Reenv: Tasa de interés preferencial corporativa en soles en 4,1 por ciento

De: BCRP

Fecha:26/06/2015 20:56 (GMT-05:00)

A: ggarcianunez@mail.com

Asunto: Tasa de interés preferencial corporativa en soles en 4,1 por ciento

<http://www.facebook.com/bcrp.gob.pe>
<http://www.twitter.com/bcrpoficial>
<http://www.youtube.com/user/bcrpoficial>
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/rss/novedades.xml>

<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/publicaciones/nota-semanal.html>

**Nota Semanal N° 24-2015 (descargar documento)
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Nota-Semanal/2015/ns-24-2015.pdf>
**

Tasa de interés preferencial corporativa en soles en 4,1 por ciento

Percepción de riesgo país de Perú bajó de 191 a 172 pbs entre el
16 y el 23 de junio

Tipo de cambio en S/. 3,18 por dólar
Reservas internacionales en US$ 59 989 millones al 22 de junio

**Nota Semanal: N° 24-2015 (descargar documento)
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Nota-Semanal/2015/ns-24-2015.pdf>
**

Resumen informativo N° 24-2015
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Nota-Semanal/2015/resumen-informativo-24-2015.pdf>
(formato PDF)
Cuadros estadísticos
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/cuadros-de-la-nota-semanal.html>
(formato XLS)
Cuadros estadísticos
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Estadisticas/Cuadros-Estadisticos/2015/cuadros-estadisticos-24-2015.pdf>
(formato PDF)

**Novedades en la página web <http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/>
**

Programa Monetario de Junio 2015: BCRP mantuvo la tasa de interés
de referencia en 3,25%
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Transparencia/Notas-Informativas/2015/nota-informativa-2015-06-11.pdf>

Inflación anual sin alimentos y energía llegó a 2,84% a mayo.
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Transparencia/Notas-Informativas/2015/nota-informativa-2015-06-03.pdf>

Los Bancos vienen cumpliendo con el programa de desdolarización
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Transparencia/Notas-Informativas/2015/nota-informativa-2015-06-01.pdf>

Curso de Actualización en Economía 2015
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/proyeccion-institucional/cursos/curso-de-actualizacion-en-economia-2015.html>

Curso de Actualización para Profesores de Economía 2015
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/proyeccion-institucional/cursos/curso-de-actualizacion-para-profesores-de-economia-2015.html>

Venta de medallas y monedas conmemorativas
<https://tiendavirtual.bcrp.gob.pe/tiendabcrp/>

<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/billetes-y-monedas/canje-de-billetes.html>

Atte,

Departamento de Publicaciones Económicas.

Commodity booms and busts: Evidence from 1900 to 2015 | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal

Commodity booms and busts: Evidence from 1900 to 2015 | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal

RV: La Newsletter du CEPII - Mars 2015

ggarcianunez@uni.edu.pe

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De: noreply@info.cepii.fr <noreply@info.cepii.fr>
Enviado: lunes, 23 de marzo de 2015 07:35 a.m.
Para: ggarcianunez
Asunto: La Newsletter du CEPII - Mars 2015

