Resiliencia macroeconómica

Tomado de Macroeconomic Resilience The Great Divide between Academics and Practitioners with 2 comments In an excellent article, Mark Thoma highlights the great divide between academics and practitioners in economics. He also identifies the fundamental reason for this divide – practitioners typically rely on intuition and rough heuristics whereas academics rely on rigorous theoretical constructs. In Herbert Simon's terminology, practitioners are satisficers, not optimisers. In a recent post, I outlined my preferred framework to analyse monetary policy as an attempt to influence the real rate curve. Clearly, this viewpoint is not rigorous but for my purposes transforming this framework into a theoretically watertight construct is not worth the effort. The aim of the framework is simple to give me a quick and dirty but useful way to process information and market data. It is also almost certain that in some scenarios, this framework will break down – but instead of thinking about all such scenarios in advance, I simply trust that my experience and my gut instinct will warn me when such a scenario occurs. To most academics, the process I have outlined above would seem to be a distinctly unscientific and "irrational" method. But as I have argued before, heuristics and intuition are rational responses in an uncertain environment where time and resources are scarce. Herbert Simon and Gerd Gigerenzer have both done excellent work on the role of heuristics but the most relevant research on the role of intuition has been undertaken by Gary Klein and other researchers in the field of 'Naturalistic Decision Making' (NDM). NDM originated from Klein's work in analysing the decision-making of firefighters – as Klein explains in this recent interview, expert firefighters follow a process that is far removed from the conventional definition of rational choice. They "build up a repertoire of patterns so that they can immediately identify, classify, and categorize situations, and have a rapid impulse about what to do. Not just what to do, but they're framing the situation, and their frame is telling them what are the important cues. That's why they're always looking, or usually looking, in the right place. They know what to ignore, and what they have to watch carefully." There's nothing magical about this: "Intuition is about expertise and tacit knowledge. I'll contrast tacit knowledge with explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is knowledge of factual material. I can tell people facts, I can tell them over the phone, and they'll know things. I can say I was born in the Bronx, and now you know where I was born. That's an example of explicit knowledge, it's factual information. But there are other forms of knowledge. There's knowledge about routines. Routines you can think of as a set of steps. But there's also tacit knowledge, and expertise about when to start each step, and when it's finished, when you're done and ready to start the next one, and whether the steps are working or not. So even for routines, some expertise is needed. There are other aspects of tacit knowledge that are about intuition, like our ability to make perceptual discriminations, so as we get experience, we can see things that we couldn't see before…. Judgments based on intuition seem mysterious because intuition doesn't involve explicit knowledge. It doesn't involve declarative knowledge about facts. Therefore, we can't explicitly trace the origins of our intuitive judgments. They come from other parts of our knowing. They come from our tacit knowledge and so they feel magical. Intuitions sometimes feel like we have ESP, but it isn't magical, it's really a consequence of the experience we've built up." Larry Summers is correct in noting that the solution is not for practitioners to become academics. It is for more academics to rigorously analyse the intuitive and heuristic-based methods and explanations that practitioners use. The real gap is in the paucity of applied economists and the misguided view of applied work with data-crunching rather than practical knowledge. As Daniel Kahneman explains in his introduction to Gary Klein's interview: "In the US, the word "applied" tends to diminish anything academic it touches. Add the word to the name of any academic discipline, from mathematics and statistics to psychology, and you find lowered status.  The attitude changed briefly during World War II, when the best academic psychologists rolled up their sleeves to contribute to the war effort. I believe it was not an accident that the 15 years following the war were among the most productive in the history of the discipline.  Old methods were discarded, old methodological taboos were dropped, and common sense prevailed over stale theoretical disputes. However, the word "applied" did not retain its positive aura for very long. It is a pity. Gary Klein is a living example of how useful applied psychology can be when it is done well. Klein is first and mainly a keen observer. He looks at people who are good at their job as they exercise their skills, sometimes in life-and-death situations, and he reports what he sees in clear and eloquent prose.  When you read his descriptions of real experts at work, you feel that it is the job of theorists to accommodate what he has seen – instead of doing what we often do, which is to scan the "real world" (when we think of it at all) for illustrations of our theoretical notions." The divide that Mark Thoma identifies is not restricted to economics – in the age of 'Big Data', all academic disciplines are moving away from the sort of work that requires researchers to get their hands dirty. In an excellent post, Jennifer Jacquet explains how field ecologists like Robert Paine are a dying breed, being replaced by ecologists more at home on a computer than in the field. This is not a criticism of mathematical ecology, simply an assertion that the kind of insights that Bob Paine derived from spending "45 years knee-deep in kelp and invertebrates on Washington State's coast" are valuable and cannot be replicated by other means. This presumption that data and theory can substitute for experience on the ground is symptomatic of the broader problem of the downgrading of tacit and contextual knowledge highlighted by many other changes in academic economics, most notably the neglect of economic history and institutional detail. One of the most striking deficiencies in economic theory that was exposed during the crisis was the disconnect between monetary economics and the institutional reality of the new regime of shadow banking and derivatives. Hyman Minsky's theories are relevant not because of their theoretical elegance but because of their firm grounding in the institutional evolution of the post-war monetary and banking system, a topic that he researched in great detail. An example of how this balance between the theoretical and applied fields can be restored is provided by the collaborative work between Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein. Kahneman and Klein have spent their entire careers tackling the same field (the psychology of decision-making) with diametrically opposed approaches – Kahneman focuses on controlled lab experiments, comparisons of decision-making performance to an objective optimum, and a generally skeptical stance towards human cognition. Klein focuses on research in real-world organisations, analysis of actual performance through more subjective variables and a generally admiring stance on human cognition. Yet they were able to collaborate and find common ground, the results of which are summarised in a fascinating paper. Economics could do with more applied researchers like Gary Klein as well as more theoretical researchers like Daniel Kahneman who are open to applied practical insights. ++++++++++ A great divide holds back the relevance of economists Jul 26, 2011 08:45 EDT economics | forecasts By Mark Thoma The opinions expressed are his own. Reuters invited leading economists to reply to Mark Thoma's Op-Ed on the "great divide" in economics and will be publishing the responses. Here are responses from Ashwin Parameswaran, James Hamilton, Dean Baker, Lawrence Summers, and a recap of Paul Krugman's. How much confidence would you have in the medical profession if the teaching faculty in medical schools had very little experience actually treating patients, and very little connection to – even a lack of respect for – the practitioners in the field? Would your confidence be improved if medical research had little to do with the questions that are important to the doctors trying to serve patients? Unfortunately, that's a pretty good description of how economics has been practiced. The questions academic economists are trying to answer have little connection to the problems faced by business economists trying to help their firms make good, profitable decisions (and vice-versa). And though academics pay some attention to government policy, particularly Federal Reserve policy, addressing the problems faced by government economists trying to help policymakers make the best possible choices is not the main focus of this research. This division between academic, government, and business economists is driven by the fact that economic theory and econometrics can be used for two different things. One is learning about how the world works. These "how and why" questions are the focus of academic research. For example, academic economists try to understand why demand curves slope downward, how business-cycle fluctuations in GDP come about, and how prices are determined in market economies. The other use of theoretical and empirical economic models is forecasting, for example predicting where the economy is headed so that businesses can react accordingly, and predicting what might happen if various government policy proposals are implemented. These are the "what if" questions that economists in government and business are most interested in. What will happen to tax revenue if business taxes are cut? What will happen to the demand for my product if the Fed raises interest rates? What is the most likely course that the economy will take? Again, a comparison with the medical field is useful. Science can help us to learn about how the body works, and that certainly aids our efforts to battle disease. This is an important area of research, and we wouldn't want to cut it short. But knowing how the body works isn't enough, we also need the ability to diagnose current illnesses and to predict when someone is going to get sick. In addition, we need to have treatments available to fix the problems that we've identified. Periodic checkups, for example, allow us to predict who might get coronary disease, and then take action to avoid much bigger problems down the road. Academic economists have emphasized the "how it works" part of economics; in econometrics, for example,  the focus is on hypothesis testing to determine which model of the economy is best, rather than on forecasting the future of the economy. Academic economists do evaluate policy proposals theoretically and empirically, and they do provide forecasts of the economy. But forecasting in particular is not the main focus of their efforts, , and they've all but ignored – even looked down their noses upon – forecasters and practitioners in the government and business communities. They are often viewed as data grubbers who use old-fashioned models and techniques, and are thus unworthy of attention from high-minded academics. However, a few practitioners saw the housing bubble coming. Shouldn't academic economists try to learn from them? What did they see that the academics missed? In addition, if the practitioners in the field are unaware of or do not have the technical ability to use the best approaches to the problems they face – criticism from academic economists over how business economists used value-at-risk models prior to the recession comes to mind – whose fault is that? Shouldn't academics try to help the practitioners get over this hurdle instead of turning their backs on the problem, and then looking down at them when they don't use or misapply cutting edge techniques? The failure of academic economists to predict the crisis shows just how costly such insularity and arrogance can be. The patient (the economy) didn't need to have a heart attack (financial meltdown), because even though the signs were there, the academic community had little interest in learning how to read them, let alone in developing early warning and intervention strategies for bubbles and other problems. The Fed does some of this, of course, and the financial crisis has motivated some academic interest in developing early warning systems that would have helped us to identify and do something about stock, housing, and other bubbles before they inflated to dangerous levels. The medical profession would do much worse without connections between the practitioners in the field and the how-it-works types in the labs. The questions researchers ask, for example, are shaped by the needs of the practitioners trying to prevent and cure illness. What types of tests can doctors do in their offices and labs to quickly and reliably indicate the current health of a patient and to forecast future health problems? In economics, if reliable tests for bubbles had been available to business economists, that could have saved the economy from considerable losses. Economics has lost the connection between the practitioners and the academics. This may have something to do with the desire among economists to become more of a science – a heavy focus on theory and math is the result. But no matter the cause, if we want to do all that we can to avoid big economic problems, and if we want to use the feedback from those testing economic ideas on real world applications as a way of better understanding how the economy works, then we must reestablish these ties. PHOTO: A stethoscope rests on a container of hand sanitizer inside of the doctor's office of One Medical Group in New York March 17, 2010. REUTERS/Lucas Jackson

