17. TASAS DE INTERES Peru
16. tipo de cambio sol/dolar-consulta del dia
V. SECCION: M. PRIMAS
1. SECCION:materias primas en linea:precios
METALES A 30 DIAS click sobre la imagen
(click sur l´image)
2. PRECIOS MATERIAS PRIMAS
9. prix du petrole
10. PRIX essence
petrole on line
1 sept 2015
Greece referendum result and the meaning of debt
8 dic 2012
CRISE ET REGULATION,ARTUS (MOUREY RETRANS)
10 ago 2012
Fwd: Macroperu Se extiende la crisis mundial
Monday, June 13, 2011
Roubini Says 'Perfect Storm' May Threaten Global Economy
There's a one-in-three chance the factors will combine to stunt growth from 2013, Roubini said in a June 11 interview in Singapore. Other possible outcomes are "anemic but OK" global growth or an "optimistic" scenario in which the expansion improves.
"There are already elements of fragility," he said. "Everybody's kicking the can down the road of too much public and private debt. The can is becoming heavier and heavier, and bigger on debt, and all these problems may come to a head by 2013 at the latest."
Elevated U.S. unemployment, a surge in oil and food prices, rising interest rates in Asia and trade disruption from Japan's record earthquake threaten to sap the world economy. Stocks worldwide have lost more than $3.3 trillion since the beginning of May, and Roubini said financial markets by the middle of next year could start worrying about a convergence of risks in 2013.
The MSCI AC World Index has tumbled 4.9 percent this month on concern recent data, including an increase in the U.S. unemployment rate to 9.1 percent in May, signal the global economy is losing steam. U.S. Treasuries rose last week, pushing two-year note yields down for a ninth week in the longest stretch of decreases since February 2008, on bets the Federal Reserve will maintain monetary stimulus.
Bond Market 'Revolt'
World expansion may slow in the second half of 2011 as "the deleveraging process continues," fiscal stimulus is withdrawn and confidence ebbs, Roubini also said.Easing growth may spur demand for dollar assets as a "safe haven," he said in response to questions after a speech in Singapore today. The Dollar Index, which gauges the U.S. currency's value against a basket of six counterparts including the euro, yen and British pound, rose 0.1 percent as of 11:35 a.m. in Singapore, bound for a fourth straight daily increase.
Roubini is among analysts who predicted the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 that was triggered by a collapse in the value of U.S. mortgage securities.
Some of his other predictions haven't panned out, including his call on July 4, 2010, for "market surprises on the downside" in ensuing months and a weakening in economic growth. The MSCI World Index rallied 23 percent in the second half of last year, while U.S. gross domestic product gains accelerated to 2.6 percent in the third quarter and 3.1 percent in the fourth quarter from 1.7 percent in the April-to-June period.
U.S. Bonds
Roubini said two days ago that in the U.S., a failure to address the budget deficit risks a bond market "revolt." President Barack Obama's administration has been negotiating with Republicans, who control the House of Representatives, over cutting the federal government's long-term shortfall and raising the debt ceiling.
"We're still running over a trillion-dollar budget deficit this year, next year and most likely in 2013," Roubini said in a speech in Singapore on June 11. "The risk is at some point, the bond market vigilantes are going to wake up in the U.S., like they did in Europe, pushing interest rates higher and crowding out the recovery."
In Europe, officials need to restructure the debt of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and waiting too long may result in a "more disorderly" process, Roubini also said.
European officials are racing to find a plan to stem Greece's debt crisis by June 24 while sharing the cost of a new rescue with bondholders. Saddled with the euro area's heaviest debt load, Greece is seeking additional loans after last year's 110 billion-euro ($159 billion) bailout.
Japan's Contraction
Japan's economy, the world's third-largest, slid into a recession last quarter, using the textbook definition of consecutive quarterly declines in GDP, after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami and ensuing nuclear crisis. The government is spending an initial 4 trillion yen ($50 billion) to clean up from the disaster, which is estimated to have caused as much as 25 trillion yen in economic damage.
Bank of Japan Governor Masaaki Shirakawa said on June 1 that supply constraints are easing faster than expected as companies rush to repair their facilities. The risk in Japan is "if growth fizzles out after a short-term reconstruction stimulus," leading to a renewed struggle to maintain expansion around 2013, Roubini said.
China's economy may face a "hard landing" after 2013 as government efforts to boost growth through investment cause excess capacity, Roubini told reporters after his June 11 speech.
'Overcapacity' in China
"China is now relying increasingly not just on net exports but on fixed investment" which has climbed to about 50 percent of GDP, he said. "Down the line, you are going to have two problems: a massive non-performing loan problem in the banking system and a massive amount of overcapacity is going to lead to a hard landing."A record $2.7 trillion of loans were extended in China over two years, pushing property prices to all-time highs even as authorities set price ceilings, demanded higher deposits and limited second-home purchases.
The nation's current challenge is to maintain growth and curb price gains ahead of a leadership change next year, Roubini said. Officials may use administrative steps and price controls, as well as raising rates further and allowing currency appreciation, if inflation becomes a bigger problem, he said.