visualiser dans votre navigateur
La Newsletter du CEPII        Mars 2015         Le contenu de l'édition anglaise peut différer
Focus Bancaire ou obligataire? Traditionnellement, c'est le rôle des banques d'apporter des ressources financières externes aux entreprises. Mais lorsque les banques sont fragilisées, les marchés obligataires peuvent offrir aux entreprises une voie alternative pour accéder au crédit. >>> Thomas Grjebine, Urszula Szczerbowicz, Fabien Tripier   publications Mutations du commerce extérieur chinois    Françoise Lemoine, Deniz Ünal Le financement obligataire accélère-t-il les reprises ?    Thomas Grjebine, Urszula Szczerbowicz, Fabien Tripier NTMs, Preferential Trade Agreements, and Prices: New evidence    Olivier Cadot, Julien Gourdon Les inégalités contribuent-elles à l'instabilité financière ?    Jérôme Héricourt, Rémi Bazillier Restructuration de la dette grecque : un débat difficile sur le statut de créancier privilégié de la BCE et du FMI    Christophe Destais Quantitative Easing: were markets surprised?    Stéphane Lhuissier La Banque nationale suisse abolit son cours plancher    Urszula Szczerbowicz Les taux d'intérêt extrêmement bas sont-ils favorables ou un frein à l'essor du crédit ?    Jean-Pierre Patat Vietnam : le choix de l'internationalisation    Michel Fouquin Quelques enseignements de l'évolution de la dette publique sous la Vème République    Jean-Pierre Patat Economic Modelling Nonlinear effects of asset prices on fiscal policy : Evidence from the UK, Italy and Spain    Luca Agnello, Gilles Dufrénot, Ricardo Sousa Journal of International Economics Input-Trade Liberalization, Export Prices and Quality Upgrading    Maria Bas,  Vanessa Strauss-Kahn   Événements Michel Aglietta aux Nocturnes de l'économie "Europe : la croissance perdue" 11 Mars 2015 What is happening with Ukraine : economic and political snapshot 12 Mars 2015 Pietro Ichino & Pietro Garibaldi sur ''les effets du Jobs Act'' 24 Mars 2015 Les relations bilatérales France - Turquie 24 Mars 2015 Secular Stagnation: Housing to the Rescue? 9 Avril 2015 Moritz Schularick on: Credit and the Macroeconomy 9 Avril 2015 3ème Printemps de l'économie : "Mais où va donc la planète ?" 13 - 17 Avril, 2015 Michèle Debonneuil, Louis Gallois et Michel Fouquin sur : Mondialisation du commerce et de l'industrie : une nouvelle ère ? 16 Avril 2015 1st MENA Trade Workshop - Call for Papers - Deadline for submitting: Feb, 22 2 - 3 Juin, 2015 15th Doctoral Meetings in International Trade and International Finance - Call for paper - Deadline for submitting: March 9 25 - 26 Juin, 2015 L'Economie mondiale 2016 - SAVE THE DATE 9 Septembre 2015 XIII ELSNIT Annual Conference : Trade Facilitation - Call for Papers - Deadline for submitting: May, 15 23 - 24 Octobre, 2015 Agriculture, International Trade and Development - Call for Papers - Deadline for submitting: July 31 19 - 20 Novembre, 2015 France-Amérique La parité euro-dollar peut être atteinte d'ici à l'été    Jérôme Héricourt C'est votre argent (BFM Business) Satisfactions autour de la BCE    Natacha Valla L' Agefi Hebdo Aligner les trois étoiles    Natacha Valla Accords / Désaccords (Radio Classique) Feuille de route sur la Grèce    Natacha Valla Actu Direct France 24 La semaine de l'éco Grèce – UE : un compromis probable ?    Natacha Valla	Edito La demande intérieure, nouveau moteur du commerce chinois Au début des années 2000, les biens de consommation n'avaient qu'un poids marginal dans les importations ordinaires manufacturières (5 %). En 2012, leur importance approche celle des biens d'équipement (16 % contre 20 %). Cet essor reflète à la fois une croissance en volume et une montée en gamme de prix/qualité extrêmement rapide. >>> Françoise Lemoine & Deniz Ünal   Rester informé Recevoir une alerte Lire un flux RSS Suivre @CEPII_Paris Nous contacter Nos autres sites   Bases de données Mesures non tarifaires La combinaison de la base Trade Unit Values du CEPII avec la nouvelle base de données sur les mesures non tarifaires et la présence de dispositions relatives aux normes dans les accords commerciaux préférentiels permet de dresser un nouveau bilan relatif aux mesures non tarifiares.>>> Olivier Cadot, Julien Gourdon CHELEM - Données 2013 Outil précieux pour analyser les tendances de l'économie mondiale, grâce à ses trois bases : CHELEM-CIN sur le commerce international, CHELEM-PIB sur les populations, PIB et taux de change et CHELEM-BAL sur les balances de paiements. Les estimations de population et PIB vont jusqu'à 2019. Données disponibles en ligne sur abonnement   Faits & chiffres 50% C'est la part du PIB industriel vietnamien produit en 2012 par les firmes étrangères. La présence étrangère est très orientée vers les secteurs exportateurs, l'accès au marché intérieur restant limité.  La contribution du secteur étranger apparaît de plus très fortement positive en matière de balance des paiements allégeant ainsi une contrainte forte sur la croissance du pays dans le passé. >>> Michel Fouquin   Emplois Economistes Stagiaires Visiting Researchers ISSN: 1255-7072 Directeur de publication : Sébastien Jean Rédacteur en chef : Dominique Pianelli
Gérer son abonnement Les informations qui vous concernent sont strictement destinées au CEPII. Vous disposez d'un droit d'accès, de modification, de rectification et de suppression des données vous concernant (loi « Informatique et Libertés » du 6 janvier 1978 modifiée). Pour toute demande, adressez-vous à : cepiiweb@cepii.fr

Foreign capital, go home! Is China going to stop buying USG bonds?

Foreign capital, go home!

POLITICAL ECONOMY | MICHAEL PETTIS | 17 AUGUST 2011 10:30

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By Michael Pettis

Is the PBoC going to stop buying USG bonds? Once again we are hearing very worried noises from various sectors about the possibility of a reduction in Chinese purchases of USG bonds. Here is what an article the South China Morning Post said:

China will press ahead with diversification of its US$3.2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) said on Thursday, adding it does not intentionally pursue large-scale foreign currency holdings. Officials have long pledged to broaden the mix of the country's huge reserves – as much as 70 per cent of which are now in US dollar assets, according to analysts' estimates – but the process has been gradual.

