are weaker if firms have the option to shift labor-intensive production out of state or abroad.

Our findings have several implications relevant to the policy discussion. The most straightforward prediction would be that if immigration reform is successful in forcing firms to pay undocumented workers market wages, the competitive advantage of hiring these workers may disappear. As a consequence, the demand for undocumented workers might well dissipate.

In addition, reform efforts that reduced the supply of undocumented workers (e.g., through tougher border and worksite enforcement) would raise firms' production costs, which may have an impact on prices if firms pass through these additional costs to consumers. However, this last point is not a direct implication of our analysis.

One word of caution about this study: Our results are based on the payroll reports of employers. This study does not have information on the activities of undocumented workers that are not recorded on firms' official wage records.

There are, of course, many other aspects of immigration policy to be considered, and we are loath to characterize the results of our research as supporting any particular approach or conclusion. But we do hope it sheds some light on a debate that already has its fair share of heat.

By Myriam Quispe-Agnoli, research economist and assistant policy adviser at the Atlanta Fed

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Stocks still face deflationary collapse: Prechter

muy preocupante

Stocks still face deflationary collapse: Prechter
Thu May 14, 2009 6:09pm EDT


NEW YORK (Reuters) - Longtime technical analyst Robert Prechter, who forecast the 1987 stock market crash, predicted this week that U.S. equities may plunge to half their lows hit in March as a deflationary depression bites.

Oil and U.S. Treasury bonds are also locked in long term bear markets, while corporate bond prices will plunge precipitously by next year as broad economy, banking system and company earnings sustain more damage from a financial crisis that's akin to the Great Depression, he said.

The U.S. S&P 500 stock index's rebound by nearly 40 percent since it sagged to a 12-year closing low of 676 points on March 9 is not sustainable, Prechter said in an interview with Reuters.

"It's not the start of a new bull market," said Prechter, chief executive at research company Elliott Wave International in Gainesville, Georgia. "Our models are (showing) right now that it is a much bigger bear market than most people realize, something along the lines of 1929-1932," he told Reuters in a wide ranging interview. "It's a very rare event," he added.

"I think the next leg down will be at least as severe if not more severe than what we just experienced. So you want to stay on the side of safety," he said.

As in his 2002 book "Conquer the Crash," which warned of the dangers of a U.S. debt bubble and deflationary depression, Prechter continues to advocate safer cash proxies such as Treasury bills.

SEVEN MORE YEARS?

Riskier assets such as commodities, corporate bonds, and stocks which are currently anticipating that the severe global economic downturn may be bottoming, are likely to have short lived intense rallies, but within an inexorable long-term decline that may last another seven years, he said.

As banks continue to accumulate losses and corporate earnings fall, "the difficulties will probably last through about 2016," he said. "There will be plenty of rallies along the way."

Oil may rally further from current levels just below $60 per barrel but the upside will be capped at about $80 per barrel as the commodity is locked in a long-term bear market, he said.

In July, U.S. crude oil hit a record peak above $147 per barrel and was just above $57 per barrel around noon on Thursday.

"Deflation is coming, it's going to lead to a depression. We're not at the bottom yet," Prechter said. "I think we are going to have bouts of deflation separated by recoveries."

Prechter also painted a bleak picture for commodities like silver and is largely unenthusiastic about gold, believing the precious metal made a major peak when it rose above $1,000 last year.

While gold may have already topped at above $1,000 an ounce in March 2008, Treasury bond prices are likely to fall in a long term bear market, with huge government debt issuance being the main catalyst.

The benchmark U.S. 10-year Treasury note yield, which moves inversely to its price, hit a five-decade low of 2.04 percent in mid-December.

"People got very enamored with bonds and very enamored with gold and I don't like to be invested in markets that are over subscribed," Prechter said.

"The Treasury (Department) has taken on so much bad debt" at a time tax receipts are falling, that "there will be a slow, but very steady change in the way people will view the U.S. government," said Prechter. As a result, investors in Treasury notes and bonds will ultimately demand higher yields, he said.

The U.S. central bank will not be able to control the government bond market and prevent yields from rising, regardless of how much money the Fed uses to buy Treasuries, he added.