Political Transition
"The policy challenge through next year, where you have a delicate political transition of the leadership, is to maintain growth in the 8 to 9 percent range while pushing inflation below what it is right now," said Roubini, the co-founder and chairman of New York-based Roubini Global Economics LLC.After next year, the bigger challenge in China is "to reduce fixed investment and savings and increase consumption. Otherwise after 2013, there will be a hard landing," he said.
The risk of "outright" deflation and the probability of another recession in the U.S. are lower now than a year ago, and output in Japan could rebound in the second half of the year, Roubini said two days ago. "High-grade" corporations have "very strong" balance sheets, he said.
Roubini in July 2006 predicted a "catastrophic" global financial meltdown that central bankers would be unable to prevent. The collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008 sparked turmoil that led to the worst financial crisis since the 1930s.
Roubini: "La tormenta perfecta que pronostiqué a principios de año se está desarrollando"
Al comentario de Roubini habría que agregar los siguientes elemnetos. En primer lugar, el índice de precios al consumidor descienden en Lima y sus exportaciones , también. La deflación en China impacta sobre el las exportaciones de los países asiaticos . Conocemos que las orordenes de exportacion de Japón rxperimentaron un caidad de 10 por ciento el mes pasado. En segundo lugar, desarrollos negativos por el lado de la oferta. Es probable que la ola de calor en USA se transforme en una Sequía . Como USA esm uno de los principales productores de grano en el Mundo, la sequ{ia auemntara el precio del maiz , trigo,y soya. Aumento en el precio del petróleo y III Guerra en el golfo.
El economista y académico de la Universidad de Nueva York,además no descartó que otros países, como Finlandia, salgan antes que Grecia del euro.
09/07/2012 - 15:56
El pasado mes de mayo Roubini pronosticó cuatro escenarios que crearían una 'tormenta perfecta' en la economía global: el estancamiento de Estados Unidos, un repunte en los problemas de deuda de Europa, la desaceleración de las economías emergentes, especialmente China, y el conflicto militar en Irán.
Según el economista, los datos de inflación que ha publicado hoy China indican que la economía del gigante asiático se está enfriando más rápido de lo previsto, mientras que Estados Unidos anunciaba el viernes pasado unas decepcionantes cifras de empleo, acumulando ya cuatro meses seguidos con datos inferiores a los previstos.
Ante este escenario, Roubini publicó esta mañana en su cuenta de Twitter que "la tormenta perfecta para 2013 que dibujé hace meses se está desencadenando".
Para el economista, en estos momentos el problema está en que los Estados soberanos se están quedando si opciones o cómo dijo el propio Roubini meses atrás, ya no tienen "conejos que sacar de la chistera". Mientras la crisis de 2008 se pudo combatir con una acción conjunta de los bancos centrales, actualmente las decisiones adoptadas por los reguladores –por ejemplo la bajada de tipos que aplicaron la semana pasada el BCE y sus homólogos chino y británico-, no han tenido el efecto deseado.
FINLANDIA SALDRA DEL EURO ANTES QUE GRECIA
En declaraciones a Bloomberg TV, el economista también ha hablado sobre la situación por la que atraviesa la zona euro y los graves problemas a los que se enfrentan algunos de sus países miembros. En esta ocasión Roubini no señala a Grecia, sino a Finlandia. Según el economista el país nórdico saldrá del euro antes que los helenos.
Roubini ha calificado de "fracaso" la cumbre que mantuvieron hace unas semanas los líderes europeos "porque las rentabilidades de los bonos de España e Italia siguen altas". En su opinión, "vamos a ver nuevas crisis de deuda en los próximos días. Los mercados esperaban algo más como la mutualización o la monetarización de la deuda".
No obstante, el economista advierte de que "el problema es que ya no es solo Angela Merkel y Alemania, ni Finlandia ni Austria ni los Países Bajos quieren mutualizar la deuda de la Eurozona". Su previsión es que en 2013 "veremos una salida de Grecia del euro", pero "no hay que descartar que algunos países del corazón de Europa, como Finlandia, abandonen antes que Grecia".
31 jul 2012
Fwd: Macroperu Recesión en United Kingndom y la incompotente política del partido conservador.
Subject: Macroperu Recesión en United Kingndom y la incompotente política del partido conservador.
UK GDP slump: Osborne's blundering incompetence made the economy sicker
- Larry Elliott, economics editor
- guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 25 July 2012 11.13 BST
- Jump to comments (…)
20 jun 2012
Obama's speech is the opening round of a White House offensive
From: The Washington Post <newsletters@email.washingtonpost.com>
Date: 2011/9/9
Subject: Politics News & Analysis: Obama's speech is the opening round of a White House offensive
To: ggarcianunez@gmail.com
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Global Economy Heading Downhill?
Author: Edward Hugh · May 8th, 2012 · Comments (2)
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According to the JP Morgan Global Composite PMI report, "Growth of global economic activity eased sharply to a five month low in April." The authors of the report found that on aggregate across the countries surveyed – 30 across the globe – both new order inflows and job creation fell back, leading them to the conclusion that "the world economy is set for a softer growth patch heading into midyear". Looking at the chart below, this certainly seems to be the case (the composite index is a measure derived from a weighted average of the manufacturing and services findings).
