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More mining tax, royalty hikes 'inevitable' – Control Risks
TORONTO (miningweekly.com) – More governments in Africa and elsewhere, especially newly elected ones, will likely look at raising mining taxes and royalties amid historically high commodity prices, Control Risks senior analyst for Africa Thomas Wilson said in an interview."I think it's inevitable. And it's always been like that, it's always followed the mineral cycle, he said on the sidelines of a MineAfrica seminar in Toronto."Governments look at commodity prices and say 'we should be getting more out of this'."The trend is also a product of the changes in governments, particularly when more democratic regimes replace what may have been "more autocratic" previous governments, he said."So they come in on a popular mandate where they have made the electorate promises to look at contracts that were signed in the past with other governments that were potentially, I suppose, less scrupulous when it came to negotiating with foreign investors."Mining companies and investors are increasingly edgy about potential changes in government policy in the regions where they operate, as nations seek ways to benefit more from record commodity prices.A trend towards resource nationalism around the world is probably the biggest risk facing mining companies, Xstrata CEO Mick Davis said in December.Last year, then-Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd proposed a 40% resources super profits tax, and although the country backed off the plan it has now released draft laws for a 30% tax on coal and iron ore miners.Also this week, reports emerged that the Tanzanian government is planning a windfall tax on the mining industry, sending shares in LSE-listed African Barrick Gold lower.And Mining companies operating in Peru also declined sharply on Monday after left-leaning Ollanta Humala, a military officer who had talked about making sure Peruvians benefit more from the country's mineral wealth, was elected President.Guinea, under new President Alpha Conde, has also said it will relook at the country's mining code, followed by a review of all existing mining contracts.Reviews of outdated laws and a push by governments to be more active in their resources sectors are not necessarily a bad thing, Wilson commented."But they must resist the temptation to turn reviews of laws and contracts into a purely revenue generating exercise."DEALS TO SURVIVEMining companies operating in higher-risk areas are also not helping themselves or their shareholders by squeezing all possible concessions out of governments when negotiating mining contracts and agreements, Webber Wentzel partner Nkikia Moshesh said at the same event.Agreements that seem skewed in the foreign investor's favour might look good on paper but run the risk of coming under fire from future governments and their voters, she commented.Regimes change, commodity prices rise, "and people end up saying 'we are not extracting enough value from this company'," Moshesh said."Mining projects are intended to be of a long term nature. You want to conclude agreements that are going to survive, and preferably will survive changes in government, changes in political thinking."ALMIGHTY STINKAfrican Barrick Gold, the biggest producer in Tanzania, and South Africa's AngloGold Ashanti both insisted this week that their tax positions in the country are protected by existing mineral development agreements, and could not be affected by a new windfall tax.But there few new mines coming onstream in Tanzania and there is relatively little exploration investment as well, commented Africa mining consultant with political risk consultancy Menas Associates Christopher Melville."If the government is serious about the windfall tax it can have no other targets than the producing mines operated by the big players," he said.Although the tax reports could just be "smoke and mirrors" related to internal party politics, it is also possible that the government is trying to use the threat of an imposed tax to persuade mining companies to renegotiate contracts voluntarily, Melville suggested."Trying to push it through...would cause an almighty stink with the majors given the stabilisation clauses in their development agreements."The government surely has no stomach for such a stink and may rather hope that unsettling announcements will be enough to encourage the companies to renegotiate voluntarily."Either way, this week's reports are clearly negative for investor interest in Tanzania, he said."The government cannot afford to kill the goose."Edited by: Creamer Media Reporter
cobre-alcanza-precio-record-27-meses
la crisis del dolar eleva el precio de los valores refugios
| Have we underestimated Chinese consumption? Posted: 28 Aug 2010 05:00 AM PDT By Michael PettisOn August 8 Credit Suisse published a study they had commissioned by Professor Wang Xiaolu of the China Reform Foundation. A lot of readers have asked on- and offline me to discuss this study in light of the entry I posted two weeks ago about Chinese consumption – and especially to explain whether this study would cause me to retract any of the things I said. Before I get into that, I suppose by now everyone has noticed that China is trying to diversify its reserve holdings and is reported to be buying more Japanese yen and Korean won, and perhaps other currencies. In my entry six weeks ago, I argued that the fear that China could disrupt the US Treasury market by dumping dollars was totally unreasonable. The latest news supports my argument, I think. First, it is pretty clear from the recent performance of the market that the vigorous attempt to diversify PBoC holdings has had no disruptive affect on the US Treasury market. It cannot. The world has a problem of too many countries eager to increase their export of savings and too few increasingly reluctant countries importing savings. Too-little foreign financing won't be an issue for the US Treasury, it is too much foreign financing that the US must worry about. As if to prove the point, the Financial Times had an article Wednesday with the title: "Foreigners flock to buy US Treasuries." I am pretty sure they will continue "flocking" for many more years.Second, even the small moves into won and yen are causing consternation in Japan and Korea. For example, Saturday's Financial Times has this: Japanese prime minister Naoto Kan on Friday said he was ready to take "decisive" action on the yen, and urged the Bank of Japan to implement "expeditious" monetary policy measures.I pointed out in my piece six weeks ago that if the PBoC switches from dollars to some other currency, one of two things must happen. Either the recipient country buys dollars to keep its currency from surging, in which case the US gets the money anyway, or the US trade deficit will be transferred to the recipient country, which will cause trade tensions with China. Wednesday's South China Morning Post already has the Japanese financial authorities threatening intervention because the rising yen is hurting exports — although apparently it is not just PBoC buying that is forcing up the yen.The second of those two things is happening, in other words, and to prevent it from continuing, Japan will resort to the first. As an aide, it was not that long ago when the Japanese were arguing that US attempts to force up the yen were misguided because Japan's trade surplus had nothing to do with the undervalued currency. Now, apparently, it seems that the value of the currency does matter after all. Expect a lot more of this. As the US deficit surges as a consequence of the combination of collapsing trade deficits in Europe and expansionary trade-related policies in China, Germany, Japan and other trade surplus countries, surplus countries may implicitly or explicitly try to relieve pressure on the US by forcing deficits onto their neighbors, but no one wants them. In the 1930s this was called beggar-thy-neighbor. I discuss it in an OpEd piece for the Financial Times on Monday. Chinese income is higher than we thought But enough on the awfully gloomy subject of trade. To get back to the Credit Suisse study, it is a very interesting attempt to estimate the real size of the Chinese economy, Chinese household income, and Chinese savings and consumption rates by eliminating some of the biases in the NBS surveys. As they explain it: The purpose is to try to correct the understatement of income in the official household survey by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Basically, the study assumes that while respondents understate their income during the survey of NBS (for reasons like worrying that such information will be passed to tax authorities, etc.), they have no incentive to understate total spending, particularly the percentage of food consumption to total spending (the Engel's coefficient).While I agree that having strangers ask questions about income may introduce biases in people's response – we're probably more likely to understate our income, especially if it includes grey or illegal income, when asked by strangers representing the government – I am not sure how comfortable I am with the idea that having friends ask the same questions eliminates biases. Maybe it just creates a different bias – I suspect we are likely to overstate our income when we discuss it with friends. Still, that aside, the numbers seem plausible, at least to me, but not everyone agrees. According to an article in the the China Daily: Officials from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) said on Wednesday that the figures in the report, which was published by an independent group in July, were unreliable.At any rate according to the study there is enough hidden and grey income in China, more than estimated by the NBS, that China's real GDP might be understated by 10% relative to official numbers. In 2008, China's official GDP was RMB 31.4 trillion. According to Wang it really was RMB 34.6 trillion. Chinese household income, the study claims, has also been understated and, with it, Chinese household consumption. The study argues that Chinese household income was about 30% higher than the estimates of the NBS.The response of most analysts and the press to the report was a little puzzling to me. Professor Wang's study, many people seemed to argue, proved that either China didn't have an under-consumption problem, or else it proved that the problem was much less serious than the worriers had claimed because both consumption and income may be higher than we think. A more sophisticated variant was the claim that the study proved that China had much greater potential for consumption growth than previously imagined. Under-consumption is easy to prove The first two statements are simply wrong. They confuse absolute consumption with relative consumption. To say that the Chinese under-consume does not mean not that Chinese households have failed to consume at a certain nominal level. It means that the consumption share of total production is very low. In that sense China most certainly has a serious under-consumption problem, and Professor Wang's study actually suggests that it is worse than any of us has imagined.The third statement is probably true, but only to the extent that the worse the under-consumption problem, the more potential there is for consumption growth. This may be arithmetically correct, but it also suggests that unlocking that consumer potential is likely to be harder than expected. How do we know that China has an under-consumption problem? To answer that question it is unnecessary even to look at the consumption statistics. All you need to know is that China has a very high investment rate (perhaps the highest in the world) and a huge trade surplus.Every country produces goods and either consumes or invests those goods. This is not quite an accounting identity, but it becomes one if you take into account the trade balance. Why? Because if it produces more than it consumes or invests, it must run a trade surplus. If it produces less, it must run a trade deficit. In other words by definition what ever you produce is equal to what you invest plus what you consume plus or minus the trade balance. China has an extremely high investment rate, perhaps the highest ever recorded for a medium or large economy. Countries with high investment rates should normally run trade deficits, since there is so little left over of their production for them to consume that they must import the balance. This is what happened, for example, to the US during most of the 19th Century.But China has probably the highest trade surplus ever recorded. This means that an extraordinarily large portion of its production is invested, and another extraordinarily large portion is exported. So what about consumption? The only way a country can run an extraordinarily high investment rate and an extraordinarily high trade surplus is if consumption is extraordinarily low. So almost by definition we know that consumption in China is extraordinarily low as a share of its total production. It is unnecessary to check consumption statistics to prove this.In fact official statistics do prove it. They show that Chinese households consumed a little less than 36% of total GDP last year. This is an unprecedented number, much lower than the 65-70% typical of the US and Europe and even far below the 50-55% typical of other low-consuming Asian countries. More income inequality But Professor Wang's study suggested something very worrying. He claims that nearly two-thirds of the missing income belongs to the wealthiest 10%. Most of the rest went to households in the top half of the income scale. Poor people in China were far less likely to have hidden, grey, or illegal income.So, according to Professor Wang, Chinese household income is distributed far more unequally than any of us had suspected. This is worrying enough for reasons of social equity, but what does it have to do with consumption? A lot. It turns out, not surprisingly, that the rich consume a much smaller share of their income than do the poor. For example, according to Professor Wang's numbers, households that earn more than RMB 400 thousand save 63% of their income, while households that earn RMB 75-400 thousand save 51%. At the other extreme households that earn RMB 7-10 thousand save only 9% of their income and households that earn less than that dis-save (by 23%)So while Chinese household income might be significantly higher than we thought, most of that additional income goes to the high-savings rich. The Chinese savings rate, consequently, is also much higher and the Chinese consumption rate much lower than the official numbers suggest. How low? Here the number is a shocker. Credit Suisse estimates that last year Chinese household consumption was just over 31 percent of GDP – although I am not sure even they completely believe this number. Still, it suggests that the real consumption rate may be between 31% (their number) and 36% (the official number). Either number is completely off the charts.So isn't this good news for consumption as far as its implications foe the economic imbalances? Consumption is so low that it has no choice but to surge, right? Perhaps, but I am very uncomfortable with this argument. It seems to me that the only way consumption can be so low is if there are some very severe structural impediments that distort consumption growth, and I think there is no reason simply to assume or hope that these impediments will dissolve and, as they do, consumption will explode. Rather than proclaim that Professor Wang's adjusted consumption rate is more evidence that consumption must surge, it seems more reasonable to wonder how any country can have such a massive imbalance. And how can Beijing unwind this imbalance? |
dordoñez:
Críticas a la respuesta de los chilenos al terremoto
Acabo de estar en un foro sobre las recientes elecciones en Chile. Un dato interesante sobre los efectos del "modelo" de libre mercado en Chile. La pobreza extrema en Chile es 3.2%. Algún país en Latinoamérica q has seguido un modelo económico diferente tiene una cifra menor a esta?