Next year, U.S. corporate bond prices will probably fall below their extreme price lows of December during the market panic of 2008 when investors fled riskier assets, he said.

"Corporates in terms of price have the big wave down coming. This has been a prequel," Prechter said.

"Many corporations who (now) say we can borrow more money and take more risks: those are the ones who will get in trouble," he said. "Many municipalities will default," he added.

(Reporting by John Parry, Haitham Haddadin and Ellis Mnyandu.)

Fwd: Macroperu The Doha Round at the back of the agenda

The Doha Round: A safety net in stormy weather

David Laborde Debucquet 14 May 2009

The current financial crisis has fostered a demand for protectionism and put the Doha Round at the back of the agenda. This column argues that a failed Doha Development Agenda would send the wrong signal in terms of global governance and could lead to an unravelling of the past 15 years of trade liberalisation.

The current financial crisis has fostered a demand for protectionism, and could lead to new trade barriers as occurred after the October 1929 crisis. A parallel can easily be drawn between the current situation and the one that existed then. In the early 1930s, unemployment was rising, a fear of deflation was prevailing, and a lack of public resources (especially in countries that paid war reparations) prevented governments from remedying the economic crisis. Moreover, today as in 1930, the context of decreasing prices can mechanically reinforce protection, as specific duties (which are numerous in agriculture) become more and more restrictive when world prices are down. In this type of economic context, protectionism is a tempting policy instrument for policymakers: it increases domestic prices and domestic activity in the short term, and it provides new government revenue. In addition, governments do not correctly anticipate world retaliation and counter retaliation, as was the case with the US in 1930 and also in 2007, when in the middle of the food crisis, governments implemented export bans and export restrictions in successive rounds of retaliation and counter retaliation. Therefore, a vicious circle of rising protectionism is always a possibility.

But there is one big difference between today's situation and that of 1930; WTO membership means that countries cannot raise tariffs above bound duties, and therefore, an increase in tariff protectionism such as between the two world wars is more implausible today. As Pascal Lamy, director-general of the WTO, stated in a speech in Sydney on March 2, 2009: "The Doha Round is the most effective way to further constrain protectionist pressures by reducing the gap between bound commitments and applied policies." The WTO is an international public good that acts as an insurance scheme against potential trade wars. And the insurance scheme would be even more effective if WTO members would conclude the Doha Round, making new commitments and reducing bound duties.

Because membership in the WTO acts as a deterrent to increased protectionism, the "cyclicity" of protectionism was much more pronounced before the WTO existed. For example, in the US the average tariff on dutiable imports was 50% in 1894, 40% in 1896, and 52.1% in 1899. The next cycle was even more severe; 49.8% in 1902, 16.4% in 1920, and 59.1% in 1932. Similar trends occurred in France (Messerlin 1985) and other European countries (Bairoch 1995; Irwin 1992). What explains this "cyclicity" of protectionism?

The main explanation is that it is linked to business cycles. During periods of sustained economic growth, unemployment is not a national concern and governments are prone to open borders to foreign competition—especially when trading partners are doing the same. During times of economic recession, the job market provides less opportunities, threats to existing jobs are badly perceived, and lobbying for protection increases.

What if Doha failed?

It is possible to evaluate how much trade destruction would occur if the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) were to fail. A recent study using the MIRAGE model of the world economy (Bouet and Labourde 2009) reveals a potential loss of $2,262 billion in volume of annual trade by 2025 (11.8%)—due not only to a failed DDA, but also to the fact that WTO members would increase protection levels to existing bound duties. The study indicates that the costs of rising protection would be almost five times greater than the gains realised from trade creation resulting from the DDA. This result is not surprising because of the asymmetric situation that currently exists; past liberalisation has kept tariffs low and has limited the margin of reduction. But at the same time, the binding overhang is still significant, especially for developing countries.¹ Even a limited increase in protection (such as eliminating the unilateral liberalisation that has taken place since the end of the Uruguay Round) would lead to a potential loss of $1,453 billion (7.6%).