"We will continue to diversify the asset allocation of our reserve assets and continue to optimise the holdings based on market conditions," the foreign exchange regulator said in a statement, responding to questions about its reserve management from the public. It did not mention the US debt debacle. Top Republicans and Democrats worked behind the scenes on Wednesday on a compromise to avert a crippling US default and potential credit rating downgrade.

Xia Bin, an adviser to the central bank, told reporters earlier this month that China should speed up reserve diversification away from dollars to hedge against risks of the US currency's possible long-term decline.

It sounds like this time the PBoC might be pretty serious about diversifying their risk away from USG bonds, right? Let's leave aside the fact that every six months we have heard the same thing for the past several years, and nothing has happened, shouldn't we nonetheless be worried? Won't reduced PBoC purchases be hugely disruptive to the US economy and to the US Treasury markets?
No, they won't. There is so much nonsense still being said about this, even by economist who should know better, that I thought I would try to address what it would mean if the PBoC were actually serious and not simply making noises aimed at domestic political constituents.
First of all, remember that the PBoC does not purchase huge amounts of USG bonds because it has a lot of money lying around and doesn't know what to do with it. Its purchase of USG bonds is simply a function of its trade policy.
You cannot run a current account surplus unless you are also a net exporter of capital, and since the rest of China is actually a net importer of capital, the PBoC must export huge amounts of capital in order to maintain China's trade surplus. In order the keep the RMB from appreciating, the PBoC must be willing to purchase as many dollars as the market offers at the price it sets. It pays for those dollars in RMB.
It is able to do so by borrowing RMB in the domestic markets, or by forcing banks to put up minimum reserves on deposit. What does the PBoC do with the dollars it purchases? Because it is such a large buyer of dollars, it must put them in a market that is large enough to absorb the money and – and this is the crucial point – whose economy is willing and able to run a large enough trade deficit.
Remember that when Country A exports huge amounts of money to Country B, Country A must run a current account surplus and Country B must run the corresponding current account deficit. In practice, only the US fulfills those two requirements – large financial markets, and the ability and willingness to run large trade deficits – which is why the PBoC owns huge amounts of USG bonds.
If the PBoC decides that it no longer wants to hold USG bonds, it must do something pretty drastic. There are only four possible paths that the PBoC can follow if it decides to purchase fewer USG bonds.

1. The PBoC can buy fewer USG bonds and purchase more USD assets.
2. The PBoC can buy fewer USG bonds and purchase more non-US dollar assets, most likely foreign government bonds.
3. The PBoC can buy fewer USG bonds and purchase more hard commodities.
4. The PBoC can buy fewer USG bonds by intervening less in the currency, in which case it does not need to buy anything else.