Diego
Economía chilena: desastre histórico
Un festín del consumo cerró el año para regocijo del comercio, importadores, algunos productores y los habituales comentaristas oficiales. Las ventas navideñas, que crecieron un diez por ciento en comparación con el año anterior, fueron interpretadas localmente como el fin de la crisis y el inicio de la reactivación. Pero se trata de un dato aislado, que probablemente tenderá a la dilución en breve plazo: para la economía chilena, 2009 ha terminado como el peor año en casi tres décadas. Con una caída del producto de 1,9 por ciento, esta contracción no tiene antecedentes desde la crisis de 1982, cuando el producto se hundió sobre el ocho por ciento.
"Si hay algo que 2009 ha dejado claro es la enorme crisis de un modelo económico insostenible no sólo para los trabajadores y la ciudadanía, sino también para la gran mayoría de los pequeños y medianos productores. El modelo neoliberal, que tanta riqueza ha logrado transferir desde las pymes, consumidores y trabajadores hacia la gran empresa, transparentó toda su inequidad y perversidad."
Está claro que se ha tratado de una crisis mundial. Sin embargo, es razonable recordar los llamados a la tranquilidad levantados hace poco tiempo por autoridades como el ministro de Hacienda, Andrés Velasco, en cuanto al blindaje, la solidez, robustez y otros calificativos exorbitados de la economía chilena. Hoy, sólo unos cuantos meses más tarde, podemos observar que aquel ministro, que misteriosamente tiene una alta valoración en las encuestas de la denominada "opinión pública", no acertó en sus pronósticos, más cercanos a meras profecías. La economía chilena, tan publicitada como modelo regional, no sólo ha tenido un tremendo desplome, sino que ha tenido uno de los peores desempeños de Latinoamérica. Sin los altos precios del cobre, las cifras hubieran sido mucho peores.
Comparativamente con otros países latinoamericanos, Chile ha tenido muy malos resultados. México es el país que más ha sufrido -y probablemente seguirá sufriendo con una intensidad casi sin precedentes- los efectos de la crisis mundial desatada por su vecino del norte. Al ser el vagón de cola de ese malogrado proyecto neoliberal llamado Nafta o TLCAN, que le llevó a depender casi en su totalidad de la economía estadounidense, el PIB mexicano cayó en 2009 más de un siete por ciento. Si descartamos algunas de las pequeñas economías centroamericanas, la mayoría de ellas muy dependientes del imperio, el siguiente país en esta lista de los más golpeados por la crisis es Paraguay, con una contracción del tres por ciento, y luego Chile, cuyo PIB cayó 1,9 por ciento. En comparación, podemos ver que Brasil caerá sólo 0,8% pero Argentina crecerá 1,5 puntos; Perú, dos por ciento; Colombia, 0,8; Venezuela, 0,3; Ecuador y Cuba, uno por ciento. El país que tendrá el mejor desempeño económico este año será Bolivia, cuyo PIB aumentará, según la Cepal, 2,5 por ciento.
Uno de los motivos del fuerte deterioro de la economía chilena es su enorme dependencia del comportamiento de sus socios comerciales. La tan elogiada apertura comercial ha sido su lastre. Más de un 60 por ciento de las exportaciones se concentran en cuatro grandes mercados (Unión Europea, Estados Unidos, Japón y China), los que, con la excepción de China, que creció ocho por ciento en 2009, sufrieron fuertes contracciones. El producto de EE.UU. cayó 2,5 por ciento, el de la UE cuatro por ciento y Japón 5,3.
La soberbia de Hacienda
El último informe de política monetaria del Banco Central, publicado en diciembre, hace referencia al alto precio del cobre que evitó mayores caídas del producto, y aprovecha, de forma muy suave pero efectiva, de enviarle un mensaje a Velasco y a su soberbia: "No conviene olvidar que en 2009, el Fisco echó mano al 40 por ciento de los fondos provenientes del alto valor del cobre, y los resultados, lejos de la pretendida `inmunidad local' al shock externo, demostraron que no se supo evitar la contracción económica -según se prevé- de 1,9 por ciento".
El alto precio del cobre evitó mayores contracciones en exportaciones como el salmón y las manufacturas, las que cayeron tres por ciento promedio. Pero no logró precaver descalabros en otras áreas de la economía, principalmente el laboral. Durante el año la tasa de desempleo superó el diez por ciento, con más de 800 mil personas sin trabajo. Si este es el dato oficial que proporciona el INE, no pocos economistas, como Orlando Caputo, han estimado que el desempleo superó, en 2009, con creces el millón de personas. Pero nada es tan grave como la cesantía juvenil, que ha llegó a bordear el 28 por ciento: uno de cada cuatro jóvenes menores de 25 años con ganas de trabajar no ha conseguido un empleo.
Del mismo modo que en la contracción del PIB, la economía chilena tampoco puede compararse favorablemente en empleo con el resto de Latinoamérica. Las cifras de la Cepal son claras: la tasa de desempleo en Latinoamérica llegó a 8,5 por ciento hacia la mitad del año pasado, que es sensiblemente menor a la que registraba Chile entonces, con niveles superiores al diez por ciento. Si comparamos por país, vemos que sólo Colombia, con 12,8 por ciento, superaba a Chile en desempleo. El resto tuvo menores índices. Por citar algunos, vemos que Argentina tenía un 8,7; Brasil, 8,2; Ecuador, 8,7, México, 7,2; Perú, 8,4, y Venezuela, 7,7 por ciento.
No hubo ni hay en Chile suficientes puestos de trabajo y tampoco buenos salarios. Según el informe del Banco Central, los salarios reales, aun cuando han aumentado gracias a la reducción de la inflación -que a noviembre marcaba -2,3 por ciento-, al hacer una medición sin considerar los sectores ligados a recursos naturales, han descendido. Ha habido una pérdida de poder adquisitivo tanto por el alto desempleo como por la caída en los salarios.
Menos plata y más endeudados
La consecuencia de esta carencia de ingresos debería ser una fuerte caída en el consumo. Pero no ha sido así. Según el Banco Central, "el consumo ha sido uno de los componentes de la demanda menos golpeados". El organismo destaca el comercio minorista, "con ventas de bienes de consumo habitual y durable que ya superan los niveles máximos de 2008, en tanto las ventas de automóviles también registran una recuperación notoria y, aunque no alcanzan los máximos de 2008, se ubican en niveles similares a los de principios de 2007".
La única respuesta al aumento del consumo está en el endeudamiento, que tras haberse frenado levemente durante el año habría comenzado a expandirse nuevamente. Según diversos estudios, los mayores niveles de endeudamiento de las familias chilenas se registraron en 2008 -subieron, en relación con el ingreso, desde un 40 por ciento en 2003 a un 69 por ciento en 2008- los que se estabilizaron durante el año pasado. El desempleo, el riesgo de perder el trabajo y el estancamiento de los salarios explican el estancamiento, el que se mantiene, por cierto, en niveles peligrosos.
Las proyecciones para el año en curso consideran el fin de la crisis. La economía chilena, dice el Banco Central, crecerá más de un cuatro por ciento, proceso estimulado por la reactivación de la economía mundial y de los principales socios comerciales chilenos. El aumento de la producción industrial en diciembre, por primera vez en más de doce meses, reforzaría estas estimaciones.