El lunes EEUU llega a su techo de endeudamiento

Entrará EEUU en default o a última hora el Congreso aumentará el límite de endeudamiento. Si no sucede los bonos del tesoro de EEUU subirán su prima de riesgo y podría colapsar el sistema financiero como en el 2008. Puede que sea el preludio de la devaluación del dolar que corrija la situación del déficit pero habrá que pensar en el reemplazo del dolar en el comercio mundial. Pero la pregunta es: ¿son los bonos del tesoro de EEUU papeles libres de riesgo como se consideran actualmente?

Tea Party Brinkmanship

What If the U. S. Looks Like Defaulting?

By MIKE WHITNEY
On Monday, the US government hit the statutory limit on the amount of money it can borrow, ($14.29 trillion) the so-called "debt ceiling". That means that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has started to implement an emergency plan to keep the government running and pay bondholders while the White House and Congress hammer out the details on a final budget deal. But Geithner's accounting maneuvers will only work for a short time. If a budget compromise isn't reached by early August, then "the borrowing authority of the United States will be exhausted" and the US will default.
Some Republican congressmen believe that a default will be "no big deal", and that bondholders and Social Security recipients will just get their checks a little later than usual. But these people really don't understand the way the system works or what is at stake. As The Economist's Greg Ip says,  "Treasury debt underpins a vast and complex web of financial relationships around the world which would all be thrown out of whack by even a technical default."  The mere suggestion that the US might delay payments to bondholders would roil markets and cause irreversible damage to the Treasuries market. That, in turn, would put the dollar into a nosedive and, perhaps, end its role as the world's reserve currency. Here's an excerpt from a post by economist Menzie Chinn who sums it up perfectly:

"....what would be key to causing a crash in the dollar's value would be a failure to raise the debt ceiling in a timely fashion. In almost any model I can think of, that would either cause a flight from US government debt, or -- even if we only go to the brink -- elevating the risk premium, and hence total interest payments, on US Treasury debt indefinitely. Thus, it's the height of irresponsibility to make unrealistic demands for deficit reduction based solely on spending cuts, thereby risking a crisis. ("What Would Really Bring about a Dollar Dive?, Econbrowser)

Nearly every other economist says the same thing. Congress is playing with dynamite.
What's obvious in the budget negotiations, is that the Republicans haven't the foggiest idea of how the financial markets work.  Of course, the Dems aren't much better, but at least they (occasionally) consider the advice of the experts . Not the Republicans. They seem to take great pride in their boneheadedness.  They think that threatening to blow up the economy is a sound strategy for forcing cuts to entitlement spending. They don't realize that their little game of chicken could backfire and change the perception that the US is a safe place for investors to park their money. In fact, the thought never seems to enter their mind.
Here's an excerpt from a letter by Geithner (to Senator Michael Bennet) warning of "catastrophic economic consequences" if the debt limit is not raised soon:

"The unique role of Treasuries securities in the global financial system means that the consequences of default would be particularly severe. Treasuries securities are a key holding on the balance sheets of virtually every major insurance company, bank, money market fund, and pension fund in the world. They are also widely used as collateral by financial institutions to meet their day-to-day cash-flow needs in the short-term financing market."

Geithner is explaining how the "shadow banking system" works and how it relies on "risk free" Triple A collateral. If the world's premier asset class--US Treasuries--suffers a downgrade because of default or falling public confidence, that would lead to widespread haircuts that would trigger another financial crisis.
Geithner again:

"A default on Treasury debt could lead to concerns about the solvency of the investment funds and financial institutions that hold Treasury securities in their portfolios, which could cause a run on money market mutual funds and the broader financial system--similar to what occurred in the wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. As the recent financial crisis demonstrated, a sudden and severe blow to confidence in the financial markets can spark a panic that threatens the health of our entire global economy and the jobs of millions of Americans."