We can go through each of these scenarios to see what would happen and what the impact might be on China, the US, and the world. To make the explanation easier, let's simply assume that the PBoC sells $100 of USG bonds.
The PBoC can sell $100 of USG bonds and purchase $100 of other USD assets. In this case basically nothing would happen. The pool of US dollar savings available to buy USG bonds would remain unchanged (the seller of USD assets to China would now have $100 which he would have to invest, directly or indirectly, in USG bonds), China's trade surplus would remain unchanged, and the US trade deficit would remain unchanged. The only difference might be that the yields on USG bonds will be higher by a tiny amount while credit spreads on risky assets would be lower by the same amount.
The PBoC can sell $100 of USG bonds and purchase $100 of non-US dollar assets, most likely foreign government bonds. Since in principle the only market big enough is Europe, let's just assume that the only alternative is to buy $100 equivalent of euro bonds issued by European governments.
There are two ways the Europeans can respond to the Chinese switch from USG bonds to European bonds. On the one hand they can turn around and purchase $100 of USD assets. In this case there is no difference to the USG bond market, except that now Europeans instead of Chinese own the bonds. What's more, the US trade deficit will remain unchanged and the Chinese trade surplus also unchanged.
But Europe might be unhappy with this strategy. Since there is no reason for Europeans to buy an additional $100 of US assets simply because China bought euro bonds, the purchase will probably occur through the ECB, in which case Europe will be forced to accept an unwanted $100 increase in its money supply (the ECB must create euros to buy the dollars).
On the other hand, and for this reason, the Europeans might decide not to purchase $100 of US assets. In that case there must be an additional impact. The amount of capital the US is importing must go down by $100 and the amount that Europe is importing must go up.
Will this reduction in US capital imports make it more difficult to fund the US deficit? Not at all. On the contrary – it might make it easier. Why? Because if US capital imports drop by $100, by definition the US current account deficit will also drop by $100, almost certainly because of a $100 contraction in the trade deficit.
A contraction in the US trade deficit is of course expansionary for the economy. Since the purpose of the US fiscal deficit is to create jobs, and a $100 contraction in the trade deficit will create jobs, the US fiscal deficit will contract by $100 for the same level of job creation – perhaps even more if you believe, as most of us do, that increased trade is a more efficient creator of productive jobs than increased government spending.
In other words although there is $100 less demand for USG bonds, there is also $100 less supply (or more) of USG bonds. It is of course possible that the USG ignores the employment impact of the contraction in the trade deficit, and goes ahead and spends the $100 anyway, but in that case unemployment would drop even more than expected.
This is the key point. If foreigners buy fewer USD assets, the US trade deficit must decline. This is almost certainly good for the US economy and for US employment. When analysts worry that China might buy fewer USG bonds, in other words, they are worrying that the US trade deficit might contract. This is something we should welcome, not deplore.
But the story doesn't end there. What about Europe? Since China is still exporting the $100 by buying European government bonds instead of USG bonds, its trade surplus doesn't change, but of course as the US trade deficit declines, the European trade surplus must decline, and even possibly go into deficit. This is because by selling dollars and buying euro, China is forcing the euro to appreciate against the dollar.
This deterioration in the trade account will force Europeans either into raising their fiscal deficits or letting domestic unemployment rise. Under these conditions it is hard to imagine they would tolerate much Chinese purchase of European assets without responding eventually with trade protection.
The PBoC can sell $100 of USG bonds and purchase $100 of hard commodities. This is no different than the above scenario except now that the exporters of those hard commodities must face the choice Europe faced above. Either they can neutralize the trade impact of Chinese purchases by buying US assets or they have to absorb the employment impact of deterioration in their trade account.
This, by the way, is a bad strategy for China but one that it seems nonetheless to be following. Commodity prices are very volatile, and unfortunately this volatility is badly correlated with Chinese needs. Since China is the largest or second largest purchaser of most commodities, stockpiling commodities is a good investment only if it continues growing rapidly, and a bad investment if its growth slows. This is the wrong kind of balance sheet position any county, especially a very poor country like China, should be engineer. It simply exacerbates underlying conditions and increases economic volatility – never a good thing, especially for a poor and undeveloped economy.
The PBoC can sell $100 of USG bonds by intervening less in the currency, in which case it does not need to buy anything else. In this case, which is the simplest of all to explain, China's trade surplus declines by $100 and the US trade deficit declines by $100 as the RMB rises. The net impact on US financing costs is unchanged for the reasons discussed above. Chinese unemployment will rise because of the reduction in its trade surplus unless it increases the fiscal deficit.
It's about trade, not capital
This may sound counterintuitive to all except those who understand the way the global balance of payments work, but countries that export capital are not doing anyone favors unless incomes in the recipient country are so low that savings are impossible or the capital export comes with technology, and countries that import capital might be doing so mainly at the expense of domestic jobs. For this reason it is absurd to worry that China might stop buying USG bonds.
On the contrary, the whole US-China trade dispute is indirectly about China's insistence on purchasing USG bonds and the US insistence that they stop. Because make no mistake, if the Chinese trade surplus declines, and the US trade deficit declines too, by definition China is directly or indirectly buying fewer USG bonds, and this reduction in bond purchases will not cause US interest rate to rise at all. If it did, it would be like saying that the higher a country's trade deficit, the lower its domestic interest rates. This statement is patently untrue.
Inevitably whenever I write about trade and capital exports someone will indignantly point out a devastating flaw in my argument. Since the US makes nothing that it imports from China, they will claim, a reduction in China's capital exports to the US (or a reduction in China's trade surplus) will have no impact on the US trade deficit. It will simply cause someone else's exports to the US to rise with no corresponding change in the US trade balance.
No it won't, unless this other country steps up its capital exports to the US and replaces China – which is pretty unlikely. Aside from the sheer idiocy of the claim that the US does not produce, or is incapable of producing, anything it imports from China, the claim is irrelevant even if it were true. Trade does not settle on a bilateral basis but must settle on a multilateral basis. If the US imports less capital its current account deficit must decline, whether because of bilateral changes in trade or not. I explain this in a blog entry early last year.
The basic point is that if reduced intervention in Chinese capital exports causes a reduction in Chinese exports to the US to be matched dollar for dollar with an increase in, say, Mexican exports to the US, the story doesn't end there. Since Mexico's trade balance is itself decided by the relationship between domestic investment and savings, a rise in Mexican exports will mean a rise in Mexican imports. It may very well be that lower Chinese exports to the US are matched by higher US imports from Mexico, but this will come with higher US exports to Mexico. And if it isn't Mexico, it will be someone else.
This is an abbreviated version of the newsletter that went out two weeks ago. Academics, journalists, and government and NGO officials who want to subscribe to the newsletter should write to me atchinfinpettis@yahoo.com, stating your affiliation, please. Investors who want to buy a subscription should write to me, also at that address.