Pero se trata de estimaciones sobre los actuales y recién pasados hechos. El mismo y tan cauteloso Banco Central advierte en su informe sobre posibles recaídas o turbulencias. "Por un lado, persisten las dudas respecto de la fortaleza de la recuperación económica global. Los últimos datos han sido mejores que lo previsto en varias economías", pero "la situación del mercado laboral sigue compleja en diversas economías, lo que, sumado al proceso de desapalancamiento (apalancamiento es la relación entre capital y deuda en una operación financiera) todavía en marcha, agrega dudas de la capacidad de recuperación del consumo y la inversión en el mundo".
Tal como ya han advertido numerosos economistas, el Banco Central chileno también recoge estos riesgos, los que surgen, especialmente, desde Estados Unidos, que, con una tasa de desempleo que ha superado el diez por ciento, mantiene niveles muy deprimidos de consumo e inversión. Tras los ingentes volúmenes de dinero inyectados por los sistemas públicos en las diferentes economías mundiales, la recuperación no ha llegado a las personas, en tanto los mercados, que mantuvieron durante el año pasado un repunte, no han conseguido tomar un rumbo propio. El auge vivido en 2009 responde más que nada a los estímulos fiscales de finales de 2008 y comienzos de 2009.
¿Hay riesgos de una nueva caída? Sí, y en el corazón del imperio. Allí también se habla de recuperación, pero no de su extrema debilidad, la que se expresa en el frágil consumo, el limitado acceso al crédito, que sigue cayendo, el estancamiento de los salarios. Y el enorme desempleo: en noviembre la tasa nacional de cesantía en Estados Unidos, aunque bajó levemente, se mantuvo en diez por ciento, la más alta en 26 años.
Y están las insolvencias bancarias. La cifra de bancos quebrados en Estados Unidos tras la crisis financiera suma y sigue. Durante la primera semana de septiembre cerraron tres nuevos bancos, sumando un total de 98 en la lista. Días más tarde, durante la reunión del FMI y el Banco Mundial en Estambul, Turquía, el inversionista y especulador mundial George Soros dijo con claridad que "Estados Unidos avanzará muy lentamente en la recuperación, porque tiene un largo camino por recorrer". Uno de sus problemas son las compañías financieras "básicamente quebradas" y los consumidores altamente endeudados. Un obstáculo mayor en un país cuya economía se basa en el consumo de masas.
El Premio Nobel de Economía Joseph Stiglitz tampoco confía en este aparente proceso de reactivación. Hay muchas señales que juegan en contra, ha dicho, como el disminuido consumo, el alto desempleo y las gigantescas deudas de las familias. Para Stiglitz las causas que llevaron a la crisis están presentes.
Es lo que ha anotado el sociólogo filipino y activista antiglobalización Walden Bello. Tras la crisis, no se ha aprobado ninguna medida regulatoria que impida a las compañías de Wall Street hacer todo tipo de juegos especulativos y caer en un futuro en un colapso similar. "Al contrario: se han inventado nuevos instrumentos especulativos, como los derivados, que permitirían a los inversores hacer dinero con la venta de planes de seguros de vida contratados por personas mayores que no pueden ya seguir pagándolos".
Hacia finales de noviembre un nuevo colapso hizo temblar a los mercados financieros mundiales. La solicitud de moratoria de pagos de Dubai, un paraíso artificial inmobiliario, recordó al mundo de los inversionistas y especuladores la fragilidad de las bases del capitalismo. Un trance que se repitió semanas más tarde con una violenta caída de los mercados griegos, que expresaron los temores por la insolvencia de esta economía de la UE. Un colapso de la República Helénica podría contaminar a otros países del bloque y amenazar la estabilidad del euro.
Entramos a 2010 con una economía mundial extremadamente frágil, fenómeno que se reproduce en la economía nacional, que ha mantenido un equilibrio precario sobre bases espurias: la institucionalidad económica apoyada en el libre mercado, la alta concentración de la propiedad, la explotación indiscriminada de los recursos naturales y de la fuerza laboral y el endeudamiento masivo que engorda a las grandes corporaciones financieras. Si hay algo que 2009 ha dejado claro es la enorme crisis de un modelo económico insostenible no sólo para los trabajadores y la ciudadanía, sino también para la gran mayoría de los pequeños y medianos productores. El modelo neoliberal, que tanta riqueza ha logrado transferir desde las pymes, consumidores y trabajadores hacia la gran empresa, transparentó toda su inequidad y perversidad.
Wall Street's Bailout HustleGoldman Sachs and other big banks aren't just pocketing the trillions we gave them to rescue the economy - they're re-creating the conditions for another crashMATT TAIBBI Posted Feb 17, 2010 5:57 AM On January 21st, Lloyd Blankfein left a peculiar voicemail message on the work phones of his employees at Goldman Sachs. Fast becoming America's pre-eminent Marvel Comics supervillain, the CEO used the call to deploy his secret weapon: a pair of giant, nuclear-powered testicles. In his message, Blankfein addressed his plan to pay out gigantic year-end bonuses amid widespread controversy over Goldman's role in precipitating the global financial crisis. The bank had already set aside a tidy $16.2 billion for salaries and bonuses — meaning that Goldman employees were each set to take home an average of $498,246, a number roughly commensurate with what they received during the bubble years. Still, the troops were worried: There were rumors that Dr. Ballsachs, bowing to political pressure, might be forced to scale the number back. After all, the country was broke, 14.8 million Americans were stranded on the unemployment line, and Barack Obama and the Democrats were trying to recover the populist high ground after their bitch-whipping in Massachusetts by calling for a "bailout tax" on banks. Maybe this wasn't the right time for Goldman to be throwing its annual Roman bonus orgy. Not to worry, Blankfein reassured employees. "In a year that proved to have no shortage of story lines," he said, "I believe very strongly that performance is the ultimate narrative." Translation: We made a shitload of money last year because we're so amazing at our jobs, so fuck all those people who want us to reduce our bonuses. Goldman wasn't alone. The nation's six largest banks — all committed to this balls-out, I drink your milkshake! strategy of flagrantly gorging themselves as America goes hungry — set aside a whopping $140 billion for executive compensation last year, a sum only slightly less than the $164 billion they paid themselves in the pre-crash year of 2007. In a gesture of self-sacrifice, Blankfein himself took a humiliatingly low bonus of $9 million, less than the 2009 pay of elephantine New York Knicks washout Eddy Curry. But in reality, not much had changed. "What is the state of our moral being when Lloyd Blankfein taking a $9 million bonus is viewed as this great act of contrition, when every penny of it was a direct transfer from the taxpayer?" asks Eliot Spitzer, who tried to hold Wall Street accountable during his own ill-fated stint as governor of New York. Beyond a few such bleats of outrage, however, the huge payout was met, by and large, with a collective sigh of resignation. Because beneath America's populist veneer, on a more subtle strata of the national psyche, there remains a strong temptation to not really give a shit. The rich, after all, have always made way too much money; what's the difference if some fat cat in New York pockets $20 million instead of $10 million? The only reason such apathy exists, however, is because there's still a widespread misunderstanding of how exactly Wall Street "earns" its money, with emphasis on the quotation marks around "earns." The question everyone should be asking, as one bailout recipient after another posts massive profits — Goldman reported $13.4 billion in profits last year, after paying out that $16.2 billion in bonuses and compensation — is this: In an economy as horrible as ours, with every factory town between New York and Los Angeles looking like those hollowed-out ghost ships we see on History Channel documentaries like Shipwrecks of the Great Lakes, where in the hell did Wall Street's eye-popping profits come from, exactly? Did Goldman go from bailout city to $13.4 billion in the black because, as Blankfein suggests, its "performance" was just that awesome? A year and a half after they were minutes away from bankruptcy, how are these assholes not only back on their feet again, but hauling in bonuses at the same rate they were during the bubble? The answer to that question is basically twofold: They raped the taxpayer, and they raped their clients. The bottom line is that banks like Goldman have learned absolutely nothing from the global economic meltdown. In fact, they're back conniving and playing speculative long shots in force — only this time with the full financial support of the U.S. government. In the process, they're rapidly re-creating the conditions for another crash, with the same actors once again playing the same crazy games of financial chicken with the same toxic assets as before.That's why this bonus business isn't merely a matter of getting upset about whether or not Lloyd Blankfein buys himself one tropical island or two on his next birthday. The reality is that the post-bailout era in which Goldman thrived has turned out to be a chaotic frenzy of high-stakes con-artistry, with taxpayers and clients bilked out of billions using a dizzying array of old-school hustles that, but for their ponderous complexity, would have fit well in slick grifter movies like The Sting and Matchstick Men. There's even a term in con-man lingo for what some of the banks are doing right now, with all their cosmetic gestures of scaling back bonuses and giving to charities. In the grifter world, calming down a mark so he doesn't call the cops is known as the "Cool Off." To appreciate how all of these (sometimes brilliant) schemes work is to understand the difference between earning money and taking scores, and to realize that the profits these banks are posting don't so much represent national growth and recovery, but something closer to the losses one would report after a theft or a car crash. Many Americans instinctively understand this to be true — but, much like when your wife does it with your 300-pound plumber in the kids' playroom, knowing it and actually watching the whole scene from start to finish are two very different things. In that spirit, a brief history of the best 18 months of grifting this country has ever seen: CON #1 THE SWOOP AND SQUAT By now, most people who have followed the financial crisis know that the bailout of AIG was actually a bailout of AIG's "counterparties" — the big banks like Goldman to whom the insurance giant owed billions when it went belly up. What is less understood is that the bailout of AIG counter-parties like Goldman and Société Générale, a French bank, actually began before the collapse of AIG, before the Federal Reserve paid them so much as a dollar. Nor is it understood that these counterparties actually accelerated the wreck of AIG in what was, ironically, something very like the old insurance scam known as "Swoop and Squat," in which a target car is trapped between two perpetrator vehicles and wrecked, with the mark in the game being the target's insurance company — in this case, the government. This may sound far-fetched, but the financial crisis of 2008 was very much caused by a perverse series of legal incentives that often made failed investments worth more than thriving ones. Our economy was like a town where everyone has juicy insurance policies on their neighbors' cars and houses. In such a town, the driving will be suspiciously bad, and there will be a lot of fires. AIG was the ultimate example of this dynamic. At the height of the housing boom, Goldman was selling billions in bundled mortgage-backed securities — often toxic crap of the no-money-down, no-identification-needed variety of home loan — to various institutional suckers like pensions and insurance companies, who