So momentum is weakening across the entire global economy at the present point, not just in say Europe, or China. Global output is still growing but it is growing at an increasingly weaker pace. What could change that? Well QE3 naturally. Why do I say that? Well look at the three significant surges in the chart. The first coincides with QE1, the second with QE2, and the third, much weaker one, fits in with the so called Operation Twist.
This tells us a number of things. In the first place these massive liquidity injections are not self sustaining, i.e. they give things a hefty push forward but even so they don't manage to jump start the various economies, especially in the developed world. They work for a bit, and then run out of steam. The fact that they systematically run out of steam tells me, at any rate, that something somewhere is broken, and that re-iterated injections on their own won't sort the problem out.
In Japan this very same "something" has now been broken since 1992, and continual liquidity injections and mounting government debt have not made it better. This is not the point to go in depth into what the something is, my story on this is scattered here and there across the various pieces of analysis I write. Suffice it to say that excessive debt and rapid population aging have to form part of the picture. Both constitute an important drag on growth. But the principal aim of this post isn't to add to the debate about what it is that is broken, it is simply to plead for a recognition that something is, and that, as a result, the situation won't simply "right" itself. This time there is no hidden helping hand.
What the various liquidity injections do do is buy time. Some people scorn that, and would rather take their armageddon full face and now. Each to his taste. If I get to die tomorrow rather than today, I am not ungrateful.
Liquidity injections are not quite the same thing as debt generation, although obviously there is a link – injections which involve straight monetisation of government debt (ECB LTRO lending against government guaranteed bank bond collateral in order to enable the bank to buy government bonds, for example) are clearly facilitating the generation of debt. While liquidity provision for its own sake in a deflated economic system is generally positive, debt generation for its own sake isn't necessarily so, since someone, someday, will have to pay it back, and if in the meantime we don't fix the problem (that "something" that is broken) then the somebody may be poorer than we are, in which case we are directly transferring income inter-generationally, from them to us. Debt to buy time for something which won't fix itself is not justified, and the money should be spent structurally, on implementing a fix. Grandiose infrastructure plans which have no real efficiency component were tried in Japan in the 1990s, and they didn't work.
"Even today, Japan is having trouble climbing out of its cement pit. At its high, in the mid-1990s, infrastructure spending accounted for 6 percent of its gross domestic product, double what the United States allocated for infrastructure in the '90s and still higher than what politicians are considering spending today. In estimates of national debt, the world's second-largest national economy is near the top of the list, perched between Lebanon and Jamaica. Last year, Japan's public debt was far greater than the size of its economy, a burden that makes its demographic challenges more difficult to address".
We face a situation which seems neither to have been contemplated in either the Austrian or the Keynesian theoretical frameworks (since both assume some sort of homeostatic corrective mechanism is ultimately at work) or in the any of the various versions of neoclassical growth theory, where some sort of semi-constant equilibrium growth path is assumed to exist, and be recoverable via the application of an appropriate set of structural reforms. Yet the three oldest societies on the planet – Japan, Germany and Italy – have been losing growth momentum for decades now, and it is quite possible will drift into negative average growth rates at some point in a non too distant future. Traditional theory never really contemplated this possibility (for a brief summary of my argument on this, see this recent interview I did with Andrew Pollen).
Now for my second main point. Where's the missing link? That is, where is the link between the Feds quantitative measures (or those of the other main developed economy central banks for that matter) and global economic momentum? Well, that's a bit of a longer story – although empirically I think it is easy to see the link is there. Basically the story has to do with international "carry" (borrowing cheap in one currency to lend dear in another, preferably with the value of the first currency falling, and the value of the second currency rising, a set of relations which "carry" itself propagates in good circular fashion), and risk sentiment. The liquidity injection makes people more willing to take on risk (think ECB and the 3yr LTROs), and the existence of the carry trade enables them to do it. Nothing new here, banks by their very nature are about intermediation, and leveraging spreads, its just that in an age of financial globalisation that intermediation has a lot more distant geographical reach.
And then of course, all that extra money helps people from Rio to New Delhi and from Ankara to Jakarta borrow up to the hilt to buy themselves a nice new flat, or SUV, or whatever.
Across Latin America's largest economy, record prices for the country's commodities and surging foreign fund inflows – what the International Monetary Fund calls "favourable tailwinds" – are driving a historic boom. Property prices are soaring, consumer credit is booming and bank profits swelling. But there are growing concerns over whether Brazil is becoming addicted to this windfall of easy money. Increasingly, there are fears that Brazil is heading for a bubble.
So excess liquidity which finds no outlet in developed economies floods into emerging markets, provoking unsustainable surges in demand and fueling inflation, which leads the local central banks to penalise borrowing in one way or another, and bring the whole dynamic to a halt again. At which point we get another liquidity injection in one of the major developed economies, and off we go again.
It is perhaps a sobering thought that households will be about as indebted in Brazil coming in to the next football World Cup as they were in Spain at the time of the 1992 Olympics, and then remember what happened next in the latter case. Brazil isn't facing a devastating bubble yet, but it could be one day if we don't find a better way of doing things.