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TLC Peru_USA Datos expo-impo 2006-2011

 

AÑO                     EXP           IMP             SALDO

TOTAL 2006     2,926.8     5,880.4     -2,953.5
TOTAL 2007     4,119.8     5,271.6     -1,151.8
TOTAL 2008     6,183.0     5,812.5       370.5
TOTAL 2009     4,918.8     4,223.3       695.5
TOTAL 2010     6,754.3     5,056.9     1,697.3
TOTAL 2011     2,602.1     2,106.6       495.5

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c3330.html

Efecto TLC Aumento de comercio USA-Perú y paso de superavit peruano en el 2006 de 2,953.5 millones dolares a un creciente deficit, en el 2010 fue de 1697 millones.

Qué nos dirán los que argumentaron que el TLC favorecería las exportaciones peruanas a USA. Estas cayeron miéntras las importaciones aumentaron. Quien negocio, Mercedez Araoz ?

Los que cuestionaron el TLC fueron avasallados por decenas de especialistas que defendían los términos del acuerdo, todavía se puede descargar del Ministerio d Comercio Exterior los estudios que justificaron el trato. Nos vendieron la idea, incumplida del aumento de las exportaciones.

".. el TLC constituye una importante oportunidad para que el Perú expanda sustancialmente su comercio exterior con el fin de contribuir a mejorar la calidad de vida de los peruanos."

"A cambio de la importante ampliación de mercados externos que obtendrá, después de firmado el TLC, el Perú deberá asumir la reducción en la recaudación fiscal como consecuencia de la eliminación del cobro de aranceles a las importaciones procedentes de Estados Unidos."

"Se está buscando mejorar la competitividad de los agricultores brindando una plataforma de servicios que refuerce aspectos tecnológicos, sanitarios y de asistencia comercial, como parte de un Programa Nacional de Reconversión y Compensación Agraria. Complementariamente a dicho plan, se ha planteado otorgar subsidios específicos a los tres principales productos que pueden
ser afectados, algodón, maíz y trigo."
http://www.tlcperu-eeuu.gob.pe/index.php

__._,_.___

Fwd: Macroperu China: idea de moratoria de EEUU es "jugar con fuego" 18:41 El resultado de una

China: idea de moratoria de EEUU es "jugar con fuego"

18:41 El resultado de una medida de ese tipo contra nuestro país será muy serio, advirtió un funcionario chino.

SINGAPUR, jun 8 (Reuters) – Los legisladores republicanos de Estados Unidos están "jugando con fuego" al contemplar incluso un breve incumplimiento del pago de deuda para obligar a recortes más profundos en el gasto fiscal, dijo el miércoles un asesor del banco central chino.

La idea de una cesación de pagos técnica -en lo esencial, postergar pagos de intereses por pocos días- ha ganado el respaldo de un creciente número de republicanos, que lo ven como un precio que valdría la pena si con eso logran que la Casa Blanca acepte profundos recortes al gasto, reportó el martes Reuters.

Pero cualquier forma de "default" podría desestabilizar a la economía global y enturbiar las ya tensas relaciones con los grandes acreedores estadounidenses, como China, advirtieron funcionarios de Gobierno e inversionistas.

Li Daokui, asesor del Banco Popular de China, dijo que una cesación de pagos podría socavar al dólar y Pekín debía disuadir a Washington de no continuar con este curso de acción. "Creo que existe el riesgo de que la moratoria de deuda estadounidense pueda ocurrir", dijo Li a reporteros en el marco de un foro en Pekín. "El resultado será muy serio y realmente espero que paren de jugar con fuego", agregó.

China es el mayor acreedor externo de Estados Unidos, ya que poseía más de 1 billón de dólares en deuda del Tesoro a marzo, según datos estadounidenses, por lo que sus preocupaciones tienen un peso considerable en Washington. "Realmente estoy preocupado por los riesgos de una moratoria en el pago de la deuda estadounidense, lo que pienso podría llevar a una caída en el valor del dólar", agregó Li.

El Congreso de Estados Unidos ha sido reacio a aumentar el límite de gasto del Gobierno, mientras los legisladores discuten cómo controlar el déficit que se proyecta que alcance los 1.4 billones de dólares este año fiscal. El Departamento del Tesoro de Estados Unidos ha dicho que se quedará sin espacio para pedir préstamos el 2 de agosto.

Si Washington no puede pagar los intereses de su deuda, el Gobierno de Barack Obama ha advertido de consecuencias "catastróficas" que podrían llevar a la débil economía de regreso a la recesión.