frequently thought they were buying investment-grade instruments. At the same time, in a glaring example of the perverse incentives that existed and still exist, Goldman was also betting against those same sorts of securities — a practice that one government investigator compared to "selling a car with faulty brakes and then buying an insurance policy on the buyer of those cars." Goldman often "insured" some of this garbage with AIG, using a virtually unregulated form of pseudo-insurance called credit-default swaps. Thanks in large part to deregulation pushed by Bob Rubin, former chairman of Goldman, and Treasury secretary under Bill Clinton, AIG wasn't required to actually have the capital to pay off the deals. As a result, banks like Goldman bought more than $440 billion worth of this bogus insurance from AIG, a huge blind bet that the taxpayer ended up having to eat. Thus, when the housing bubble went crazy, Goldman made money coming and going. They made money selling the crap mortgages, and they made money by collecting on the bogus insurance from AIG when the crap mortgages flopped. Still, the trick for Goldman was: how to collect the insurance money. As AIG headed into a tailspin that fateful summer of 2008, it looked like the beleaguered firm wasn't going to have the money to pay off the bogus insurance. So Goldman and other banks began demanding that AIG provide them with cash collateral. In the 15 months leading up to the collapse of AIG, Goldman received $5.9 billion in collateral. Société Générale, a bank holding lots of mortgage-backed crap originally underwritten by Goldman, received $5.5 billion. These collateral demands squeezing AIG from two sides were the "Swoop and Squat" that ultimately crashed the firm. "It put the company into a liquidity crisis," says Eric Dinallo, who was intimately involved in the AIG bailout as head of the New York State Insurance Department. It was a brilliant move. When a company like AIG is about to die, it isn't supposed to hand over big hunks of assets to a single creditor like Goldman; it's supposed to equitably distribute whatever assets it has left among all its creditors. Had AIG gone bankrupt, Goldman would have likely lost much of the $5.9 billion that it pocketed as collateral. "Any bankruptcy court that saw those collateral payments would have declined that transaction as a fraudulent conveyance," says Barry Ritholtz, the author of Bailout Nation. Instead, Goldman and the other counterparties got their money out in advance — putting a torch to what was left of AIG. Fans of the movie Goodfellas will recall Henry Hill and Tommy DeVito taking the same approach to the Bamboo Lounge nightclub they'd been gouging. Roll the Ray Liotta narration: "Finally, when there's nothing left, when you can't borrow another buck . . . you bust the joint out. You light a match." And why not? After all, according to the terms of the bailout deal struck when AIG was taken over by the state in September 2008, Goldman was paid 100 cents on the dollar on an additional $12.9 billion it was owed by AIG — again, money it almost certainly would not have seen a fraction of had AIG proceeded to a normal bankruptcy. Along with the collateral it pocketed, that's $19 billion in pure cash that Goldman would not have "earned" without massive state intervention. How's that $13.4 billion in 2009 profits looking now? And that doesn't even include the direct bailouts of Goldman Sachs and other big banks, which began in earnest after the collapse of AIG. CON #2 THE DOLLAR STORE In the usual "DollarStore" or "Big Store" scam — popularized in movies like The Sting — a huge cast of con artists is hired to create a whole fake environment into which the unsuspecting mark walks and gets robbed over and over again. A warehouse is converted into a makeshift casino or off-track betting parlor, the fool walks in with money, leaves without it. The two key elements to the Dollar Store scam are the whiz-bang theatrical redecorating job and the fact that everyone is in on it except the mark. In this case, a pair of investment banks were dressed up to look like commercial banks overnight, and it was the taxpayer who walked in and lost his shirt, confused by the appearance of what looked like real Federal Reserve officials minding the store. Less than a week after the AIG bailout, Goldman and another investment bank, Morgan Stanley, applied for, and received, federal permission to become bank holding companies — a move that would make them eligible for much greater federal support. The stock prices of both firms were cratering, and there was talk that either or both might go the way of Lehman Brothers, another once-mighty investment bank that just a week earlier had disappeared from the face of the earth under the weight of its toxic assets. By law, a five-day waiting period was required for such a conversion — but the two banks got them overnight, with final approval actually coming only five days after the AIG bailout. Why did they need those federal bank charters? This question is the key to understanding the entire bailout era — because this Dollar Store scam was the big one. Institutions that were, in reality, high-risk gambling houses were allowed to masquerade as conservative commercial banks. As a result of this new designation, they were given access to a virtually endless tap of "free money" by unsuspecting taxpayers. The $10 billion that Goldman received under the better-known TARP bailout was chump change in comparison to the smorgasbord of direct and indirect aid it qualified for as a commercial bank. When Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley got their federal bank charters, they joined Bank of America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and the other banking titans who could go to the Fed and borrow massive amounts of money at interest rates that, thanks to the aggressive rate-cutting policies of Fed chief Ben Bernanke during the crisis, soon sank to zero percent. The ability to go to the Fed and borrow big at next to no interest was what saved Goldman, Morgan Stanley and other banks from death in the fall of 2008. "They had no other way to raise capital at that moment, meaning they were on the brink of insolvency," says Nomi Prins, a former managing director at Goldman Sachs. "The Fed was the only shot." In fact, the Fed became not just a source of emergency borrowing that enabled Goldman and Morgan Stanley to stave off disaster — it became a source of long-term guaranteed income. Borrowing at zero percent interest, banks like Goldman now had virtually infinite ways to make money. In one of the most common maneuvers, they simply took the money they borrowed from the government at zero percent and lent it back to the government by buying Treasury bills that paid interest of three or four percent. It was basically a license to print money — no different than attaching an ATM to the side of the Federal Reserve. "You're borrowing at zero, putting it out there at two or three percent, with hundreds of billions of dollars — man, you can make a lot of money that way," says the manager of one prominent hedge fund. "It's free money." Which goes a long way to explaining Goldman's enormous profits last year. But all that free money was amplified by another scam: CON #3 THE PIG IN THE POKE At one point or another, pretty much everyone who takes drugs has been burned by this one, also known as the "Rocks in the Box" scam or, in its more elaborate variations, the "Jamaican Switch." Someone sells you what looks like an eightball of coke in a baggie, you get home and, you dumbass, it's baby powder. The scam's name comes from the Middle Ages, when some fool would be sold a bound and gagged pig that he would see being put into a bag; he'd miss the switch, then get home and find a tied-up cat in there instead. Hence the expression "Don't let the cat out of the bag." The "Pig in the Poke" scam is another key to the entire bailout era. After the crash of the housing bubble — the largest asset bubble in history — the economy was suddenly flooded with securities backed by failing or near-failing home loans. In the cleanup phase after that bubble burst, the whole game was to get taxpayers, clients and shareholders to buy these worthless cats, but at pig prices. One of the first times we saw the scam appear was in September 2008, right around the time that AIG was imploding. That was when the Fed changed some of its collateral rules, meaning banks that could once borrow only against sound collateral, like Treasury bills or AAA-rated corporate bonds, could now borrow against pretty much anything — including some of the mortgage-backed sewage that got us into this mess in the first place. In other words, banks that once had to show a real pig to borrow from the Fed could now show up with a cat and get pig money. "All of a sudden, banks were allowed to post absolute shit to the Fed's balance sheet," says the manager of the prominent hedge fund. The Fed spelled it out on September 14th, 2008, when it changed the collateral rules for one of its first bailout facilities — the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, or PDCF. The Fed's own write-up described the changes: "With the Fed's action, all the kinds of collateral then in use . . . including non-investment-grade securities and equities . . . became eligible for pledge in the PDCF." Translation: We now accept cats. The Pig in the Poke also came into play in April of last year, when Congress pushed a little-known agency called the Financial Accounting Standards Board, or FASB, to change the so-called "mark-to-market" accounting rules. Until this rule change, banks had to assign a real-market price to all of their assets. If they had a balance sheet full of securities they had bought at $3 that were now only worth $1, they had to figure their year-end accounting using that $1 value. In other words, if you were the dope who bought a cat instead of a pig, you couldn't invite your shareholders to a slate of pork dinners come year-end accounting time. But last April, FASB changed all that. From now on, it announced, banks could avoid reporting losses on some of their crappy cat investments simply by declaring that they would "more likely than not" hold on to them until they recovered their pig value. In short, the banks didn't even have to actually hold on to the toxic shit they owned — they just had to sort of promise to hold on to it. That's why the "profit" numbers of a lot of these banks are really a joke. In many cases, we have absolutely no idea how many cats are in their proverbial bag. What they call "profits" might really be profits, only minus undeclared millions or billions in losses. "They're hiding all this stuff from their shareholders," says Ritholtz, who was disgusted that the banks lobbied for the rule changes. "Now, suddenly banks that were happy to mark to market on the way up don't have to mark to market on the way down." CON #4 THE RUMANIAN BOX One of the great innovations of Victor Lustig, the legendary Depression-era con man who wrote the famous "Ten Commandments for Con Men," was a thing called the "Rumanian Box." This was a little machine that a mark would put a blank piece of paper into, only to see real currency come out the other side. The brilliant Lustig sold this Rumanian Box over and over again for vast sums — but he's been outdone by the modern barons of Wall Street, who managed to get themselves a real Rumanian Box. How they accomplished this is a story that by itself highlights the challenge of placing this era in any kind of historical context of known financial crime. What the banks did was something that was never — and never could have been — thought of before. They took so much money from the government, and then did so little with it, that the state was forced to start printing new cash to throw at them. Even the great Lustig in his wildest, horniest dreams could never have dreamed up this one. The setup: By early 2009, the banks had already replenished themselves with billions if not trillions in bailout money. It wasn't just the $700 billion in TARP cash, the free money provided by the Fed, and the untold