Global Manufacturing In LimboLand
Even if it was services activity, rather than manufacturing, that showed the greatest global weakness during April, manufacturing was only able to gouge out a minimal improvement on what was already a weak March performance, and even then what growth there was was very unevenly distributed.
Overall output, new orders and employment all continued to rise during the month, but there was a marked divergence between the world's two largest industrial regions, the US and the Eurozone. In fact, the US remained one of the principal spurs of global manufacturing growth in April, with the US PMI rising to a ten-month high, provoking indirectly yet more debate about the desirability of austerity across the EU. Nonetheless, as can be seen from the chart, the surge in manufacturing output remains modest when compared with the two earlier waves, which is why I am among those who think that the arrival of some sort of QE3 is now only a matter of time.
The Eurozone manufacturing PMI, in contrast, posted its lowest reading in almost three years, as operating conditions deteriorated across all of the big-four Euro economies (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain). The US PMI is currently 8.9 points above its Eurozone equivalent, the greatest divergence in favour of the US since Eurozone data were first compiled in June 1997.
Meanwhile the Asia PMIs remained mixed with solid growth being signaled in India against only modest expansions in Japan, Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea. Conditions also remained weak to subdued in China. So at this point in time, even the Asian economies as a group are hardly "powering ahead".
The most marked feature of the April reports as far as Europe is concerned is certainly the way in which conditions in core Europe continue to worsen. As the monthly report said,"the April PMIs also indicated that manufacturing weakness was no longer confined to the region's geographic periphery. The German PMI fell to a 33-month low, conditions deteriorated sharply again in France and the Netherlands also contracted at a faster rate". The rate of decline in new orders accelerated, and jobs were lost in German manufacturing for the first time in two years.
Indeed it is the state of the once mighty German economy that is now starting to give cause for concern. The economy suffered a mild contraction in the last three months of last year, and the possibility exists that this will be repeated in Q1 2012, in which case Germany will also be technically back in recession. Whether or not this is the case we will know in a week or so, but either way, the fact that it is a close call, and that things are evidently getting worse as we enter the second quarter certainly undermines some of the force in Angela Merkel's argument that austerity leads to growth.
As Tim Moore, senior economist at Markit and author of the German manufacturing report put it:
"Germany started the second quarter of 2012 with its worst manufacturing performance for almost three years, as another month of weaker order inflows finally brought production levels back into contraction. With backlogs of work failing to support output volumes in April, manufacturers cut their staffing numbers for the first time since March 2010.
"The investment goods sector was at the forefront of the downturn in April, as jitters about global economic conditions meant clients in export markets sought to delay large scale spending decisions. Investment goods producers saw export orders fall at the steepest pace in nearly three years, and in turn job losses were the most pronounced of the three main market groups monitored by the survey.
Germany's economy is export dependent. This export dependency comes from having a very high median population age. It is not a cultural quirk of the Germans. There is no fundamental issue with German competitiveness, there is not some major structural reform that is missing, there is not even over indebtedness in the public or private sectors. The only reason the German economy has fallen back into recession is that demand for its products among customers has dropped off, while the long awaited second pillar of domestic demand has once more failed to appear. It is as simple as that.
With the results of the recent French elections in the forefront of their minds, people are now starting to ask themselves just how Germany will respond to a Francois Hollande Presidency, forgetting that elections are also looming in Germany next year, and that the CDU is busily loosing ground. Whether or not Germany technically confirms a recession when the results for the first three months of the year are out in a week or so, the performance of the economy is visibly worsening and German leaders are under pressure to show they are willing and able to respond. Otherwise Angela Merkel may face wrath not only from those irritated by the having to contribute towards the bailouts, she will also have to contend with those irritated by her economic ineffectiveness back home. And in any event, the party which would gain from a Merkel electoral defeat – the SPD – are not that far from seeing things the way Monsieur Hollande does.
Which is why Angela Merkel's approach was always far too simplistic. As I have said a number of times, I think she is right to search for some sort of financial stability in the face of the aging population issue, but the best way to get from here to there is not necessarily to walk in a straight line. Naturally, austerity is a relative concept, but whether you are cutting your deficit from 10% to 9%, or from 3% to 2% as you go into a recession you still hit short term growth with a double whammy, as Italy is currently discovering. As can be seen in the chart below (which is the April Italian services PMI) domestic demand is plummeting on the back of the latest round of austerity, and this is leading the main centre left party in the government to at least cry ouch!
At the very least European fiscal policy needs to allow for a counter cyclical component, even as you pull back from a very high deficit level, and not, as at present, insist on an entirely pro-cyclical one in a recessionary environment, thus magnifying the amplitude of the demand swings. If an economy needs more than 5% deficit (or more than 10% for that matter) simply to get meaningful GDP growth, then you need to understand why this is and find solutions, since as I say above debt itself doesn't cure anything, and arguably as our populations age accumulated debt only makes things worse. But if one of the engines on the plane starts to malfunction, the objective needs to be to get the passengers to the ground safely, and not necessarily by the most direct route.