Geithner is not exaggerating. This WILL happen. Why?  Because this is what happened in 2008 and, unfortunately, nothing has changed. If the US defaults, then the risk premium on US Treasuries will rise and their price will fall. That means that the trillions of dollars that have been exchanged for UST's in the repo market --where financial institutions exchange cash deposits for high-grade collateral--will be revalued causing massive losses for the holders of UST's. Those losses will ripple through the money markets and commercial paper markets knocking down the same financial dominoes they did when Lehman Brothers failed.  Bottom line: None of the Dodd-Frank reforms have increased financial market stability at all. The system is as vulnerable to meltdown as it was in September 2008.
Geithner again: 

"Treasuries securities enjoy their unique role in the global financial system precisely because they are viewed as a risk-free asset....A default would call into question the status of Treasuries securities as a cornerstone of the financial system, potentially squandering this unique role and the economic benefits that come with it."

This such an important point, it might help to use an analogy.
Let's say I need some cash to finance some other business operations I have going. So, I go down to the local pawn shop with my custom-built Jaguar, my original Vermeer oil painting, and my collection of Renaissance gold coins. The pawnbroker takes one look at my trove and says he can lend me $25,000 for a week, but I'll have to pay him $26,000 to get my stuff back. I say, "Okay", and borrow the money. This allows me to keep my other business operations running. Then, a week later, I return to the pawn shop and repay the money I borrowed.
Okay, so far?
So, next week I go back to the pawn shop and try to get the same deal. Only this time, the dealer has done a little research and discovered that my custom Jaguar is actually a late-model Yugo with a flashy paint job; my original Vermeer is actually a paint-by-numbers fake I picked up at a flea market, and my collection of Renaissance gold coins, is actually a scattering of slot-machine slugs with a pyrite finish. So the dealer gets all huffy and says he'll only lend me half of what he had before, ($12,500) But that's a big problem for me, because now I don't have the money to fund my other operations or pay my employees. So I have to dig into savings (bank capital), which makes it harder for me to lend money to anyone else.  As time goes on, I am forced to sell more of my personal belongings (assets) just to stay afloat.
This is precisely what happened to the banks during the financial crisis.  Financial firms that had been providing full-value for securitized bonds (my Jaguar) got worried that those bonds might contain toxic subprime loans (my Yugo). So they reduced the amount of money they would lend on the bonds.  These so-called "haircuts" set-off a slow-motion panic that lasted for over a year, draining nearly $4 trillion from the shadow banking system. The problem was compounded by the fact that no one knew which bundles held the worst mortgages or which banks had the biggest pile of bonds. So, interbank lending began to freeze, LIBOR skyrocketed, and the credit markets ground to a standstill. When Lehman Brothers defaulted on September 15, 2008, the downward spiral accelerated and the entire financial system crashed.
If the US defaults on its debt, Treasuries will be repriced, the country's biggest banks will discover they've got less capital than they thought, and the financial system will suffer another meltdown. Only this time, it will be much worse, because Treasuries will no longer be regarded as the premier risk-free financial asset upon which all other financial assets are measured. That means the US will have to pay higher rates to meet its obligations which will make it harder to dig out of recession.
Wall Street and Big Business understand the gravity of the situation which is why they've tried to discourage GOP brinkmanship. But--to their credit--congressional members of the Tea Party have shrugged off the arm twisting and stubbornly stood their ground. The idea is that eventually, Obama will see that they have him over a barrel and he'll cave in. Isn't that the way that power works?
There's a lesson here for political activists. The Tea Party has stumbled upon a perfectly-legal "asymmetrical" strategy for effecting change, that is, locate the vulnerabilities in the system and exploit those weaknesses to shape policy. There's no reason leftists couldn't play the same sort of game, provided they were  willing to get their hands dirty.
Mike Whitney lives in Washington state. He can be reached at fergiewhitney@msn.com

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ADIOS a CHINAMERICA ... PLAN QUINQUENAL