"Esto tiene implicaciones nefastas para la economía en un momento en que los datos macro están debilitándose", dijo Ben Westmore, un economista de materias primas en el National Australia Bank. "Es simplemente una idea horrible", declaró.

Los mercados financieros han seguido de cerca el debate en Estados Unidos, pero estiman que es bajo el riesgo de una moratoria.

REUTERS – 08/06/11

irlanda: 100 mil millones salvataje,BBC

"Eurozona enfrenta \" : http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2010/11/101116_eurozona_crisis_irlanda_jrg.shtml?s

The real price of that bunch of asparagus

The real price of that bunch of asparagus

FELICITY LAWRENCE

The once upmarket vegetable is much cheaper than it used to be. But it comes at a big environmental cost

ASPARAGUS GROWN in Peru and sold here is commonly held up as a symbol of unacceptable food miles, but a report has raised an even more urgent problem: its water footprint. The study, by the development charity Progressio, has found that industrial production of asparagus in Peru's Ica Valley is using up the area's water so fast that smaller farmers and local families are finding wells running dry. Water to the main city in the valley is also under threat, it says. It warns that the export of the luxury vegetable, much of it to European supermarkets, is unsustainable in its current form.

The Ica Valley, a desert area in the Andes, is one of the driest places on Earth. The asparagus beds developed in the past decade require constant irrigation, with the result that the local water table has plummeted since 2002, when extraction overtook replenishment. In some places it has fallen by eight metres each year, one of the fastest rates of aquifer depletion in the world.

The market in fresh asparagus barely existed before the end of the 1990s. Peru has become the largest exporter of asparagus, earning more than €350 million a year. About 95 per cent of that asparagus comes from the Ica Valley.

The expansion of the agricultural frontier in the region was made possible thanks to multimillion-euro investments by the World Bank from the late 1990s on. In just 10 years asparagus cultivation has exploded to cover nearly 100sq km of reclaimed desert. The trade has created about 10,000 jobs in a very poor area, contributing significantly to Peru's growth, but it has already provoked conflict. When a World Bank executive went to investigate complaints about the water shortages in April he was shot at.

"The water tragedy unfolding in this region of Peru should set alarms bells ringing for government, agribusiness and retailers involved in Ica's asparagus industry," said report author Nick Hepworth.

Two wells serving up to 18,500 people in the valley have already dried up. Traditional small- and medium-scale farmers have also found their water supplies severely diminished.

Juan Alvarez's experience is typical. His family has farmed the Ica Valley for four generations. He employs 10 people through the year, with up to 40 jobs in peak season, but he says those livelihoods are under threat. The wells on his farm used to hit water at 55m, and he could pump 60l of water a second from them. Now some have dried out, and where there is still water he has to drill down 108m and can extract only 22l a second even at that depth.

Alvarez told researchers: "Agroexporters came with new government policies and tax exemptions. They bought water rights and started buying wells very far away. They have created jobs, and that's important, but the reality is they are depleting the water resources, and when the water is gone they will leave. But what future is there for us? We will never leave."

For smaller farmers the crisis is even more acute. Elisa Gomez and her family own a small farm next to one of the largest asparagus exporters and have to buy water for irrigation from the local canal, but the industrial production has made it hard to survive. "We pay for water for 15 days twice a year. But the soil is not as productive as before and dries out in just three days. Now the land is so dry the water drains away much faster."

The large-scale exporting companies are not immune from the crisis of overextraction either. They are facing rising costs for their water. They have been deepening existing wells, buying up old ones from neighbouring land and piping water huge distances. Some are also alleged to have got around a ban on new wells by paying off officials.

One of the largest and most modern of Peru's fresh asparagus producers spoke to Progressio researchers anonymously. It has received loans from the World Bank's lending arm. Its chief executive said that the water levels in some wells were falling by as much as two metres a year. All its wells are licensed and legal, but, he said, regulation was weak and there was no inspection of what people extracted.

"Peru provides the world with the best example of how to mismanage water. We desperately need to rationalise water use in the Ica. We are spending huge sums just to survive." He argued that big businesses such as his were at the forefront of science to use water efficiently but that traditional farmers used water carelessly.

The water shortages on Peru's Pacific coast are expected to worsen as climate change shrinks the glaciers that feed the Ica river system.

Promoting food for export has been a key plank in World Bank policy for developing countries. Its investment arm, International Finance Corporation, says it aims to promote sustainable development through investment in private-sector companies, which it requires to minimise their water use: "We define sustainability as providing economic growth opportunities for the poor and protecting the environment and the rights of vulnerable communities."

How far the policy helps the poorest in those countries remains a subject of fierce debate among international development experts.