Naturally infrastructure work on the periphery which needed German technology would help German export companies, so it wouldn't be that hard to sell in the heimat. But what use would it be to the receiving countries? That we won't know until we see the proposals in detail, and discover how it is going to be financed. If such infrastructure would help exports, both within and outside Europe, then it could be a plus. If it is only to build high speed train networks that lead to nowhere (or as is currently under discussion in Spain up to a frontier with Portugal across which there will be no connection waiting on the other side) then we are simply falling into the Japan trap, and applying a simplistic 1930s version of Keynesianism that doesn't work in the present context. But at the end of the day, the fact we are having this debate in the first place only serves to highlight the fact that we still don't have a roadmap for coming out of the crisis in Europe, and we still don't know what our future is going to look like.
And meanwhile, of course, there is Greece, and that blasted ongoing economic contraction to think about.
As Paul Smith, Senior Economist at Markit and author of the Greece Manufacturing PMI report commented:
"April proved to be another difficult month for Greek manufacturers, with latest data again showing steep contractions across a number of key variables measured by the survey. "In line with recent reports, the issues facing manufacturers – and the Greek economy as a whole – remain deep rooted. Panelists again noted problems in accessing working capital and a culture of cash payments, implying that credit lines remain either closed or that agreements will come with restrictive terms.
"At present, it remains hard to see how these issues can be solved suggesting that the manufacturing sector is set for continued struggle in the months ahead."
Following his cue, and looking over at the latest election results in that unfortunate country, it remains hard to see how the issues arising can be solved, and it isn't clear what is going to happen next.
Filed under: Economic Growth, Euro, European Periphery, Japan
Etiquetas: 2012, CRISIS, EMPLEO, global, JUN12, MACROECONOMICS, MONEDA, MUNDO, PRODUCCION, USA
13 sept 2011
September 2, 2011, 9:38 am
Comparing Recessions and Recoveries: Job Changes
By CATHERINE RAMPELL
Source: Labor Department. Chart by Amanda Cox.
Horizontal axis shows months. Vertical axis shows the ratio of that month’s nonfarm payrolls to the nonfarm payrolls at the start of recession. Note: Because employment is a lagging indicator, the dates for these employment trends are not exactly synchronized with National Bureau of Economic Research’s official business cycle dates.
Today’s jobs report is nothing but bad news.
The United States economy showed no net gain in jobs in August, the Labor Department reported, after having added an average of 53,000 in each of the three prior months. This was the worst jobs number since last September.
CATHERINE RAMPELL
Dollars to doughnuts.
.Hiring was essentially unchanged in almost every private industry. The biggest gain was in health care, which added 30,000 jobs, but health care has been growing steadily despite what happens to the rest of the economy. Government employment continued to fall.
The chart above shows economywide job changes in this last recession and recovery compared with other recent ones, with the black line representing the most recent downturn. Since the downturn began in December 2007, the economy has shed, on balance, about 5 percent of its nonfarm payroll jobs. And that does not even account for the fact that the working-age population has continued to grow, meaning that if the economy were healthy we should have more jobs today than we had before the recession.
The unemployment rate — measured by a different government survey, and based on how many people are without jobs but are actively looking for work — was unchanged in August, at 9.1 percent.
There are now 14 million workers who are looking for work and cannot find it; the figure nearly doubles if you include workers who are in part-time jobs but want to be employed full time, and those who want to work but have stopped looking. A broader measure of the unemployment rate that includes these underemployed workers is 16.2 percent.
Fwd: ARGENPRESS.info - Envío especial: Clases, estados e ideologías imperiales
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/08/clases-estados-e-ideologias-imperiales.html
¿Imperialismo versus economía de mercado?
Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/08/imperialismo-versus-economia-de-mercado.html
¿Un imperio trasnacional?
Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/08/un-imperio-trasnacional.html
Teorías de la sucesión hegemónica
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/08/teorias-de-la-sucesion-hegemonica.html
Discusiones sobre el declive de Estados Unidos
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/07/discusiones-sobre-el-declive-de-estados.html
Los cambios en la rivalidad interimperial
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/07/los-cambios-en-la-rivalidad.html
¿Etapa final o temprana del imperialismo?
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/07/etapa-final-o-temprana-del-imperialismo.html
Replanteos marxistas del imperialismo
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/07/replanteos-marxistas-del-imperialismo.html
Interpretaciones convencionales del imperio
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/07/interpretaciones-convencionales-del.html
Las áreas estratégicas del imperio
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/06/las-areas-estrategicas-del-imperio.html
Adversarios y aliados del imperio
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/06/adversarios-y-aliados-del-imperio.html
Gestión colectiva y asociación económica imperial
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/06/gestion-colectiva-y-asociacion.html
El papel imperial de Estados Unidos
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/06/el-papel-imperial-de-estados-unidos.html
El imperialismo contemporáneo
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/05/el-imperialismo-contemporaneo.html
"El imperialismo del siglo XXI" (Capítulo I – Parte IV): La teoría
clásica del imperialismo
Por: Claudio Katz (especial para ARGENPRESS.info)
http://www.argenpress.info/2011/05/el-imperialismo-del-siglo-xxi-capitulo_20.html
Etiquetas: 2011, ARGENTINA, ECONOMIA, EMPLEO, MACROECONOMICS, set11, TECNOLOGIA
1 sept 2011
Le commencement de la fin,Lordon
Par Frédéric Lordon, texte du 11 août 2011 diffusé par le M'PEP avec l'autorisation de l'auteur.