losses obscured by accounting tricks. Another new rule allowed banks to collect interest on the cash they were required by law to keep in reserve accounts at the Fed — meaning the state was now compensating the banks simply for guaranteeing their own solvency. And a new federal operation called the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program let insolvent and near-insolvent banks dispense with their deservedly ruined credit profiles and borrow on a clean slate, with FDIC backing. Goldman borrowed $29 billion on the government's good name, J.P. Morgan Chase $38 billion, and Bank of America $44 billion. "TLGP," says Prins, the former Goldman manager, "was a big one." Collectively, all this largesse was worth trillions. The idea behind the flood of money, from the government's standpoint, was to spark a national recovery: We refill the banks' balance sheets, and they, in turn, start to lend money again, recharging the economy and producing jobs. "The banks were fast approaching insolvency," says Rep. Paul Kanjorski, a vocal critic of Wall Street who nevertheless defends the initial decision to bail out the banks. "It was vitally important that we recapitalize these institutions." But here's the thing. Despite all these trillions in government rescues, despite the Fed slashing interest rates down to nothing and showering the banks with mountains of guarantees, Goldman and its friends had still not jump-started lending again by the first quarter of 2009. That's where those nuclear-powered balls of Lloyd Blankfein came into play, as Goldman and other banks basically threatened to pick up their bailout billions and go home if the government didn't fork over more cash — a lot more. "Even if the Fed could make interest rates negative, that wouldn't necessarily help," warned Goldman's chief domestic economist, Jan Hatzius. "We're in a deep recession mainly because the private sector, for a variety of reasons, has decided to save a lot more." Translation: You can lower interest rates all you want, but we're still not fucking lending the bailout money to anyone in this economy. Until the government agreed to hand over even more goodies, the banks opted to join the rest of the "private sector" and "save" the taxpayer aid they had received — in the form of bonuses and compensation. The ploy worked. In March of last year, the Fed sharply expanded a radical new program called quantitative easing, which effectively operated as a real-live Rumanian Box. The government put stacks of paper in one side, and out came $1.2 trillion "real" dollars. The government used some of that freshly printed money to prop itself up by purchasing Treasury bonds — a desperation move, since Washington's demand for cash was so great post-Clusterfuck '08 that even the Chinese couldn't buy U.S. debt fast enough to keep America afloat. But the Fed used most of the new cash to buy mortgage-backed securities in an effort to spur home lending — instantly creating a massive market for major banks. And what did the banks do with the proceeds? Among other things, they bought Treasury bonds, essentially lending the money back to the government, at interest. The money that came out of the magic Rumanian Box went from the government back to the government, with Wall Street stepping into the circle just long enough to get paid. And once quantitative easing ends, as it is scheduled to do in March, the flow of money for home loans will once again grind to a halt. The Mortgage Bankers Association expects the number of new residential mortgages to plunge by 40 percent this year. CON #5 THE BIG MITT All of that Rumanian box paper was made even more valuable by running it through the next stage of the grift. Michael Masters, one of the country's leading experts on commodities trading, compares this part of the scam to the poker game in the Bill Murray comedy Stripes. "It's like that scene where John Candy leans over to the guy who's new at poker and says, 'Let me see your cards,' then starts giving him advice," Masters says. "He looks at the hand, and the guy has bad cards, and he's like, 'Bluff me, come on! If it were me, I'd bet everything!' That's what it's like. It's like they're looking at your cards as they give you advice." In more ways than one can count, the economy in the bailout era turned into a "Big Mitt," the con man's name for a rigged poker game. Everybody was indeed looking at everyone else's cards, in many cases with state sanction. Only taxpayers and clients were left out of the loop. At the same time the Fed and the Treasury were making massive, earthshaking moves like quantitative easing and TARP, they were also consulting regularly with private advisory boards that include every major player on Wall Street. The Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee has a J.P. Morgan executive as its chairman and a Goldman executive as its vice chairman, while the board advising the Fed includes bankers from Capital One and Bank of New York Mellon. That means that, in addition to getting great gobs of free money, the banks were also getting clear signals about when they were getting that money, making it possible to position themselves to make the appropriate investments. One of the best examples of the banks blatantly gambling, and winning, on government moves was the Public-Private Investment Program, or PPIP. In this bizarre scheme cooked up by goofball-geek Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, the government loaned money to hedge funds and other private investors to buy up the absolutely most toxic horseshit on the market — the same kind of high-risk, high-yield mortgages that were most responsible for triggering the financial chain reaction in the fall of 2008. These satanic deals were the basic currency of the bubble: Jobless dope fiends bought houses with no money down, and the big banks wrapped those mortgages into securities and then sold them off to pensions and other suckers as investment-grade deals. The whole point of the PPIP was to get private investors to relieve the banks of these dangerous assets before they hurt any more innocent bystanders. But what did the banks do instead, once they got wind of the PPIP? They started buying that worthless crap again, presumably to sell back to the government at inflated prices! In the third quarter of last year, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup and Bank of America combined to add $3.36 billion of exactly this horseshit to their balance sheets. This brazen decision to gouge the taxpayer startled even hardened market observers. According to Michael Schlachter of the investment firm Wilshire Associates, it was "absolutely ridiculous" that the banks that were supposed to be reducing their exposure to these volatile instruments were instead loading up on them in order to make a quick buck. "Some of them created this mess," he said, "and they are making a killing undoing it." CON #6 THE WIRE Here's the thing about our current economy. When Goldman and Morgan Stanley transformed overnight from investment banks into commercial banks, we were told this would mean a new era of "significantly tighter regulations and much closer supervision by bank examiners," as The New York Times put it the very next day. In reality, however, the conversion of Goldman and Morgan Stanley simply completed the dangerous concentration of power and wealth that began in 1999, when Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall Act — the Depression-era law that had prevented the merger of insurance firms, commercial banks and investment houses. Wall Street and the government became one giant dope house, where a few major players share valuable information between conflicted departments the way junkies share needles. One of the most common practices is a thing called front-running, which is really no different from the old "Wire" con, another scam popularized in The Sting. But instead of intercepting a telegraph wire in order to bet on racetrack results ahead of the crowd, what Wall Street does is make bets ahead of valuable information they obtain in the course of everyday business. Say you're working for the commodities desk of a big investment bank, and a major client — a pension fund, perhaps — calls you up and asks you to buy a billion dollars of oil futures for them. Once you place that huge order, the price of those futures is almost guaranteed to go up. If the guy in charge of asset management a few desks down from you somehow finds out about that, he can make a fortune for the bank by betting ahead of that client of yours. The deal would be instantaneous and undetectable, and it would offer huge profits. Your own client would lose money, of course — he'd end up paying a higher price for the oil futures he ordered, because you would have driven up the price. But that doesn't keep banks from screwing their own customers in this very way. The scam is so blatant that Goldman Sachs actually warns its clients that something along these lines might happen to them. In the disclosure section at the back of a research paper the bank issued on January 15th, Goldman advises clients to buy some dubious high-yield bonds while admitting that the bank itself may bet against those same shitty bonds. "Our salespeople, traders and other professionals may provide oral or written market commentary or trading strategies to our clients and our proprietary trading desks that reflect opinions that are contrary to the opinions expressed in this research," the disclosure reads. "Our asset-management area, our proprietary-trading desks and investing businesses may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the recommendations or views expressed in this research." Banks like Goldman admit this stuff openly, despite the fact that there are securities laws that require banks to engage in "fair dealing with customers" and prohibit analysts from issuing opinions that are at odds with what they really think. And yet here they are, saying flat-out that they may be issuing an opinion at odds with what they really think. To help them screw their own clients, the major investment banks employ high-speed computer programs that can glimpse orders from investors before the deals are processed and then make trades on behalf of the banks at speeds of fractions of a second. None of them will admit it, but everybody knows what this computerized trading — known as "flash trading" — really is. "Flash trading is nothing more than computerized front-running," says the prominent hedge-fund manager. The SEC voted to ban flash trading in September, but five months later it has yet to issue a regulation to put a stop to the practice. Over the summer, Goldman suffered an embarrassment on that score when one of its employees, a Russian named Sergey Aleynikov, allegedly stole the bank's computerized trading code. In a court proceeding after Aleynikov's arrest, Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph Facciponti reported that "the bank has raised the possibility that there is a danger that somebody who knew how to use this program could use it to manipulate markets in unfair ways." Six months after a federal prosecutor admitted in open court that the Goldman trading program could be used to unfairly manipulate markets, the bank released its annual numbers. Among the notable details was the fact that a staggering 76 percent of its revenue came from trading, both for its clients and for its own account. "That is much, much higher than any other bank," says Prins, the former Goldman managing director. "If I were a client and I saw that they were making this much money from trading, I would question how badly I was getting screwed." Why big institutional investors like pension funds continually come to Wall Street to get raped is the million-dollar question that many experienced observers puzzle over. Goldman's own explanation for this phenomenon is comedy of the highest order. In testimony before a government panel in January, Blankfein was confronted about his firm's practice of betting against the same sorts of investments it sells to clients. His response: "These are the professional investors who want this