Tras 3 años de debacle del mundo occidental, esta, a pesar de los intentos de 'recuperar la economia' , no ha logrado un ápice de avance. Mas bien, con las medidas tomadas, favoreciendo al sector financiero y destrozando el sector productivo en USA-EUROPA-JAPON, se han incrementado los CONFLICTOS sociales, que tienden a multiplicarse y confrontan, ahora, a sus Estados, con mayor radicalidad cada dia. Ver lo que sucede en EEUU-España-Grecia-Irlanda-Portugal etc. China, sabemos, es el mayor importador mundial. Pero va variando sus paradigmas económicos y ello, influye en el accionar del conjunto de la dinámica económica mundial. Va  fomentando el crecimiento hacia adentro y el aumento del consumo interno, lo que llevará a disminuir las importaciones, a elevar el salario mínimo en sus diferentes regiones teniendo los inversores extranjeros que adaptarse a una situación de menores utilidades. Las luchas de masas en Medio Oriente, de marcado tinte antidictatorial (ante satrapías longevas y sanguinarias) mientras en Europa la juventud se subleva ante una clase política que lejos de gobernar pensando en el bien común, descarga la crisis en los hombros populares dejando un porvenir incierto, nos presentan algunos datos con los que se inaugura la segunda década del siglo XXI.    China: el XII plan quinquenal Adiós a "Chinamérica" Michaël Krätke y La Brèche Viento Sur Traduccion Faustino Eguberri   Stephen Roach, presidente de la Morgan Stanley Asia y profesor en Yale (Estados Unidos), confía al periódico madrileño El País del 8 de mayo de 2011:  'China no tiene otra opción (consumir más); especialmente en esta coyuntura poscrisis, sin demanda creciente proveniente de los Estados Unidos, de Europa y del Japón. Y el gobierno va en esa dirección: ha puesto en marcha un plan para desarrollar nuevos empleos, elevar los salarios y reducir la tasa de ahorro construyendo un embrión de red de seguridad social. Son las bases de una sociedad de consumo. Esto es absolutamente necesario.  Pero, a la vez, es un riesgo enorme. China es el principal ahorrador del mundo. Elevar el nivel de consumo (de los hogares que tienen un ahorro de precaución para hacer frente a los costes de la educación, la enfermedad, la vejez, etc) reducirá la tasa de ahorro y, con ella, el nivel de acumulación de las reservas en divisas, de la demanda en bonos del tesoro americano, de dólares estadounidenses. Ahí se encuentra el problema. Puede haber un choque si el principal ahorrador comienza a consumir, pero el principal consumidor no comienza a ahorrar. ¿Cómo se van a financiar los Estados Unidos?' El gobierno chino se fija, oficialmente, diversos objetivos.  El primero: aumentar la parte del consumo en el Producto Interior Bruto (PIB). Para esto, intenta actuar sobre los salarios, en particular impulsando al alza los salarios mínimos, que son bastante diferentes según las regiones. Los salarios mínimos deberían pasar (en dólares), por ejemplo, de 167 a 196 por mes en Shanghai entre 2010 y 2011; de 164 a 202 en la importante zona industrial de Shenzen. La subida en porcentaje es importante; el salario mínimo sigue siendo modesto, pero su subida tiene un impacto en toda la escala. La parte del consumo en el PIB no ha dejado de bajar de 2002 a 2010; un enderezamiento se muestra como una necesidad económica y política para las autoridades. Las inversiones, por el contrario, han aumentado; pero las exportaciones netas han sido frenadas desde 2009. Sin embargo, la parte en la inversión de las operaciones especulativas (en la construcción, entre otras, y en fábricas 'exigidas' por los poderes provinciales) no debe ser ignorada; lo que el gobierno intenta corregir.  Aumentar el consumo haría a la economía menos dependiente del comercio mundial, que tiene componentes regionales importantes. Sin embargo, la subida de los salarios mínimos va a poner en cuestión la 'competitividad' de los sectores industriales que utilizan una masa de trabajadores y trabajadoras de bajo salario; esto producirá pérdidas de empleo. ¿Cuál será la reacción de las trabajadoras y trabajadores de estos sectores? Y, ¿cuál será la reacción de los capitalistas que quieren mantener su margen de ganancia, incluso en los sectores claramente más de alta gama?  Esto en el momento en que el gobierno tiene como segundo y tercer objetivos declarados rebajar la inflación -que era oficialmente del 2,9% en el 2º trimestre de 2010 y de 5,1% en el 1º trimestre de 2011- y limitar la subida del paro? Los interrogantes se podrían multiplicar.  Pero una cosa está clara: un factor clave de la evolución reside en las reacciones de los asalariados y asalariadas y de los campesinos pobres durante esta fase en la que el cambio de paradigma económico está al orden del día y en la que el poder no deja de afirmar su "autoritarismo". Michael Krätke, en el artículo que publicamos a continuación, describe las nuevas orientaciones en marcha. Un tema que deberá ser seguido con más atención en esta página web. (Redacción de La Breche] Mientras los norteamericanos y los europeos se ven estrangulados por sus planes de austeridad, la exportación alemana deja caer su mirada sobre el Este: allí, en efecto, continúa prosperando una necesidad ciclópea.  Los países emergentes (China, Brasil e India) son los que han escapado más rápidamente a la crisis financiera mundial de 2008-2009, no sin arañazos a pesar de todo.  En el curso del año 2009, en China, el hundimiento de las exportaciones ha conllevado el de la producción, que ha caído cerca de un 21% y ha provocado el cierre de numerosas empresas; otras 670.000, aproximadamente, han sido arrastradas en este movimiento por un efecto cascada. Esto ha llevado a un paro masivo, en particular en las provincias costeras. Más de 11 millones de trabajadores emigrantes han perdido su empleo y la tasa de paro oficial alcanza el 9%. Nada que ver con medidas a medias Pero a pesar de todo, China habría podido salir en peor estado de la crisis, puesto que casi ningún banco ha tenido que cerrar. Cuando las turbulencias proseguían en los mercados financieros, el gobierno del primer ministro Wen Jiabao decidió reconfigurar Shanghai como centro financiero internacional y promover Hong Kong como centro financiero offshore para sus propias obligaciones de Estado.  En paralelo ha sido aprobado un paquete de ayudas fiscales de un montante de alrededor de 590.000 millones de dólares.  Las provincias no se han quedado atrás, puesto que a su vez han inyectado miles de millones de yuanes en sus ciclos económicos regionales respectivos para un valor, al cambio, de 13.000 millones de dólares.  No son medidas a medias: solo el relanzamiento coyuntural de Barack Obama puede, en dimensiones, ser comparado a esto. Con estos programas, serán financiadas una serie de medidas que sugieren una reorientación del modelo de exportación chino y teniendo por objetivo una transformación completa de la economía.  Este plan quinquenal, el duodécimo, cuyas lineas principales ya habían sido esbozadas el año pasado y que ha sido aprobado en marzo de 2011 en Pekin por la Asamblea Popular Nacional (parlamento) de China, es muy claro. El gobierno ha comprendido las lecciones de la crisis y quiere el cambio.  Saludado como "el primer plan quinquenal verde de toda la historia de China ", éste debería dejar tras él en 2015 un país más verde, más social, más igualitario, más urbano y más formado.  Los fetichistas del crecimiento no han logrado hacer que el Partido Comunista Chino eche el freno del crecimiento:  el crecimiento económico, ahora se encuentra por debajo de la media del período 2005-2010, en la que los objetivos de crecimiento eran ya más bajos que al comienzo del período llamado reformista. Un crecimiento ralentizado (sigue alrededor del 9% en 2011), una clara reducción del consumo de energía y de materias primas, salarios reales más elevados, un aumento del consumo privado, una expansión del sector de los servicios, un Estado social más generoso y mejor equipado: todo esto tiene consecuencias sobre la economía mundial. Lo que se propone aquí es nada menos que el adiós a una "Chinamérica ", la de la asombrosa interdependencia económica entre China y los Estados Unidos.  Los chinos quieren, en un futuro próximo, exportar mejores productos e incluso productos de alta calidad, y para ello apoyan masivamente la investigación tecnológica en las industrias clave y la importación de tecnología.  En última instancia, China va a disminuir el saldo positivo de la balanza comercial y a reducir la cantidad de deuda estadounidense en dólares que posee aún. Lo que plantea la cuestión de saber quien el futuro próximo refinanciará el déficit estatal estadounidense si los chinos prefieren invertir su dinero en materias primas y en empresas extranjeras, más que en bonos el tesoro americano. Inversión en la educación China quiere acelerar el cambio estructural apostando por las nuevas industrias estratégicas tales como las tecnologías de la información, las biotecnologías, los combustibles no fósiles, las tecnologías medioambientales, las nuevas materias primas, los medios de transporte alternativos (coches híbridos y eléctricos) y la tecnología punta (trenes de alta velocidad, satélites, 'fábricas inteligentes'). Su volumen en el Producto Interior Bruto (PIB) del país debería aumentar hasta alrededor de un tres por ciento de aquí a 2015.  El sector moderno de los servicios debería conocer una expansión que le permitiera domar el tigre del paro -que constituye hasta ahora el principal argumento contra el freno a la economía exportadora- así como el tigre de la inflación (actualmente alrededor del 4%). El duodécimo plan quinquenal parece haber sido pensado de forma concienzuda: en el plano macroeconómico, éste se concentra en el mercado interno, a través de los proyectos macroeconómicos exclusivamente, es decir creando redes de transporte y de energía que cubran el conjunto del gigante asiático. Para poner en pie este cambio, habrá que aumentar el potencial intelectual del país: se invertirá así masivamente (a diferencia de Alemania) en la educación y la investigación. De aquí a 2015, la media del gasto en investigación y en desarrollo en el PIB debe pasar del 1,75% actual al 4%. Por primera vez, este plan quinquenal contiene un largo capítulo sobre el cambio climático.  China continúa siendo el mayor consumidor de energía del mundo y preocupa por sus emisiones elevadas de dióxido de carbono. Pero la República Popular de China quiere ahora dejar detrás el carbono reemplazándole por energías limpias y reducir de aquí a 2015 sus emisiones contaminantes un 17% (40-45% de aquí a 2020).  Para ello se pretende invertir en energías renovables, un tercio de lo que será colectado a través de los impuestos se destinará al desarrollo de éstas y, por le momento, las empresas chinas estarán obligadas por la ley a consumir una electricidad proveniente de fuentes de energía alternativas, lo que conducirá a China a generar la misma cantidad de electricidad eólica y solar que los Estados Unidos hoy. Sin embargo el programa atómico se mantiene y nadie habla de abandonarlo. Además, en relación a la capacidad de 10,8 gigawatios de los trece reactores atómicos que existen actualmente, las nuevas centrales atómicas construidas de aquí a 2015 deberán alcanzar una capacidad de 40 gigawatios.  Esto gustará a los constructores de reactores atómicos alemanes y francesas que se ufanan de tener las instalaciones más seguras del planeta. * Michael R. Krätke es profesor de política económica y de derecho fiscal en la Universidad de Amsterdam, investigador asociado en el Instituto Internacional de Historia Social de esa misma ciudad y profesor de economía política y director del Instituto de Estudios Superiores de la Universidad de Lancaster en el Reino Unido. http://www.vientosur.info/ __._,_.___ . __,_._,___