We asked some leading retailers to comment. Marks Spencer said: "We have a range of responsible water use projects under way and have strengthened our farming standards to include greater focus on water efficiency." Tesco said: "We are pleased that Progressio has highlighted Tesco's role in raising industry standards in water management in areas such as the Ica Valley. We have a strong record in this area and our Nurture standard is regularly reviewed and improved. We acknowledge there is more to do and so we are continually working with our suppliers to help them minimise their environmental impact, including water use."

http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2010/0918/1224279140536.html

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balanza comercial USA-PERU y algunas conclusiones

From: Angel Marces 
Date: 2010/6/24

 

De las 135 partidas de importaciones peruanas que registra la oficina de censos de US, tenemos que las 15 mas importantes en valor en los ultimos 5 años, en promedio hacen el 90% en valor de las importaciones de cada año. Para definir "importancia" he sumado los valores de cada partida en los ultimos 5 años y he rankeado la suma (lo que permite incluir cualquier partida grande que hubiera caido considerablemente o cualquiera pequeña que se hubiese disparado) Valores en millones de USD

US Imports from Peru
End-Use Code	Value 2005	Value 2006	Value 2007	Value 2008	Value 2009
(14270) Nonmonetary gold	1,555,783	1,408,518	438,669	294,254	640,961
(14220) Copper	556,825	1,006,056	980,458	852,324	537,157
(40000) Apparel and household goods-cotton	751,631	789,249	750,451	723,905	539,104
(10020) Other petroleum products	463,775	452,789	447,184	605,866	274,055
(14280) Other precious metals	183,611	226,695	437,249	619,570	166,806
(00130) Vegetables and preparations	221,463	278,633	329,204	381,137	381,739
(14250) Tin	150,328	197,578	262,168	366,047	266,107
(10010) Fuel oil	224,316	298,931	278,889	289,585	38,082
(10000) Crude	88,035	77,571	158,925	357,943	310,103
(00000) Green coffee	78,828	120,085	137,060	168,846	161,893
(14260) Zinc	86,298	125,572	132,924	105,124	121,194
(00120) Fruits and preparations, including frozen juices	50,018	68,085	75,360	105,680	103,300
(01000) Fish and shellfish	64,810	60,717	79,964	89,371	104,909
(41310) Jewelry (watches, rings, etc.)	86,753	84,112	76,481	61,935	41,087
(15200) Finished metal shapes & advncd manuf, except steel	37,703	54,303	83,968	90,363	36,478

Las variaciones interanuales de estos 15 principales productos son las siguientes:

US Imports from Peru
End-Use Code	crec yoy 06	crec yoy 07	crec yoy 08	crec yoy 09
(14270) Nonmonetary gold	-9.47%	-68.86%	-32.92%	117.83%
(14220) Copper	80.68%	-2.54%	-13.07%	-36.98%
(40000) Apparel and household goods-cotton	5.00%	-4.92%	-3.54%	-25.53%
(10020) Other petroleum products	-2.37%	-1.24%	35.48%	-54.77%
(14280) Other precious metals	23.46%	92.88%	41.70%	-73.08%
(00130) Vegetables and preparations	25.81%	18.15%	15.78%	0.16%
(14250) Tin	31.43%	32.69%	39.62%	-27.30%
(10010) Fuel oil	33.26%	-6.70%	3.84%	-86.85%
(10000) Crude	-11.89%	104.88%	125.23%	-13.37%
(00000) Green coffee	52.34%	14.14%	23.19%	-4.12%
(14260) Zinc	45.51%	5.85%	-20.91%	15.29%
(00120) Fruits and preparations, including frozen juices	36.12%	10.69%	40.23%	-2.25%
(01000) Fish and shellfish	-6.32%	31.70%	11.76%	17.39%
(41310) Jewelry (watches, rings, etc.)	-3.04%	-9.07%	-19.02%	-33.66%
(15200) Finished metal shapes & advncd manuf, except steel	44.03%	54.63%	7.62%	-59.63%

De las 132 partidas de exportaciones de USA a Peru, las 15 mas importantes hacen en promedio el 59% de las exportaciones anuales, mientras que las 30 primeras no llegan al 80% de las exportaciones anuales. Esto solo refleja la mayor diversificacion de la economia USA. Vean tambien la menor concentracion de valor por partida respecto de las importaciones peruanas. Otro dato: todos son productos industriales (excepto algunas computadoras y accesorios)