Le 28 août 2011.
Résumé
Pour l'auteur, directeur de recherches au CNRS, la certitude de la catastrophe finale commence à se profiler. Le néolibéralisme, en effet, est un régime d'endettement généralisé : ménages, institutions financières, États. La crise menace de mettre à bas tout le système des institutions financières, car si la puissance publique a pu sauver les banques de la crise de la dette privée, il n'est pas certain qu'elle puisse y parvenir pour les dettes publiques.
Les agences de notation font de la politique. Car ce que l'agence Standard & Poor's a noté, ce n'est pas la solvabilité des États-Unis dont chacun sait qu'ils règleront leurs dettes. Ce que cette agence a noté, c'est le dissensus politique aux États-Unis sur la question de la dette. Autrement dit, le fait de ne pas être d'accord politiquement, entre la Maison blanche et le Congrès, devenait un problème pour cette agence. D'ailleurs, contrairement à ce qui se passe habituellement, les taux d'intérêt des titres de l'État American n'ont pas augmenté, ils ont baissé après cette dégradation !
La dégradation de la note des États-Unis, qui étaient la meilleure signature du monde, va être interprétée par les marchés comme le fait que toutes les autres signatures sont moins bonnes. Dans ce cadre, le candidat le plus sérieux à la prochaine dégradation est la France.
Le système européen actuel touche à l'absurde. D'un côté, les marchés financiers, pour être « rassurés », exigent l'austérité pour que toutes les sources des pays leurs soient versées au travers du remboursement des dettes ; mais d'un autre côté, l'austérité empêche la croissance qui seule peut générer les recettes fiscales permettant de rembourser les dettes… Les plans européens continuent à fabriquer des surendettés futurs pour « sauver » les surendettés présents. Deux sérieux candidats s'avancent au guichet : l'Espagne et l'Italie. Avec 440 milliards d'euros, l'EFSF ne fait pas le poids puisqu'il faudra au minimum 800 milliards d'euros.
Les euro-réjouis, ceux-là mêmes qui ont répété pendant deux décennies que l'Europe n'avait rien de libéral, qu'elle était même le bouclier contre la mondialisation, que jamais main de l'homme n'avait produit construction institutionnelle si merveilleusement agencée, fondent leurs derniers espoirs d'éviter la ruine finale sur un miraculeux sursaut politique qui au tout dernier moment accoucherait enfin du « fédéralisme ». Mais cet espoir-là ne vaut pas mieux que tous ceux qui avaient précédé. Car le fédéralisme politique sera encore très incomplet – le plus probablement consistera-t-il en la fusion des dettes publiques européennes, ou d'une part d'entre elles, en eurobonds communs et indifférenciés.
Mais c'est faire l'hypothèse peu vraisemblable que les marchés oublieraient instantanément que sous la surface commune des eurobonds se tient toujours une pluralité d'émetteurs d'inégales signatures.
Mais surtout : pour que le « saut fédéral » soit à la hauteur du problème, il faudrait bien davantage, et notamment une intégration si poussée qu'elle ne laisserait aux nations membres qu'une importance financière résiduelle, le poids relatif de l'État fédéral et des États fédérés basculant jusqu'à atteindre des proportions équivalentes à celle des États-Unis, ou de l'Espagne dans ses rapport avec ses régions. Qui peut imaginer le surgissement d'un État fédéral européen pesant budgétairement autant que les États-membres réunis (comme aux États-Unis) avec tout ce qu'il appelle de « progrès » politiques : de vraies institutions politiques fédérales, la constitution d'une citoyenneté politique européenne unique, primant sur les citoyennetés nationales, etc., seules avancées capables de soutenir une politique financière commune ? Ou, plus exactement, qui peut imaginer qu'un authentique processus constituant puisse survenir avant que nous ne finissions au milieu des ruines fumantes ?
Il n'y a plus qu'une voie de recours : on ne sortira de pareil effondrement que par une gigantesque opération de création monétaire. Incapables de faire face à leurs engagements de paiement interne, les États qui sont en déficit se tourneront vers la banque centrale pour financer leur solde. Mais, sans même s'attarder à la lettre des traités, la BCE est-elle capable de répondre favorablement à une demande de ce genre ? Poser la question c'est y répondre. Tout l'habitus du banquier central européen s'y oppose. Dans ces conditions, les pays concernés reprendront barre sur leur banque centrale nationale, de fait extraite du SEBC (le Système Européen de Banques Centrales), pour lui faire émettre des euros en quantité ad hoc. A ce moment précis, constatant l'apparition dans la zone euro d'une source de création monétaire anarchique, affranchie des règles du SEBC, donc susceptible de mélanger ses euros impurs aux euros purs (et par là de les corrompre), l'Allemagne considérera que le point de l'intolérable a été atteint et, faute d'avoir les moyens d'exclure le(s) contrevenant(s), jugera que sa propre conservation monétaire lui fait devoir de quitter les lieux. Fin du voyage pour l'euro, en tout cas dans sa forme originelle.