Ciclos de Kondratieff y Economia Peruana

 

Para ayudarlos nueva figura. El arear sombreada les indica el incio de la fase depresiva del ciclo de Kondratieffa

http://bseminario.blogspot.com/2011/06/la-economia-peruana-y-los-ciclos-

de.html

http://bseminario.blogspot.com/2011/06/la-economia-peruana-y-los-ciclos-de.html

La coherencia con similar periodo de depresion en el Pe´ru es bastante elevada. 

 

 

AFPs chilenas dueñas de 24% de La Polar

Escándalo financiero en La Polar golpea a la Bolsa y AFP ven pasos legales

Retailer sorprendió ayer al anunciar que arriesga hasta US$ 430 millones por prácticas no autorizadas por el directorio en sus créditos a clientes.

por K. Ferrando y H. Cárcamo

La Polar rememoró ayer la crisis que en 1999, con otros dueños, la llevó a una quiebra de la que salió lenta y trabajosamente. El retailer perdió en un día casi la mitad de su valor bursátil, un 42%, y arrastró al Ipsa a una caída diaria de 1,18%, tras divulgar al mercado que sus provisiones -créditos con riesgo de incobrabilidad- podrían ser superiores en casi 10 veces a las realizadas en 2010. El año pasado sumaron $ 22 mil millones. Una estimación inicial del nuevo riesgo financiero fue situado por la firma entre $ 150 mil millones (US$ 321 millones) y $ 200 mil millones (US$ 428 millones).
El directorio de La Polar se reunió lunes y miércoles para analizar el tema. Ayer dieron a conocer que en esas sesiones se informó de "prácticas" en la gestión de su cartera de crédito -vinculadas a la renegociación de deudas de tenedores de tarjetas- no autorizadas por el directorio.
La empresa no detalló cuáles fueron esas prácticas, pero en la industria creen que aluden a repactaciones unilaterales de créditos morosos, lo que originó una demanda colectiva presentada la semana pasada por el Sernac. "Eso permite contabilizar deudores morosos como vigentes", dice un agente del mercado.
La Polar afirmó que los hechos divulgados ayer no afectan "su modelo de negocio". Además, adoptó una serie de medidas que fueron comunicadas a diferentes agentes del mercado. Entre ellas está el nombramiento de Eduardo Bizama como nuevo gerente general, en reemplazo de Martín González, quien vuelve a la gerencia comercial, y el despido del gerente de productos financieros, Julián Moreno. En su lugar asumirá Hernán Arancibia como gerente de crédito, hoy gerente de la división riesgo crédito del Banco de Chile. La firma designó a Ernst & Young como auditor externo en reemplazo de PwC.
La alerta del caso llegó a la Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS) el viernes 3 de junio, cuando accionistas representados por el estudio Gutiérrez y Silva ingresaron una consulta sobre los balances de La Polar. La SVS dio cinco días de plazo a La Polar para informar y el miércoles les ordenó hacerlo ayer.
Los accionistas

En las AFP la molestia era generalizada. Las gestoras poseen el 24% de una firma que no tiene controlador, lo que para algunos podría explicar el problema (ver página 34). La inversión, sin embargo, representa sólo el 0,2% de los activos del sistema. Habitat, Cuprum, Provida y Capital estudiarán acciones legales. Habitat acusó que lo ocurrido impacta la fe pública depositada en la empresa, dado que los estados financieros deberían ser confiables. Provida declaró su indignación y Cuprum dijo que seguirá acciones administrativas y judiciales para resguardar el interés de los afiliados. "Estas acciones pueden comprender a directores, administradores, auditores externos, clasificadores de riesgo", advirtió la AFP del grupo Penta.

Las AFP buscarán desde hoy coordinarse entre ellas y con otros socios de la firma para, entre otras cosas, solicitar una junta extraordinaria de accionistas y pedir las actas de directorio de La Polar, ente que preside Pablo Alcalde desde 2009.
Existe, además, un comité de directores, formado por tres miembros de la mesa, que debe velar para que los balances reflejen la realidad financiera de las empresas. Y que supervisa el trabajo de  la auditora externa -Price Waterhouse revisó los balances de La Polar en 2010- sobre la que están puestas todas las miradas por el recuerdo del caso Enron.

Perú: trescientos años del Modelo Primario Exportador

Necesitas las fechas de las Ondas largas de Kondratieff para entender la figura. Lo que lista el NBER son ciclos de Juglar o Kitchin.

 http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html

Perú: trescientos años del Modelo Primario Exportador

un gráfico que les resume los ultimos 300 años de la historia económica del Per{u

http://bseminario.blogspot.com/2011/06/economia-peruana-trescientos-anos-del.html

 

Por Que se Viene Colapso de Burbuja en Mercados Emergentes

Factores de la burbuja en los mercados emergentes han sido la expansion economica mundial y exceso de oferta de capitales y liquidez, altos precios de los commodities y dolar debil.
Colapso vendra por menores flujos de capitales de inversion del primer mundo, crack en precios de los commodities y dolar fuerte.
http://seekingalpha.com/article/274131-why-an-emerging-market-bubble-may-be-on-the-horizon


Why an Emerging Market Bubble May Be on the Horizon
by: Steven M. Rogé June 9, 2011   
In recent years, emerging markets have attracted significant attention and capital, neither of which was undeserved. First, they gained attention because they provided unique investment opportunities in developing countries with tremendous growth potential, unlike "stodgy" options such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Second, with the advent and popularization of ETFs, investing in emerging markets was easier than it ever had been before, and large amounts of capital shifted to take advantage of these opportunities. However, we believe a reality check may be in order, and in the next few minutes we will walk you through our current thesis on emerging markets; but first, a capital markets refresher.
While we cannot predict returns or what will unfold in the near-term, we hold fast to two core beliefs that dictate our investment thesis:

1. Capital markets theory dictates that whenever there is arbitrage (or, in general, above-average investment opportunities) funds will flow toward this opportunity in order to make a profit, and
2. Since capital markets cannot predict values perfectly, history has shown many times that too much money will flow toward the opportunity until it is overvalued, creating an unsustainable bubble.

