This is not to denigrate Germans as bad Europeans, or accuse them – as some have, ridiculously – of attempting to recreate the Third Reich in modern form by pressing their own policies on others. A more reluctant nation of conquerors there has never been. Germany's unwillingness to accept joint responsibility for Europe's debts without corresponding fiscal harmonisation and common governance has nothing to do with wishing to subject the rest of Europe to servitude and mercantilist exploitation. Rather, it is about protecting its own taxpayers and sovereignty from southern profligacy.
The mistake that Berlin is making is to believe that, somehow or other, everyone else can be made as economically virtuous as itself: that Greeks can, via austerity, be transformed into Germans. Yet it doesn't take a degree in economics to figure out that if everyone is scrimping and saving, there won't be any demand in the economy. Not everyone can be a surplus nation, yet this logical impossibility is what German policy seems to be trying to create.
The natural remedy for the sort of trade and capital imbalances we have seen build up within Europe is currency adjustment. When a currency devalues, it both makes the goods and services of the deficit nation more competitive, and reduces the burden of external indebtedness.
But within a currency union, such adjustment becomes impossible. There is no mechanism for the sort of burden-sharing that must occur to put economic activity back on a sustainable footing. There are no market disciplines to ensure the corrective action that will improve competitiveness. All these things have to be centrally imposed, leading to erosion of fiscal and democratic sovereignty.
Most of these problems were foreseen when monetary union was established, but they were swept under the carpet. Everyone wanted to believe in Neverland. Throughout Europe, politicians were dishonest about what the union could and would deliver.
If Germany cannot be persuaded into bailing the other nations out, either by agreeing joint-liability "eurobonds" or through massive European Central Bank purchases of sovereign debt – quantitative easing – what options are left? We are way past the stage where expelling a few miscreants would cure the eurozone's crisis – so the obvious solution is for the single currency to reconstitute itself on an different basis. What's required is a wider separation of surplus and deficit nations, so that the natural corrective of currency adjustment can establish an appropriate carve-up of the debt overhang between creditors and debtors.
Almost any such solution is bound to be hugely disruptive. But, by common agreement, the approach most likely to produce an orderly rebalancing would be for Germany and its satellite economies to exit the single currency, leaving all the paraphernalia of the euro to the Mediterranean nations, newly liberated from the shackles of German discipline.
Unfortunately, the economically optimal tends to be politically unacceptable. For Germany to recreate the Deutsche mark and float against the euro would plunge the economy into recession overnight, as industry scrambled to cut costs to regain lost competitiveness. It would also require massive recapitalisation of the banking system, whose euro loans would be correspondingly impaired. This is, in a sense, what needs to happen, but don't expect Germany to accept it without a fight. A creditor will never lightly forgive his debtors.
Watching Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy at their press conference on Tuesday, it was clear that the two are still a million miles away from recognising the enormity of the choices their nations face – and that the crisis will need to escalate at least another couple of notches before they will even consider the solutions that are required. The idea that Europe might solve its problems simply by putting Herman Van Rompuy in charge of budgetary co-ordination and slapping a tax on financial transactions was little short of laughable.
The truth is that a project meant to tame Germany and integrate her into the heart of Europe has backfired spectacularly. Far from making economies converge, it has succeeded only in driving them ever further apart. From Britain's island haven, we can only look on in horror as Europe once again stares into the abyss. The combination of tight fiscal and loose monetary policy that our free-floating, sovereign currency has allowed means that, in relative terms at least, we ought to fare better than our neighbours. But when the storm breaks, it will be small consolation to have the sturdiest raft.