exposure." In other words, our clients are big boys, so screw 'em if they're dumb enough to take the sucker bets I'm offering. CON #7 THE RELOAD Not many con men are good enough or brazen enough to con the same victim twice in a row, but the few who try have a name for this excellent sport: reloading. The usual way to reload on a repeat victim (called an "addict" in grifter parlance) is to rope him into trying to get back the money he just lost. This is exactly what started to happen late last year. It's important to remember that the housing bubble itself was a classic confidence game — the Ponzi scheme. The Ponzi scheme is any scam in which old investors must be continually paid off with money from new investors to keep up what appear to be high rates of investment return. Residential housing was never as valuable as it seemed during the bubble; the soaring home values were instead a reflection of a continual upward rush of new investors in mortgage-backed securities, a rush that finally collapsed in 2008. But by the end of 2009, the unimaginable was happening: The bubble was re-inflating. A bailout policy that was designed to help us get out from under the bursting of the largest asset bubble in history inadvertently produced exactly the opposite result, as all that government-fueled capital suddenly began flowing into the most dangerous and destructive investments all over again. Wall Street was going for the reload. A lot of this was the government's own fault, of course. By slashing interest rates to zero and flooding the market with money, the Fed was replicating the historic mistake that Alan Greenspan had made not once, but twice, before the tech bubble in the early 1990s and before the housing bubble in the early 2000s. By making sure that traditionally safe investments like CDs and savings accounts earned basically nothing, thanks to rock-bottom interest rates, investors were forced to go elsewhere to search for moneymaking opportunities. Now we're in the same situation all over again, only far worse. Wall Street is flooded with government money, and interest rates that are not just low but flat are pushing investors to seek out more "creative" opportunities. (It's "Greenspan times 10," jokes one hedge-fund trader.) Some of that money could be put to use on Main Street, of course, backing the efforts of investment-worthy entrepreneurs. But that's not what our modern Wall Street is built to do. "They don't seem to want to lend to small and medium-sized business," says Rep. Brad Sherman, who serves on the House Financial Services Committee. "What they want to invest in is marketable securities. And the definition of small and medium-sized businesses, for the most part, is that they don't have marketable securities. They have bank loans." In other words, unless you're dealing with the stock of a major, publicly traded company, or a giant pile of home mortgages, or the bonds of a large corporation, or a foreign currency, or oil futures, or some country's debt, or anything else that can be rapidly traded back and forth in huge numbers, factory-style, by big banks, you're not really on Wall Street's radar. So with small business out of the picture, and the safe stuff not worth looking at thanks to the Fed's low interest rates, where did Wall Street go? Right back into the shit that got us here. One trader, who asked not to be identified, recounts a story of what happened with his hedge fund this past fall. His firm wanted to short — that is, bet against — all the crap toxic bonds that were suddenly in vogue again. The fund's analysts had examined the fundamentals of these instruments and concluded that they were absolutely not good investments. So they took a short position. One month passed, and they lost money. Another month passed — same thing. Finally, the trader just shrugged and decided to change course and buy. "I said, 'Fuck it, let's make some money,'" he recalls. "I absolutely did not believe in the fundamentals of any of this stuff. However, I can get on the bandwagon, just so long as I know when to jump out of the car before it goes off the damn cliff!" This is the very definition of bubble economics — betting on crowd behavior instead of on fundamentals. It's old investors betting on the arrival of new ones, with the value of the underlying thing itself being irrelevant. And this behavior is being driven, no surprise, by the biggest firms on Wall Street. The research report published by Goldman Sachs on January 15th underlines this sort of thinking. Goldman issued a strong recommendation to buy exactly the sort of high-yield toxic crap our hedge-fund guy was, by then, driving rapidly toward the cliff. "Summarizing our views," the bank wrote, "we expect robust flows . . . to dominate fundamentals." In other words: This stuff is crap, but everyone's buying it in an awfully robust way, so you should too. Just like tech stocks in 1999, and mortgage-backed securities in 2006. To sum up, this is what Lloyd Blankfein meant by "performance": Take massive sums of money from the government, sit on it until the government starts printing trillions of dollars in a desperate attempt to restart the economy, buy even more toxic assets to sell back to the government at inflated prices — and then, when all else fails, start driving us all toward the cliff again with a frank and open endorsement of bubble economics. I mean, shit — who wouldn't deserve billions in bonuses for doing all that? Con artists have a word for the inability of their victims to accept that they've been scammed. They call it the "True Believer Syndrome." That's sort of where we are, in a state of nagging disbelief about the real problem on Wall Street. It isn't so much that we have inadequate rules or incompetent regulators, although both of these things are certainly true. The real problem is that it doesn't matter what regulations are in place if the people running the economy are rip-off artists. The system assumes a certain minimum level of ethical behavior and civic instinct over and above what is spelled out by the regulations. If those ethics are absent — well, this thing isn't going to work, no matter what we do. Sure, mugging old ladies is against the law, but it's also easy. To prevent it, we depend, for the most part, not on cops but on people making the conscious decision not to do it. That's why the biggest gift the bankers got in the bailout was not fiscal but psychological. "The most valuable part of the bailout," says Rep. Sherman, "was the implicit guarantee that they're Too Big to Fail." Instead of liquidating and prosecuting the insolvent institutions that took us all down with them in a giant Ponzi scheme, we have showered them with money and guarantees and all sorts of other enabling gestures. And what should really freak everyone out is the fact that Wall Street immediately started skimming off its own rescue money. If the bailouts validated anew the crooked psychology of the bubble, the recent profit and bonus numbers show that the same psychology is back, thriving, and looking for new disasters to create. "It's evidence," says Rep. Kanjorski, "that they still don't get it." More to the point, the fact that we haven't done much of anything to change the rules and behavior of Wall Street shows that we still don't get it. Instituting a bailout policy that stressed recapitalizing bad banks was like the addict coming back to the con man to get his lost money back. Ask yourself how well that ever works out. And then get ready for the reload. |
Gerardo Saravia(http://www.revistaideele.com/node/570)
* Los gráficos han sido tomados del economista Waldo Mendoza.
De tanto hablar del milagro económico peruano, finalmente se ha concretado, pero no exactamente en los términos de blindaje ante la crisis con el que el Presidente encandiló nuestros oídos a comienzos de este año.
Ni siquiera (a pesar de los pronósticos oficiales) podremos, en el epílogo de la crisis mundial, contar a nuestro país entre los que mejor performance lograron. A estas alturas, el cuento de “Perú país refugio de capitales” mejor ni contarlo.
Con la caída de diez a cero puntos en el PBI, el milagro anunciado se convirtió en la pesadilla del soñador. Estamos entre los países que han sufrido la caída más brutal de su producción en lo que va del año. ¿De la región? Qué va: del mundo.
Bajo cero
Sin duda, a fin de año no faltarán los titulares con cuadros comparativos que anunciarán, festivos, que hemos crecido más que nuestros vecinos y lejanos. En esas condiciones, habrá que aclarar la diferencia entre un país que crecía a 4% y ha caído a menos 2% y uno que crecía a 9% y ha caído a cero o uno.
El terremoto de 8 puntos abajo en escala García no va a significar una hecatombe económica como la de los años 1980, pero sí revela la vulnerabilidad de nuestra economía. No era tan fuerte como nos habían contado. O, lo que es peor, no hemos sabido administrar nuestras fuerzas.
No existe acá afán alguno de endilgarle al Gobierno culpas externas. Está claro que la crisis la importamos, y que no existía maniobra macro ni micro capaz de evitar que se presentara en el país. El pecado consistió precisamente en pretender negar lo evidente, no hacer nada o hacerlo a destiempo.
¿El resultado?: una caída brutal del PBI que ha llevado al aparato productivo a la recesión desde hace dos trimestres. Sin embargo, el Gobierno persiste en el error de negarlo.
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El impacto económico de la crisis en el país se expresa, según el economista Bruno Seminario, por tres canales: inversión minera, manufactura y servicios.
“Esta crisis ha afectado la rentabilidad de la minería. Los flujos de inversión directa extranjera en el último trimestre del año pasado pasaron de 7.000 millones de dólares a cero. Luego se recuperaron un poco. Los nuevos proyectos de inversión se han cortado.”
La industria textil ha caído en un 50%, como la producción agroindustrial: no han podido vender sus productos al exterior y tampoco los pudieron colocar acá. Lo mismo ha ocurrido en otras ramas. Los economistas llaman a esto “reducción de inventarios”. Es decir, las industrias acumularon una serie de productos que no llegaron a vender y han tenido que reducir sus tasas de producción.
En el sector construcción construcción, una catapulta económica, se ha registrado un incremento mínimo de la inversión pública (ésta representa, en total, un 10% del PBI) y un decrecimiento de la privada, que es la principal en el sector.
Lamentablemente, esta información no son quejas de llorones y pesimistas como zarandeó el despacho gubernamental a inicios de año. Son cifras oficiales, obtenidas de fuentes oficiales, confundidas y clandestinas entre los encriptados informes del BCR y el INEI.
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A pesar de la cáustica ineptitud de nuestros conductores económicos, hay aspectos de nuestra economía que se mantienen fuertes debido al abultado crecimiento de años anteriores. El sistema bancario, por ejemplo. Las últimas grandes crisis nacionales dejaron como saldo muchos bancos muertos y los demás heridos o absorbidos. En este caso se han mantenido indemnes.
El sector Comercio sigue siendo un misterio. De acuerdo con la rebúsqueda oficial, se aprecia un incremento, lo que parecería contradictorio con esta etapa de crisis. No es lógico encontrar que toda la industria caiga de porrazo y que el sector comercial no solo se mantenga sino que crezca.
Bruno Seminario cree encontrar la razón en el cambio de metodología: “En el sector comercial no se sabe bien lo que está pasando; si se midiera con la metodología antigua, estaría cayendo en 7%. El sector está compuesto tanto por el grupo de tiendas pequeñas y bodegas como por los grandes centros comerciales. Ahora las encuestas captan solo las ventas de las empresas grandes. El problema es que ahora estas grandes tiendas se están expandiendo a sectores donde antes estaban las pequeñas. Por ejemplo, si alguien antes compraba en tiendas chicas, ahora lo hace en las grandes, y las estadísticas muestran ese incremento como si fuera una expansión general del comercio”.
Bien dicen que existe la verdad, la mentira y las estadísticas.