We have seen this pattern repeated time and time again. Within the past dozen years we have separately seen both technology companies and real estate become the "hot" sectors, only to become overvalued and subsequently crash. While each sector proved to be a good investment opportunity at the outset and attracted large amounts of capital (Belief 1), too much money flowed to these opportunities, creating a bubble (Belief 2). Based on the underlying tenets of capital market theory and what we have witnessed throughout history, we believe that there is another bubble lurking about on the verge of popping.
We see a bubble in emerging market equities. While we believe that the growth in emerging market investing was justified due to economic expansion opportunities and capital flow, higher commodity prices, and a weaker dollar, these once-promising markets may soon face headwinds from all three factors.
In explaining our case, we will provide evidence from our three key factors, which encouraged the historical growth and investment opportunities of emerging markets, but which now may lead to a collapse. It is also important to recognize that these three factors will not bring down the entire country, or even the bond markets; we are strictly focused on the collapse of emerging market equities.
The Case for Growth
Opportunities for economic expansion by emerging market countries is a great investment thesis—the United States, though not an emerging market, created unsurpassed wealth for its citizens during an incredibly long period of economic expansion from the 1940s through 2000, despite bumps along the road. After seeing the wealth that the US created, many investors would jump at the chance to get in on the ground floor of an emerging market in hopes that similar economic expansion and wealth creation could be realized.
Relative to our two other factors, economic expansion of emerging market countries has unfolded over a much longer time horizon, most notably over the past few decades. Both technology advances and the spread of capitalism have encouraged this growth through the sharing of ideas and technologies and increasing import/export markets. Technology in particular has made it cheaper and easier to start businesses across the globe, and small businesses often provide the backbone for many countries' economies. Needless to say, as businesses and investment opportunities pop up and investors can communicate quickly across the globe, capital begins to migrate toward these investments.
In addition to general economic expansion, many emerging market countries have enjoyed strong growth because of their commodity-rich geography. Using the Dow Jones Emerging Market classifications, emerging markets include the oil-dependent countries such as United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman and mining countries such as Brazil, Peru and Argentina. Many of these emerging market countries are very dependent upon their global natural resource exports for continued economic growth, and thus are very sensitive to any price changes in the commodity. The oil countries have built up staggering wealth as both developed and emerging markets are voracious oil consumers and prices continue to be high.
While the dollar has bounced back and forth over the past few years relative to other global currencies, the underlying trend has been a weakening dollar with no fiscal or monetary policies to support a strengthening of the dollar. This is especially apparent with the Fed's QE2 program, which essentially is just creating dollars out of thin air, further depressing the value of each dollar. The flipside to a declining dollar is that other currencies strengthen against the dollar, thus, returns on international investments can be even higher when converted back into dollars because the foreign currency is now stronger. Also, many global commodities (oil for example) are priced in the global marketplace in US currency, so as the dollar declines, oil prices increase, further helping those oil-rich emerging markets.
Needless to say, the opportunities for economic expansion of commodity-rich countries, compounded by a weakening dollar, has propelled many emerging markets to valuation levels that may no longer make sense as these three factors turn around.

The Case for Collapse
While emerging markets will still grow in the long-term, the world is still feeling the aftershocks of the recent financial crisis, decreasing growth and investment opportunities. In addition, natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis and typhoons have left part of the world just trying to recover, let alone grow. The United States specifically, as one of the largest exporters of capital, still requires rock-bottom interest rates and dollar-printing machines to keep capital flowing
 
As investors chase these foreign opportunities, it is possible that some emerging markets have become overvalued relative to mature markets. For example, consider the current value of the iShares MSCI EAFE Index ETF (EFA) relative to its emerging market counterpart, the iShares MSCI Emerging Market Index (EEM). EFA holds securities from countries such as the UK, Japan, Germany and France; only ten countries make up nearly 90% of the index, with a combined GDP of nearly $20 trillion. Similarly, the EEM fund invests approximately 90% of its assets in ten countries such as China, Brazil, Taiwan and Russia, with a combined GDP of only $12.5 trillion. However, both funds each have roughly $40 billion under management, implying that investors are overweighting emerging markets significantly relative to mature markets.
Anther piece of evidence pointing to an overflow of capital to the emerging markets is the fact that the Vanguard Emerging Markets Stock Index ETF (VWO) was the most popular index fund in the United States in 2010, attracting more than $19 billion in capital, making the SPDR Gold Trust ETF (GLD) a distant second as it pulled in less than $6 billion . In an even more disparate comparison than the iShares example above, VWO manages over $65 billion to invest in emerging markets, while Vanguard's EAFE ETF (VEA) manages less than $9 billion.
While previously we discussed how natural resources helped the emerging markets prosper, a downturn in commodity prices can equally harm these markets. This wouldn't be so alarming if commodity prices were not so high right now, but unfortunately they now have a long way to fall if the tide turns. One of the biggest commodities most investors watch is oil, which is currently hovering around $100. Nearly all investors remember the time when oil spiked a few years ago to over $140, only to come crashing down to the $30s. Similarly, oil reached an inflation-adjusted average of above $100 in 1980 , and fell below $30 (inflation-adjusted) within 6 years.
The sharp rise in oil prices, especially relative to the anemic global economic growth, should be cause for concern. Since bottoming out in 2009, oil is up more than 150%, which is obviously unsustainable. Many other commodities important to emerging markets have increased extraordinarily as well, and when we hear reports than speculators artificially add $10 or more to a barrel of oil, we can assume the same is happening with other commodities. Simply removing the speculators and letting supply/demand take its course may bring commodities down to more reasonable levels, thus dampening returns for many emerging markets.
Finally, commodities should decrease against the strengthening of the US Dollar. As we discussed before, commodities priced in USD benefit as the dollar falls; however, they can just as easily be harmed by a strong dollar. Compounding this effect, a strong US Dollar would decrease returns made on foreign investments, thus making foreign markets (both developed and emerging) less attractive than domestic investments. While we have yet to see any direct information on how the government plans to support the dollar, we may see an effect from the completion of the QE2 program. By slowing the flow of dollars, we hope to see a stronger dollar emerge.
While a strong dollar would hurt all foreign investments, the double-whammy of weaker commodity prices and a stronger dollar would most likely hurt the emerging markets worse due to their relative lack of currency strength. If these events begin to unfold, investors who have piled right into emerging market funds in staggering numbers may just as quickly head for the exits. Emerging market funds have certainly enjoyed an admirable run, but it may be time to think about rebalancing your portfolio to underweight these markets— that way, when things do go wrong, you will be among the few who avoid hearing the sound of a bubble popping in your portfolio. 

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Bernanke: jugar con límite de deuda EEUU podría terminar mal

Jefe Fed: jugar con límite de deuda EEUU podría terminar mal

martes 14 de junio de 2011 14:51 GYT

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - El presidente de la Reserva Federal, Ben Bernanke, advirtió el martes que si no se sube el techo de la deuda de Estados Unidos de 14,3 billones de dólares se corre el riesgo de una pérdida de confianza en la solvencia crediticia del país que podría ser desastrosa.

Bernanke dijo que ante la ausencia de una rápida resolución en la batalla sobre el límite de deuda, Estados Unidos podría perder su preciada calificación crediticia "AAA", mientras que el especial estatus del dólar como moneda de reserva podría dañarse.