US Exports to Peru
End-Use Code	Value 2005	Value 2006	Value 2007	Value 2008	Value 2009
(11110) Fuel oil	192,978	198,955	419,744	1,067,209	336,522
(12500) Plastic materials	140,190	164,719	376,899	451,140	304,830
(21030) Excavating machinery	94,184	159,225	227,259	359,425	243,580
(21301) Computer accessories	140,197	154,790	125,538	208,341	259,175
(21100) Industrial engines	77,338	94,276	121,028	172,230	242,903
(21180) Industrial machines, other	79,373	114,970	138,576	213,671	152,762
(12540) Chemicals-organic	94,625	110,115	149,402	167,568	160,285
(21300) Computers	48,294	84,371	130,482	200,678	176,041
(21170) Materials handling equipment	94,373	129,106	100,763	128,006	139,775
(11120) Petroleum products, other	48,582	97,852	108,311	147,662	180,805
(21400) Telecommunications equipment	65,566	76,150	102,610	170,376	152,875
(21000) Drilling & oilfield equipment	45,665	77,923	117,609	178,237	140,468
(60000) Minimum value shipments	55,677	71,726	99,603	157,191	119,193
(41050) Other household goods	69,303	149,338	95,709	107,045	77,652
(00000) Wheat	78,355	18,633	160,971	127,409	81,585

Las variaciones interanuales de estos productos son:

US Exports to Peru
End-Use Code	crec yoy 06	crec yoy 07	crec yoy 08	crec yoy 09
(11110) Fuel oil	3.10%	110.97%	154.25%	-68.47%
(12500) Plastic materials	17.50%	128.81%	19.70%	-32.43%
(21030) Excavating machinery	69.06%	42.73%	58.16%	-32.23%
(21301) Computer accessories	10.41%	-18.90%	65.96%	24.40%
(21100) Industrial engines	21.90%	28.38%	42.31%	41.03%
(21180) Industrial machines, other	44.85%	20.53%	54.19%	-28.51%
(12540) Chemicals-organic	16.37%	35.68%	12.16%	-4.35%
(21300) Computers	74.70%	54.65%	53.80%	-12.28%
(21170) Materials handling equipment	36.80%	-21.95%	27.04%	9.19%
(11120) Petroleum products, other	101.42%	10.69%	36.33%	22.45%
(21400) Telecommunications equipment	16.14%	34.75%	66.04%	-10.27%
(21000) Drilling & oilfield equipment	70.64%	50.93%	51.55%	-21.19%
(60000) Minimum value shipments	28.83%	38.87%	57.82%	-24.17%
(41050) Other household goods	115.49%	-35.91%	11.84%	-27.46%
(00000) Wheat	-76.22%	763.90%	-20.85%	-35.97%

Hay varias conclusiones que se pueden sacar de estos datos. Las mas interesantes son:

- Las importaciones peruanas en USA estan concentradas en productos tradicionales. La reduccion de las tasas de crecimiento de estas importaciones es en gran medida un reflejo de la progresiva devaluacion del dolar respecto del sol durante este quinquenio (de hecho durante casi toda la ultima decada) y, en los ultimos dos años, de la violenta contraccion economica de US. Como mencione en el correo anterior, el TLC con USA entro en vigencia hace 16 meses, asi que el efecto, si existe, es marginal. Si el dolar se sigue devaluando respecto del sol y la recuperacion de USA es lenta y fragil, deberiamos esperar que continue la caida en las tasas de crecimiento de las importaciones.

- El crecimiento de las exportaciones de USA a Peru es casi en su totalidad de productos industriales. Esto es consecuencia de mayor nivel de inversion privada y publica en el Peru. Es posible que la progresiva devaluacion del dolar respecto del sol durante este quinquenio haya hecho mas barato importar equipos desde USA que desde otros paises. La contraccion de las exportaciones en 2009 en estos productos es tan pareja que sospecho que refleja la desaceleracion de la actividad economica en Peru. Esta contraccion deberia revertirse en 2010, es decir, las exportaciones de USA a Peru deberian seguir creciendo.

- Estas dos situaciones convergen y se expresan en el superavit comercial que USA tiene con Peru. Sin embargo esto no ocurre en muchos otros paises, ya que el segundo factor esta ausente en muchas economias (estuvieron/estan aun en recesion)

- Por los montos y tipos de partidas que se exportan de USA a Peru, dudo que Peru como bloque sea una parte considerable de los ingresos de las empresas exportadoras de USA. Esto lleva a pensar que estas empresas priorizaran otros mercados y que el enfasis en Peru como mercado de exportacion es secundario (spillover effect). Mas bien para las empresas peruanas si hay mucho interes por aprovechar la mayor competitividad de los productos industriales de USA y seguir importando bienes de capital.

- Los efectos de cambios estructurales como los TLC, que se dan en el largo plazo, se deben analizar mas alla de los niveles de comercio, como por ejemplo a traves de la diversificacion de las importaciones de Peru en los paises con los que se firma estos TLC. Lo importante no es que los flujos sean voluminosos y concentrados desde el inicio, sino que sean numerosos y diversos para que motiven a los empresarios nacionales a arriesgarse. Tambien es preciso recordar que este tipo de cambios institucionales coexisten con factores adversos como los mencionados arriba, lo que dificulta determinar su impacto real.