Ensayo sobre la ceguera
Ante esta recatafila de malas noticias, es inevitable preguntar qué se hizo mal. El economista Waldo Mendoza, aquel que vaticinara crecimiento cero para este año y que se ganó a pulso la ira oficial, intenta dibujarnos el asunto de una manera muy poco auspiciosa para quienes pensaban que García había aprendido la lección de no meterse en temas para los que está negado.
“Pese a todas las fortalezas que decíamos tener, el comportamiento de la economía ha sido muy similar al de 1997-1998 (la última gran crisis). En 1997 la economía crecía 7%, y en 1998 nos caímos 1%. Este año crecíamos al 10% y probablemente llegaremos a cero. La responsabilidad básica es de la política macroeconómica. Debe ser la primera vez en la historia que contábamos con todos los recursos para enfrentar la crisis. En 1998 no teníamos divisas; esta vez sí, y muchas. En 1998 los bancos estaban frágiles: un pequeño sacudón los tumbaba y de hecho los tumbó; esta vez están sólidos. En 1998 teníamos déficit fiscal y no podíamos hacer una política fiscal contracíclica; esta vez sí la tenemos. Todo esto nos hace pensar que hay algo que no hemos hecho bien.”
Otra oportunidad perdida. No estábamos curados.
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La búsqueda de culpables no es muy productiva en lo inmediato, pero debería ser aleccionadora. Veamos cómo funciona la cosa: la política macroeconómica es responsabilidad del Ministerio de Economía y del BCR. Cuando se da un episodio de crisis, estas instituciones son las encargadas de tomar las medidas para contrarrestarlo o, al menos, amortiguarlo.
Como impedir la crisis era imposible, lo que sí se podía era morigerar sus efectos. La receta para estos casos no es un enigma egipcio: se trata, más bien, de una fórmula universal. El BCR baja los intereses y el Ministerio de Economía expande el gasto fiscal. A eso también se le conoce como una política contracíclica: cuando el mercado se contrae, el Estado expande su inversión y baja los intereses; cuando el mercado se expande, el Estado contrae el gasto.
A las dos instituciones se les critica que no hayan tomado las medidas a tiempo.
En el caso del BCR hay opiniones encontradas. Si bien se le achaca haber bajado los encajes y los intereses cuando la crisis ya era muy profunda, Seminario sostiene que hizo bien en esperar que se estabilizara la situación del quebrado Lehman Brothers, para que la medida tuviera efecto en un mejor terreno.
En lo que sí todos coinciden es en la parsimonia con la que actuó el Ministerio de Economía. Rigurosamente errática. Cuando la crisis era inminente y todos vaticinaban contracción mundial, acá seguíamos festejando nuestro inflamado PBI. Cuando la mayoría de gobiernos del mundo decidieron hacer una política fiscal expansiva, aquí Valdivieso —entonces ministro de Economía— redujo inexplicablemente el gasto fiscal. Cuando la crisis nos golpeó en la cara a inicios de año, se decía que creceríamos 6,5%. Al final terminaron despidiendo al Mago Valdivieso y el Puma Carranza reingresó a la cancha, pero quiso meter los goles a último minuto, cuando ya perdíamos por goleada. ¿Demasiado boys estos chicagos? ¿O le hacían demasiado caso al capitán del equipo?
Waldo Mendoza no puede entender cómo gente capacitada pudo cometer yerros tan grandes. “Tenemos un BCR con gente sofisticada; tenemos un Ministerio de Economía con gente sofisticada que se creyó el discurso gubernamental que estamos blindados si se dice que estamos blindados. ¿Para qué hacer algo?”.
Es difícil imaginar a nuestro Presidente tomando distancia de las grandes decisiones. Su notoria tendencia es más bien a meter la cuchara en todo, y no nos referimos a su fisonomía. Bueno, también.
El problema es que cuando el Presidente decía que la economía peruana estaba blindada y que íbamos a ser refugio del capital extranjero, era porque realmente se lo creía. Y el Gobierno actuó de acuerdo con esta peregrina idea.
Lo cierto es que este año, de lo único que fuimos refugio fue de dos ex ministros bolivianos acusados de violar derechos humanos, y de que la inversión extranjera se fue hasta nuevo aviso, más rápido que volando.
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Un lector desavisado podrá advertir que no siente la crisis. Que la gente sigue comprando igual y que sigue llenando las tiendas. Y puede tener razón, lo que, sin embargo, no significa que la crisis no exista. La peculiaridad de esta crisis es que ha atacado directamente a la médula del aparato productivo pero no ha producido inflación.
Según Bruno Seminario, la crisis no se siente globalmente en el país porque los perjudicados están muy sectorizados: “Solo la gente que se ha quedado sin trabajo ha visto reducidos sus ingresos. No es como antes, cuando todos se quedaban sin ingresos porque o subía el tipo de cambio o subían todos los precios, producto de la inflación, y eso afectaba a todo el mundo. Ahora se afecta únicamente a una parte de la población, y eso determina cierta estabilidad en la demanda de servicios”. Sin embargo, si la crisis continúa y no nos recuperamos, ella seguirá afectando la cadena productiva y podría llegar a todos, ya que el Estado no tiene la capacidad de sostener indefinidamente el gasto fiscal que contenga la crisis.
Para ello hay dos cosas que debemos considerar: el desenvolvimiento de la crisis internacional, y… que estamos en recesión.
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No se lo digas a nadie
Aunque el Gobierno lo ha querido negar en todos sus silencios, de acuerdo con la nomenclatura internacional, el Perú se encuentra en recesión desde principios de año. Es el único país que no ha querido admitirlo. Aquí también se presenta el truquito de las estadísticas.
Para que un país se declare en recesión debe haber tenido, en dos trimestres seguidos, un crecimiento por debajo de cero. El Gobierno argumenta que en el primer trimestre de este año crecimos 0,9% y, por lo tanto, no estamos en recesión. Pero así no se mide el PBI en este mundo. Existe una forma seria de medir el PBI, que se llama “medición estacionalizada”. Mejor que lo explique Waldo Mendoza:
“Por ejemplo, en agricultura la producción de papa en mayo y junio siempre será mayor que en agosto. Entonces, para tener una visión real de la producción se desestacionalizan las cifras, lo que implica usar determinadas formas económicas como las que utilizan los macroeconomistas. De esa manera se mide el PBI en todo el mundo desarrollado.
“Si uno mira las cifras desestacionalizadas en el Perú, descubre que estamos en recesión desde el último trimestre del año pasado, y no hay hasta ahora ningún documento oficial que lo reconozca. Claro: cuando uno reconoce que está enfermo, aplica las medidas correspondientes. Somos el único país que tiene vergüenza de admitir que está en recesión”.
Lo que suceda en adelante con nuestro país va a seguir dependiendo de cómo se esclarezca el panorama mundial. La buena noticia es que la crisis parece haber tocado fondo y la recuperación se empezará a notar en los próximos meses. El problema va a ser cuán lenta o rápida puede ser, como advierte Mendoza:
“Al parecer, las tasas desestacionalizadas del cuarto trimestre en los Estados Unidos, Japón y Alemania van a ser positivas. Casi todos coinciden en que la recuperación ya empieza, pero también en que esa recuperación va a ser lenta, por diversos motivos. En el caso norteamericano, porque su Gobierno, para salir de la crisis, se ha puesto a gastar como loco; por eso su déficit fiscal debe estar en 8 o 9% de su PBI. Como esa cifra es insostenible, los próximos años los norteamericanos van a buscar desaparecer ese déficit cobrando impuestos. No hay otro método. Entonces el consumo privado no va a poder reactivarse en ese país, como estábamos acostumbrados. En Europa va a ser lo mismo, y éstas son las locomotoras del mundo. Si Europa y los Estados Unidos van a tener un crecimiento modesto, ¿como podrá crecer China sostenidamente? Así como en la caída, en la recuperación también los efectos son lentos”.
Quizá sea mejor curarse en salud. Pero el Gobierno, a pesar de la elocuencia de los números, parece que no termina de curarse de entusiasmitis y ha decidido que ya no es necesario seguir expandiendo el gasto fiscal. En el último presupuesto más bien se observa una reducción para las regiones. El ex vicepresidente del BCR, Óscar Dancourt, observa que en un contexto negativo esta contracción podría ser bastante dañina:
“Hay actuar de manera preventiva, pero para eso necesitas un diagnóstico exacto, y no se sabe qué va a pasar con la economía mundial. El Ministro ha dicho que ya no se necesitarían más impulsos fiscales, pero la recesión se puede extender hasta el 2010. Y para eso hay que comprar un seguro, que consiste en seguir con una política fiscal expansiva. En cambio, si no se concreta, se cortan esos programas”.
El Gobierno apuesta todas sus fichas a una eminente recuperación de la economía, sin tener en cuenta lo larga y lenta que puede ser.
Como corolario de las infelices cifras que coronan la macroeconomía peruana, puede decirse que el consejo de oro lo tienen las abuelas: decir la verdad, aunque duela. Lo recomienda hasta el sentido común: el primer paso para combatir una enfermedad es reconocer que se la tiene.
El presidente García tenía en esta crisis económica la oportunidad de su vida para revindicarse como estadista; pero ha demostrado, una vez más, que la economía no es su fuerte.
A diferencia de los años 80, esta vez tenía todo a su favor. Pero nuevamente desaprovechó la oportunidad. El 0% de crecimiento que nos acecha este año y la caída en nueve puntos del PBI hablan lindo de un Presidente peleado con los números y, hace mucho, también con la verdad.
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-¿Pero la caída del crecimiento es culpa de este gobierno o es consecuencia de la crisis mundial?
-Es una combinación de ambos factores. Se advirtió reiteradas veces de la gravedad de lo que se venía, se le dijo al gobierno que gaste para que haya inversión y consumo, pero el gobierno dio una respuesta frívola e inconsistente, lo que ha tenido como resultado esta caída del crecimiento a casi cero.