"Incluso una corta suspensión de pagos de capital o intereses en las obligaciones de deuda del Tesoro podría causar severos trastornos en los mercados financieros y en el sistema de pagos", dijo Bernanke en comentarios preparados para un evento auspiciado por el Comité para un Presupuesto Federal Responsable.

La falta de acción podría también "crear dudas fundamentales sobre la solvencia crediticia de Estados Unidos, y perjudicar el rol especial del dólar y de los bonos del Tesoro en los mercados globales en el largo plazo", agregó Bernanke.

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What are the social implications of economic collapse?

by Simon Black · View Comments

June 14, 2011
New York City
For the last few days, we've been having an important discussion about the magnitude of the economic challenges in the west; if you didn't read yesterday's letter, I really encourage you to do so before proceeding because it's important to understand why the west has truly passed the point of no return.
Simply put, the United States and much of Europe are borrowing an extraordinary amount of money now just to pay interest on the money they've already borrowed. They cannot even self-fund their mandatory entitlement programs without going into the hole, and their options are limited:
Option 1: Continue borrowing, keep the party going.
As long as the government CAN do this, they WILL do this.  Regardless of their intentions, though, more debt only worsens the situation, creating higher borrowing costs in the long run, and even more debt. As this happens, the pool of buyers begins to dry up, especially from overseas.
Option 2: Inflation
The more buyers stop purchasing Treasury securities, the more the Federal Reserve will mop up the excess liquidity. In doing so, the Fed essentially conjures up money and loans it to the government.
No matter what the government monkey statistics say, this is inflationary, plain and simple. The more money they print, the greater the level of inflation in the long-term. Meanwhile, as foreigners simultaneously reduce their US dollar holdings, this inflation will become more acutely felt in the US.
Option 3: Austerity
There's going to come a time when the US government is forced to face its economic reality and make some incredibly deep cuts that would be felt across society, from Wall Street and the military industrial complex to project housing on the other side of the tracks.
Option 4: Default
Eventually, the debt burden is simply going to be too much, and the most obvious solution will be to default. Politicians will make China out to be the enemy and they will probably invent a war just to have an excuse to default on Chinese owned debt. Americans will wave the flag and celebrate defaulting on their enemies.
Option 5: Economic Cannibalism
In the best traditions of Atlas Shrugged, the government will continue its persecution of the productive class– professionals, investors, entrepreneurs, and skilled workers. Existing taxes will rise, new taxes will be created, trade barriers will be enacted, and a maze of cost prohibitive regulations will be passed.
The first option (keeping the party going) is what has been happening for years. Politicians make small concessions to show they're "serious" about fiscal discipline, cutting laughably small programs while dumping hundreds of billions of dollars into wars and entitlement programs.
The worse the debt situation becomes, though, the higher the borrowing costs become, and the worse the debt situation becomes. It's not an enviable position. Existing lenders will continue backing away from the US Treasury market, giving option 1 a half-life measured in months at best.
In the longer term, only options 2-5 remain: inflation, austerity, default, and cannibalism. Each of these remaining options will shake the financial system to its core. More importantly, each of these has the power to create widespread social upheaval.
When inflation eats away at a family's already meager standard of living, when austerity eliminates the benefits to which recipients have grown accustomed, when default vanquishes a retiree's savings, when high taxes make workers feel like they're just government serfs– this is when the real turmoil will begin:
* Rising crime: devoid of a job or means to support their families, people will turn to crime out of desperation
* Class warfare: with dividing lines drawn between have's vs. have-not's, it will become unpopular and even dangerous to be successful
* Corruption: low-level public service officials will look to supplement their income through bribery and kickbacks
* Black economy: An underground, cash-only (probably gold or foreign currency) economy will emerge with people getting paid in envelopes
* Censorship: Of course they'll blame it on national security, but the idea will be to prevent public disparaging of government policy
* War: The government will need another major event to distract people from the real problems
* Protests/Riots: This is when things turn bloody
* Police state conditions: The government will close ranks and send the cops out to show all the little people who's really in charge
There are a number of other manifestations, and many are already showing signs of emergence. The US and European police states are alive and well. Crime is on the rise.
In Europe, cops are doing battle in the streets with their citizens. Think it can't happen in the US? Remember tanks in the streets during the LA riots? Remember New Orleans? Remember any number of G8/G20 protests?
Here's the bottom line: all you have to do is glance at the headlines to see what happens when you strip people of their livelihood, of their ability to put food on the table for their families.

The US has been able to kick the can down the road with the most blunt social implications simply because the country benefits so much from a US-oriented financial system. This is coming to an end very, very quickly.
As a rule of thumb, the greater the economic distortion, the harder the collapse. The US economy has been in a fantasy world for so long, and when its dominant primacy is yanked away, the collapse will be at freefall speed.
Listen… I'm not talking about the end of the world here, I'm talking about difficult times ahead, and the things that go beyond economics. It's time to face facts and look at how society will change (and has already changed).
Tomorrow, I'd like to write more about what we can do now. Meanwhile, please tell me what you think about this– how do you see society changing from this reset of the financial system?

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TLC Peru_USA Datos expo-impo 2006-2011

 

AÑO                     EXP           IMP             SALDO

TOTAL 2006     2,926.8     5,880.4     -2,953.5
TOTAL 2007     4,119.8     5,271.6     -1,151.8
TOTAL 2008     6,183.0     5,812.5       370.5
TOTAL 2009     4,918.8     4,223.3       695.5
TOTAL 2010     6,754.3     5,056.9     1,697.3
TOTAL 2011     2,602.1     2,106.6       495.5

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c3330.html

Efecto TLC Aumento de comercio USA-Perú y paso de superavit peruano en el 2006 de 2,953.5 millones dolares a un creciente deficit, en el 2010 fue de 1697 millones.

Qué nos dirán los que argumentaron que el TLC favorecería las exportaciones peruanas a USA. Estas cayeron miéntras las importaciones aumentaron. Quien negocio, Mercedez Araoz ?

Los que cuestionaron el TLC fueron avasallados por decenas de especialistas que defendían los términos del acuerdo, todavía se puede descargar del Ministerio d Comercio Exterior los estudios que justificaron el trato. Nos vendieron la idea, incumplida del aumento de las exportaciones.

".. el TLC constituye una importante oportunidad para que el Perú expanda sustancialmente su comercio exterior con el fin de contribuir a mejorar la calidad de vida de los peruanos."

"A cambio de la importante ampliación de mercados externos que obtendrá, después de firmado el TLC, el Perú deberá asumir la reducción en la recaudación fiscal como consecuencia de la eliminación del cobro de aranceles a las importaciones procedentes de Estados Unidos."

"Se está buscando mejorar la competitividad de los agricultores brindando una plataforma de servicios que refuerce aspectos tecnológicos, sanitarios y de asistencia comercial, como parte de un Programa Nacional de Reconversión y Compensación Agraria. Complementariamente a dicho plan, se ha planteado otorgar subsidios específicos a los tres principales productos que pueden
ser afectados, algodón, maíz y trigo."
http://www.tlcperu-eeuu.gob.pe/index.php

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The Catalysts Start to Catalyze

by John Rubino on June 15, 2011

For a couple of years now it's been clear that the world was about to fall apart, with the only question being which local failure turns out to be the catalyst for a systemic breakdown. So many things were on the verge of blowing up…yet none of them did. The world's governments have engaged in a heroic period of "extend and pretend" that has kept the system together longer than seemed possible.