Le néolibéralisme pourrait donc bien mourir par sa dénégation préférée : la dette – dont il n'a cessé de crier les dangers… quand tous ses mécanismes conduisaient à son emballement généralisé. Jamais un groupe d'intérêt aussi puissant que celui qui s'est constitué autour de la finance ne renoncera de lui-même au moindre de ses privilèges, seuls peuvent le mettre à bas la force d'un mouvement insurrectionnel – puisqu'il est bien clair par ailleurs qu'aucun des partis de gouvernement, nulle part, n'a le réel désir de l'attaquer –, ou bien la puissance dévastatrice d'une catastrophe que son système aura lui-même engendré.
Sur les ruines, enfin, tout rebâtir.
Pour accéder au texte complet, cliquez ici :
http://www.m-pep.org/spip.php?article2343
Accédez aux textes de Frédéric Lordon sur son blog
30 jul 2011
Resiliencia macroeconómica
| Tomado de Macroeconomic Resilience with 2 comments In an excellent article, Mark Thoma highlights the great divide between academics and practitioners in economics. He also identifies the fundamental reason for this divide – practitioners typically rely on intuition and rough heuristics whereas academics rely on rigorous theoretical constructs. In Herbert Simon's terminology, practitioners are satisficers, not optimisers. In a recent post, I outlined my preferred framework to analyse monetary policy as an attempt to influence the real rate curve. Clearly, this viewpoint is not rigorous but for my purposes transforming this framework into a theoretically watertight construct is not worth the effort. The aim of the framework is simple to give me a quick and dirty but useful way to process information and market data. It is also almost certain that in some scenarios, this framework will break down – but instead of thinking about all such scenarios in advance, I simply trust that my experience and my gut instinct will warn me when such a scenario occurs. To most academics, the process I have outlined above would seem to be a distinctly unscientific and "irrational" method. But as I have argued before, heuristics and intuition are rational responses in an uncertain environment where time and resources are scarce. Herbert Simon and Gerd Gigerenzer have both done excellent work on the role of heuristics but the most relevant research on the role of intuition has been undertaken by Gary Klein and other researchers in the field of 'Naturalistic Decision Making' (NDM). NDM originated from Klein's work in analysing the decision-making of firefighters – as Klein explains in this recent interview, expert firefighters follow a process that is far removed from the conventional definition of rational choice. They "build up a repertoire of patterns so that they can immediately identify, classify, and categorize situations, and have a rapid impulse about what to do. Not just what to do, but they're framing the situation, and their frame is telling them what are the important cues. That's why they're always looking, or usually looking, in the right place. They know what to ignore, and what they have to watch carefully." There's nothing magical about this: "Intuition is about expertise and tacit knowledge. I'll contrast tacit knowledge with explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is knowledge of factual material. I can tell people facts, I can tell them over the phone, and they'll know things. I can say I was born in the Bronx, and now you know where I was born. That's an example of explicit knowledge, it's factual information.Larry Summers is correct in noting that the solution is not for practitioners to become academics. It is for more academics to rigorously analyse the intuitive and heuristic-based methods and explanations that practitioners use. The real gap is in the paucity of applied economists and the misguided view of applied work with data-crunching rather than practical knowledge. As Daniel Kahneman explains in his introduction to Gary Klein's interview: "In the US, the word "applied" tends to diminish anything academic it touches. Add the word to the name of any academic discipline, from mathematics and statistics to psychology, and you find lowered status. The attitude changed briefly during World War II, when the best academic psychologists rolled up their sleeves to contribute to the war effort. I believe it was not an accident that the 15 years following the war were among the most productive in the history of the discipline. Old methods were discarded, old methodological taboos were dropped, and common sense prevailed over stale theoretical disputes. However, the word "applied" did not retain its positive aura for very long. It is a pity.The divide that Mark Thoma identifies is not restricted to economics – in the age of 'Big Data', all academic disciplines are moving away from the sort of work that requires researchers to get their hands dirty. In an excellent post, Jennifer Jacquet explains how field ecologists like Robert Paine are a dying breed, being replaced by ecologists more at home on a computer than in the field. This is not a criticism of mathematical ecology, simply an assertion that the kind of insights that Bob Paine derived from spending "45 years knee-deep in kelp and invertebrates on Washington State's coast" are valuable and cannot be replicated by other means. This presumption that data and theory can substitute for experience on the ground is symptomatic of the broader problem of the downgrading of tacit and contextual knowledge highlighted by many other changes in academic economics, most notably the neglect of economic history and institutional detail. One of the most striking deficiencies in economic theory that was exposed during the crisis was the disconnect between monetary economics and the institutional reality of the new regime of shadow banking and derivatives. Hyman Minsky's theories are relevant not because of their theoretical elegance but because of their firm grounding in the institutional evolution of the post-war monetary and banking system, a topic that he researched in great detail. An example of how this balance between the theoretical and applied fields can be restored is provided by the collaborative work between Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein. Kahneman and Klein have spent their entire careers tackling the same field (the psychology of decision-making) with diametrically opposed approaches – Kahneman focuses on controlled lab experiments, comparisons of decision-making performance to an objective optimum, and a generally skeptical stance towards human cognition. Klein focuses on research in real-world organisations, analysis of actual performance through more subjective variables and a generally admiring stance on human cognition. Yet