-¿Haber acelerado el crecimiento hasta llegar a cerca del diez por ciento el año pasado ha agravado la crisis?
-Así es. El gobierno debió haber modulado el crecimiento a un nivel del siete por ciento, pero en lugar de eso lo lanzó a 150 kilómetros por hora y ahora el carro se está desbarrancando. El gobierno ha tenido una política de corto plazo de acelerar el crecimiento, sabiendo que eso generaría consecuencias negativas a mediano plazo, pero esperaba que la crisis estalle en unos años, cuando ellos ya no estén en el poder, y sea el próximo gobierno el que pague la factura. Pero con la crisis mundial la bomba estalló antes de lo que habían calculado.
-¿Es una ilusión del presidente García pensar que el Perú puede ser un refugio para los inversionistas?
-Eso es una tontería que está al nivel de la locura.
-¿Y decir que el Perú no será muy afectado por la crisis es otra locura?
-Durante mucho tiempo se dijo que estábamos blindados, pero estamos viendo que no es así. La crisis recién está comenzando. En los últimos seis meses del año sentiremos con mayor fuerza su impacto.
-¿Qué medidas debe tomar el gobierno para disminuir la gravedad de ese impacto?
-Hay que proteger el mercado interno, como están haciendo todos los países. Es suicida la actual política de bajar los aranceles y firmar Tratados de Libre Comercio. Es fundamental la inversión en obras de infraestructura de pequeña y mediana dimensión para defender los empleos y los salarios. Se debe mejorar la capacidad de consumo de la población, dándoles mayores ingresos a los trabajadores.
-¿La liberación de las CTS es una buena medida para impulsar el consumo interno?
-Eso es una cortina de humo. Estimulará el consumo solamente por una vez y su impacto será diminuto.
-¿Y cuál será el impacto de la exoneración del pago de aportaciones sociales a las gratificaciones?
-Tendrá un impacto positivo en la economía porque liberará como 400 millones de soles. Pero ese impacto será temporal. Está archiprobado por todas las políticas keynesianas que en una etapa de crisis el único modo de reconstituir el mercado es aumentando los sueldos…
-¿Pero en medio de esta crisis es posible aumentar los sueldos?
-En los últimos años las utilidades han crecido una barbaridad, pero los sueldos han subido muy poco. El Estado no sabe qué hacer con el dinero que no gasta. Y la industria privada para vender necesita que la gente pueda comprar. Bajando el interés referencial, que ahora está en cinco por ciento, a cerca del uno por ciento, como está en casi todos los países, se abarataría el crédito y eso le daría a la industria las condiciones para que expanda su capacidad productiva y así pueda aumentar sueldos.
-¿Cuáles serán los sectores más golpeados por la crisis?
-El sector textil, donde las ventas ya han caído 63 por ciento y la pérdida de empleos es muy importante; la industria del calzado; la agroindustria y las Pymes, particularmente las que trabajan vinculadas a la construcción, donde hay una caída muy fuerte.
-¿Cuánto caerá el crecimiento económico este año?
-El crecimiento del PBI ha bajado de 12,9 por ciento en el pico del 2008, a 0,19 por ciento en febrero de este año. Si esto sigue así, lo más optimista es pensar que el crecimiento estará alrededor de cero…
-El FMI pronostica un crecimiento de 3,5 por ciento para nuestro país este año.
En octubre de 2008, el FMI decía que el 2009 el Perú iba a crecer 6,9 por ciento; ahora ha bajado su cálculo de crecimiento a la mitad. Creo que lo más probable es que dentro de tres meses el FMI vuelva a bajar su pronóstico de crecimiento para el Perú. Si el programa anticrisis funciona, el crecimiento para este año será de cero, pero si no funciona podemos caer a menos cinco por ciento.
-¿Y está funcionando o no el programa anticrisis?
-Hasta ahora ese programa es un fracaso rotundo. Para fines de marzo el Estado debió haber ejecutado el 25 por ciento de los recursos destinados para inversión pública este año, pero la ejecución es de solamente el nueve por ciento. El nivel de gasto en sectores claves está por debajo del cinco por ciento. En el sector Salud y en los programas sociales se ha gastado menos del uno por ciento. Eso es una vergüenza.
-¿Por qué el gobierno tiene tan poca capacidad para gastar lo presupuestado?
-Por ineficacia administrativa y por la corrupción. Sacan a licitación la construcción de hospitales o la compra de ambulancias, por citar dos ejemplos, y se descubre un manejo deshonesto, por lo que las licitaciones se deben anular.
-Su evaluación sobre el manejo económico del gobierno no deja espacio para el optimismo.
-Si no se cambia la política económica y no se mejora la capacidad de gasto del gobierno, los pronósticos son pesimistas, porque la recesión será muy fuerte.
“Gestión de Carranza es catastrófica”
-¿Cómo evalúa la gestión del ministro de Economía, Luis Carranza?
-Es una gestión catastrófica. Su primer fracaso fue el shock de inversiones. En esta segunda gestión ha fracasado con el programa anticrisis de estímulo económico. El ministro Carranza no tiene la capacidad para manejar una política económica. Ha llevado la economía al suelo. Su equipo impide que se movilice el gasto público. En el Congreso se ha descubierto un número impresionante de fondos que el gobierno crea, les asigna recursos y luego nunca se emite el decreto con el reglamento para usar esos fondos, y después con ese mismo dinero se plantean nuevos fondos. Es un truco para evitar gastar.
-¿Cuál es la intención de evitar gastar el dinero que se tiene?
-Existe la plata, están los proyectos, pero no se gasta. Eso es inexplicable, salvo que haya un intento de boicotear al gobierno desde dentro del propio gobierno…
-¿Quiénes podrían querer boicotear al gobierno desde dentro?
-Contraer el Estado en plena crisis es invitar a que la tensión social aumente. No me extrañaría que algunos quieran frenar la acción del Estado para agudizar la crisis y crear un caos en momentos que se puede ver el tema del indulto a Fujimori...
-¿Usted cree que hay un complot fujimorista al interior del gobierno para agravar la crisis?
-No encuentro otra explicación a esta política de frenar el gasto público. No olvidemos que el primer y segundo vicepresidentes de la República son fujimoristas, que en el Banco Central de Reserva está José Chlimper, que ha sido ministro de Fujimori. El ministro Carranza está estrechamente vinculado al Grupo Brescia, que junto con el Grupo Romero fueron parte de la columna vertebral económica del gobierno de Fujimori. Aquí puede haber una operación política compleja para intentar favorecer a Fujimori agravando la crisis, porque eso abre las puertas al autoritarismo, lo que favorecería a Fujimori.
Entrevista: Carlos Noriega en diario La Primera, Lima.
De acuerdo al reporte del ministerio de economía, que evalúa el impacto de la crisis. Riesgo país está muy cerca de la luz roja, según monitoreo del MEF. Ingresos corrientes y tributarios del gobierno ya están en rojo.
Beatriz Jiménez,PERIODISTA DE la republica
Este reporte, al que pudo acceder La República, trata de resumir la situación económica actual a través de una especie de “semáforo de la crisis”. En vista de las cifras manejadas, el gobierno reconoce en este documento que la economía está en luz ámbar.
“No se trata de asustar a la población, sino de tener la precaución del caso”, declaró el viceministro de Economía Eduardo Morón, autor del reporte. “Se trata de un termómetro que nos permite alertar tempranamente y tomar decisiones de manera oportuna”, explicó.
Cifras en rojo
Las cuentas fiscales son valoradas por el gobierno en luz roja, ya que se encuentran en niveles superiores a la señal de alerta. “ La recaudación se anticipa como negativa debido a la bajada del precio de los minerales (en luz ámbar) y de la actividad económica”, señala Morón.
Según el ex presidente del Banco de Reserva Gonzalo García Núñez, el desbalance en la recaudación de impuestos de Personas Jurídicas se debe, principalmente, a que las mineras han comenzado a no pagar tributos fruto de la bajada del precio del cobre y otros metales.
Alerta amarilla
El riesgo país, un índice internacional que mide el grado de “peligro” que entraña un país para las inversiones extranjeras, se multiplicó por 2 respecto al promedio mantenido de 2004 a 2008.
El otro hecho que constata el documento es que las exportaciones peruanas se han reducido a la mitad en el último trimestre del año, mientras que las importaciones han crecido exponencialmente.
“Dado que hemos tenido un boom en inversiones era natural el crecimiento de las importaciones de maquinaria especial”, justifica el viceministro.
Frente a esta situación de déficit de la balanza comercial se alzan las voces para restaurar los aranceles existentes en 2007.
“Es necesario tomar medidas temporales que eleven los aranceles para una mejor defensa del mercado interno”, señala García Núñez.
Ante esta alerta, el economista Humberto Campodónico considera necesario que el gobierno informe de las respuestas económicas que aplicará para revertir la situación.
“El gobierno ha entendido con claridad que una crisis internacional fuerte nos afectará, que se acabó la época de las vacas gordas y empieza la de las vacas flacas”, opinó, y agregó que hoy es necesario que dé a conocer las respuestas económicas a estas cifras en rojo.
Al igual que García Núñez, Campodónico consideró que una respuesta necesaria es subir los aranceles para disminuir el alza de las importaciones.
Datos
Crecimiento. A pesar de la crisis , la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) estimó que en 2009 Perú, con una expansión del 5%, será el país dela región que más crecerá.
Reservas. Perú tiene casi 31 mil millones de dólares en reservas. Esta cifra es la más alta de la región. En el reporte del MEF, la luz roja está en los 15 mil millones. “Perú está sobreasegurado”, dice Morón, aunque reconoce que las reservas disminuirán este año. “Podríamos perder la mitad y aún estaríamos cerca del nivel de países como Chile o Brasil”.