But now the game seems to be ending. It's still not clear which bomb will go off first, but a bunch of fuses have gotten very short indeed. Here's a survey of old crises that are finally coming to a head:

California and Illinois
These two U.S. states are bankrupt by any reasonable definition, but are somehow managing to pay most of their bills. Their political classes are dominated by public sector unions, so neither has tried the tough medicine of places like Wisconsin or New Jersey. Instead, they've used a combination of much higher taxes (Illinois) and accounting gimmicks as a means to much higher taxes (California) to delay the inevitable reckoning.
Both are reaping what they've sown. Illinois, after raising corporate and income taxes, now faces an exodus of businesses to more friendly climes like Indiana and Texas. The governor is doling out tax breaks to keep major employers, a practice that 1) sends those new taxes right back out the door and 2) leads every other company to demand the same treatment. Latest on the list is the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the state's biggest financial institution. No end in sight but bankruptcy.
California desperately wants to raise taxes but can't get an increase through the legislature. Thanks to a recently passed referendum, lawmakers don't get paid unless they produce a budget, so they'll do so pretty soon. But without more tax revenues it will fill the gaping deficit with gimmicks like delayed payments. No one will be fooled. The only question now is whether there's room in Texas for all the California companies that will soon be leaving. Again, no end in sight but bankruptcy. Short munis and pretty much anything dependent on consumer spending, since the resulting public sector layoffs will devastate demand for cars and other luxuries.
The Middle East
As country after country blows up, the U.S. finds itself sucked into increasing numbers of "humanitarian" military operations that are, of course, really about protecting the flow of oil. It won't work. An oil crisis of some sort is coming. Buy energy stocks, from oil to clean tech, short everything else.
The U.S. budget
With America borrowing, in effect, its entire military budget from China, unemployment headed back to double digits even by Washington's fraudulent accounting, and neither party willing to really address the military/entitlements complex, the debt will keep piling up until it can't. The rating agencies are now, belatedly, threatening the US AAA rating, the loss of which would either drive interest rates back to their historical average of 5%-6% (sending interest costs out of control) or force the Fed to start buying all the bonds issued by Treasury (sending the money supply out of control). Result: imminent currency crisis. Buy gold and silver, short Treasuries.
Housing
After seeming to stabilize for a few months, housing is tanking again. Sales and prices are down, underwater mortgages are surging, home builder confidence is at new lows, and poor innocent Bank of America is stuck with trillions of bad paper that it's not accounting for. As home prices accelerate to the downside, look for huge bank write-downs, massive stock volatility, and maybe another bailout. Short anything in the financial sector.
Europe
Ah, the euro. Greece is imploding…riots in the street, the government is falling, and the Bundesbank and ECB can't agree on how to handle the coming default. This one is coming to a head very soon, to be followed by the other PIIGS countries — assuming there's still a Eurozone to try to save. Short the European banks with the most Greek paper, load up on precious metals.
Does it matter which blows up first?
Not any more. They're all so close that just their prospect is enough to send capital running for cover. It's a nasty year no matter what. But then comes the next stimulus plan, which complicates the whole "short the world" thesis. The markets have been consistently fooled by this kind of thing, and there's no reason to believe that QE3 won't ignite another rally in risk assets. So monitor those shorts and be ready to close them out when CNBC starts hinting at a big pending announcement from Bernanke or Geithner. Shift the proceeds into precious metals, which will absolutely rocket when the next wave of fake liquidity hits the market.

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mining tax

More mining tax, royalty hikes 'inevitable' – Control Risks

TORONTO (miningweekly.com) – More governments in Africa and elsewhere, especially newly elected ones, will likely look at raising mining taxes and royalties amid historically high commodity prices, Control Risks senior analyst for Africa Thomas Wilson said in an interview.

"I think it's inevitable. And it's always been like that, it's always followed the mineral cycle, he said on the sidelines of a MineAfrica seminar in Toronto.

"Governments look at commodity prices and say 'we should be getting more out of this'."

The trend is also a product of the changes in governments, particularly when more democratic regimes replace what may have been "more autocratic" previous governments, he said.

"So they come in on a popular mandate where they have made the electorate promises to look at contracts that were signed in the past with other governments that were potentially, I suppose, less scrupulous when it came to negotiating with foreign investors."

Mining companies and investors are increasingly edgy about potential changes in government policy in the regions where they operate, as nations seek ways to benefit more from record commodity prices.

A trend towards resource nationalism around the world is probably the biggest risk facing mining companies, Xstrata CEO Mick Davis said in December.

Last year, then-Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd proposed a 40% resources super profits tax, and although the country backed off the plan it has now released draft laws for a 30% tax on coal and iron ore miners.

Also this week, reports emerged that the Tanzanian government is planning a windfall tax on the mining industry, sending shares in LSE-listed African Barrick Gold lower.

And Mining companies operating in Peru also declined sharply on Monday after left-leaning Ollanta Humala, a military officer who had talked about making sure Peruvians benefit more from the country's mineral wealth, was elected President.

Guinea, under new President Alpha Conde, has also said it will relook at the country's mining code, followed by a review of all existing mining contracts.

Reviews of outdated laws and a push by governments to be more active in their resources sectors are not necessarily a bad thing, Wilson commented.

"But they must resist the temptation to turn reviews of laws and contracts into a purely revenue generating exercise."

DEALS TO SURVIVE

Mining companies operating in higher-risk areas are also not helping themselves or their shareholders by squeezing all possible concessions out of governments when negotiating mining contracts and agreements, Webber Wentzel partner Nkikia Moshesh said at the same event.

Agreements that seem skewed in the foreign investor's favour might look good on paper but run the risk of coming under fire from future governments and their voters, she commented.

Regimes change, commodity prices rise, "and people end up saying 'we are not extracting enough value from this company'," Moshesh said.

"Mining projects are intended to be of a long term nature. You want to conclude agreements that are going to survive, and preferably will survive changes in government, changes in political thinking."

ALMIGHTY STINK

African Barrick Gold, the biggest producer in Tanzania, and South Africa's AngloGold Ashanti both insisted this week that their tax positions in the country are protected by existing mineral development agreements, and could not be affected by a new windfall tax.

But there few new mines coming onstream in Tanzania and there is relatively little exploration investment as well, commented Africa mining consultant with political risk consultancy Menas Associates Christopher Melville.

"If the government is serious about the windfall tax it can have no other targets than the producing mines operated by the big players," he said.

Although the tax reports could just be "smoke and mirrors" related to internal party politics, it is also possible that the government is trying to use the threat of an imposed tax to persuade mining companies to renegotiate contracts voluntarily, Melville suggested.

"Trying to push it through...would cause an almighty stink with the majors given the stabilisation clauses in their development agreements.

"The government surely has no stomach for such a stink and may rather hope that unsettling announcements will be enough to encourage the companies to renegotiate voluntarily."

Either way, this week's reports are clearly negative for investor interest in Tanzania, he said.

"The government cannot afford to kill the goose."

Edited by: Creamer Media Reporter

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