A successfully concluded DDA would not only increase trade, but it would also reinforce binding commitments and reduce existing bound duties, which would make the trade environment more secure and decrease the costs associated with potential trade wars. The study concretised this idea by comparing the application of current bound duties with the application of new bound duties resulting from the DDA; a successful DDA would be worth $809 billion in terms of trade volume and $184 billion in terms of real income.

These conclusions are especially true for poor countries since most unilateral and unbound liberalisations have taken place in the developing world in recent years, and poor countries currently benefit from unilateral preferences granted by developed countries that may be cancelled should the DDA fail. If the real value of the DDA is measured by the insurance role that it plays, then two-thirds of the total global value of $184 billion in terms of real income (or $128 billion) would benefit developing countries. This explains why the DDA should be finally considered as a "Development" Round.

By focusing only on the limited gains of the DDA, many observers have neglected the potential cost of its failure; a failed DDA would send the wrong signal in terms of global governance, and in more pragmatic terms, it could lead to an unravelling of the past 15 years of trade liberalisation. In the current unstable environment, a concrete global agreement will be the proof needed by the private sector that governments can act upon the commitments they make in speeches.

References

Bairoch, P. 1995. Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bouet, A., and D. Labourde. 2009. Assessing the Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round. IFPRI Discussion Paper, Forthcoming, IFPRI.
Irwin, D.A. 1992. Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies in the World Trading System: an Historical Perspective. In New Dimension of Regional Integration, eds. de J. de Melo and A. Panagarya. Cambridge .Center for Economic Policy Research.
Messerlin P. 1985. Les Politiques Commerciales et leurs Effets en Longue Periode. In Le Protectionnisme, eds. B. Lassuderie-Duchene and J.-L. Reiffers. Paris: Economica.
US International Trade Commission, 2006,Value of US Imports for Consumption, Duties Collected and Ratio of Duties to Values, 1891 – 2005, Statistical services Division, March 2006.

Fwd: Macroperu Luis Carranza, Finance Minister of Peru and barefaced liar

saludos,g

It always happens eventually; the liar gets caught in his lie. Yesterday Peru's FinMin and nation's number two liar Luis Carranza (numero uno above) gave a presentation on the prospects for his country's economy. If anyone wants a copy of the powerpoint show (49 slides of fun with dense numbers, graphs with arrows pointing UP! UP! UP! and Spanish language) send me a mail, but suffice to say the whole idea must have been to blow smoke in the eyes of the dumbass nodding donkey journalists present. That's because anyone with a basic understanding of economics....and i mean basic really is enough...can see just how much BS was on display yesterday. For one thing, the full-on statistician Farid Matuk was quick to point out that MEF has quietly dropped something called GDP elasticity from 3 to 1. What this means in practical terms is that they are suddenly toeing the line of the Central Bank and assuming a currency devaluation to maintain growth at all costs (esp to the cost of those poor Limeños with mortgages in dollars). However a different statistic that I noted was that the breakdown of Carranza's fantasy 3.5% GDP growth this year assumes a 5% growth in mining GDP. Whaaaaaaaaaaaaat?????? We're supposed to believe that Peru's mining industry will contribute 5% more this year than it did last year...remember copper at $4/lb, Zinc and Lead at $1/lb and silver at $18/oz, people? Here's a chart using final metals exports as a proxy to total GDP activity in Peru's mining sector (as nearly all the metal produced in Peru is exported). We see the 2008 export figures for Peru, the first three months of 2009 and what Peru will need to export to get that 5% growth Carranza masturbates about. It's asinine. It's just a heap of barefaced lies. Nothing else. There's no way that monthly exports can suddenly jump from under $1.1bn to over $1.83Bn and stay at that average for the rest of the year. More likely is a $6bn gap between the cash Carranza wants and the cash he's going to get. And $6Bn in Peru is a significant chunk of annual GDP. There's only one question left to answer now: Will this man do the honourable thing and resign when his ridiculous economic projections are proven false by the end of this year?

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PERU:MEDICION DE PROMESAS ELECTORALES

http://www.rpp.com.pe/2009-05-14-las-promesas-electorales-no-se-pueden-verificar-segun-ex-presidente-del-inei-noticia_181384.html