they were able to collaborate and find common ground, the results of which are summarised in a fascinating paper. Economics could do with more applied researchers like Gary Klein as well as more theoretical researchers like Daniel Kahneman who are open to applied practical insights. ++++++++++ A great divide holds back the relevance of economistsJul 26, 2011 08:45 EDT economics | forecasts By Mark Thoma The opinions expressed are his own. Reuters invited leading economists to reply to Mark Thoma's Op-Ed on the "great divide" in economics and will be publishing the responses. Here are responses from Ashwin Parameswaran, James Hamilton, Dean Baker, Lawrence Summers, and a recap of Paul Krugman's. How much confidence would you have in the medical profession if the teaching faculty in medical schools had very little experience actually treating patients, and very little connection to – even a lack of respect for – the practitioners in the field? Would your confidence be improved if medical research had little to do with the questions that are important to the doctors trying to serve patients? Unfortunately, that's a pretty good description of how economics has been practiced. The questions academic economists are trying to answer have little connection to the problems faced by business economists trying to help their firms make good, profitable decisions (and vice-versa). And though academics pay some attention to government policy, particularly Federal Reserve policy, addressing the problems faced by government economists trying to help policymakers make the best possible choices is not the main focus of this research. This division between academic, government, and business economists is driven by the fact that economic theory and econometrics can be used for two different things. One is learning about how the world works. These "how and why" questions are the focus of academic research. For example, academic economists try to understand why demand curves slope downward, how business-cycle fluctuations in GDP come about, and how prices are determined in market economies. The other use of theoretical and empirical economic models is forecasting, for example predicting where the economy is headed so that businesses can react accordingly, and predicting what might happen if various government policy proposals are implemented. These are the "what if" questions that economists in government and business are most interested in. What will happen to tax revenue if business taxes are cut? What will happen to the demand for my product if the Fed raises interest rates? What is the most likely course that the economy will take? Again, a comparison with the medical field is useful. Science can help us to learn about how the body works, and that certainly aids our efforts to battle disease. This is an important area of research, and we wouldn't want to cut it short. But knowing how the body works isn't enough, we also need the ability to diagnose current illnesses and to predict when someone is going to get sick. In addition, we need to have treatments available to fix the problems that we've identified. Periodic checkups, for example, allow us to predict who might get coronary disease, and then take action to avoid much bigger problems down the road. Academic economists have emphasized the "how it works" part of economics; in econometrics, for example, the focus is on hypothesis testing to determine which model of the economy is best, rather than on forecasting the future of the economy. Academic economists do evaluate policy proposals theoretically and empirically, and they do provide forecasts of the economy. But forecasting in particular is not the main focus of their efforts, , and they've all but ignored – even looked down their noses upon – forecasters and practitioners in the government and business communities. They are often viewed as data grubbers who use old-fashioned models and techniques, and are thus unworthy of attention from high-minded academics. However, a few practitioners saw the housing bubble coming. Shouldn't academic economists try to learn from them? What did they see that the academics missed? In addition, if the practitioners in the field are unaware of or do not have the technical ability to use the best approaches to the problems they face – criticism from academic economists over how business economists used value-at-risk models prior to the recession comes to mind – whose fault is that? Shouldn't academics try to help the practitioners get over this hurdle instead of turning their backs on the problem, and then looking down at them when they don't use or misapply cutting edge techniques? The failure of academic economists to predict the crisis shows just how costly such insularity and arrogance can be. The patient (the economy) didn't need to have a heart attack (financial meltdown), because even though the signs were there, the academic community had little interest in learning how to read them, let alone in developing early warning and intervention strategies for bubbles and other problems. The Fed does some of this, of course, and the financial crisis has motivated some academic interest in developing early warning systems that would have helped us to identify and do something about stock, housing, and other bubbles before they inflated to dangerous levels. The medical profession would do much worse without connections between the practitioners in the field and the how-it-works types in the labs. The questions researchers ask, for example, are shaped by the needs of the practitioners trying to prevent and cure illness. What types of tests can doctors do in their offices and labs to quickly and reliably indicate the current health of a patient and to forecast future health problems? In economics, if reliable tests for bubbles had been available to business economists, that could have saved the economy from considerable losses. Economics has lost the connection between the practitioners and the academics. This may have something to do with the desire among economists to become more of a science – a heavy focus on theory and math is the result. But no matter the cause, if we want to do all that we can to avoid big economic problems, and if we want to use the feedback from those testing economic ideas on real world applications as a way of better understanding how the economy works, then we must reestablish these ties. PHOTO: A stethoscope rests on a container of hand sanitizer inside of the doctor's office of One Medical Group in New York March 17, 2010. REUTERS/Lucas Jackson |
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Peru:crisis impacto regional arequipa,raul mauro
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