SNI-ADEX-CAMARAS: DEFENSA COMPRAS NACIONALES

La alianza plantea la defensa de la ley de compras nacionales, mef la tiene en la mira

Fwd: Macroperu The Doha Round at the back of the agenda

The Doha Round: A safety net in stormy weather

David Laborde Debucquet 14 May 2009

The current financial crisis has fostered a demand for protectionism and put the Doha Round at the back of the agenda. This column argues that a failed Doha Development Agenda would send the wrong signal in terms of global governance and could lead to an unravelling of the past 15 years of trade liberalisation.

The current financial crisis has fostered a demand for protectionism, and could lead to new trade barriers as occurred after the October 1929 crisis. A parallel can easily be drawn between the current situation and the one that existed then. In the early 1930s, unemployment was rising, a fear of deflation was prevailing, and a lack of public resources (especially in countries that paid war reparations) prevented governments from remedying the economic crisis. Moreover, today as in 1930, the context of decreasing prices can mechanically reinforce protection, as specific duties (which are numerous in agriculture) become more and more restrictive when world prices are down. In this type of economic context, protectionism is a tempting policy instrument for policymakers: it increases domestic prices and domestic activity in the short term, and it provides new government revenue. In addition, governments do not correctly anticipate world retaliation and counter retaliation, as was the case with the US in 1930 and also in 2007, when in the middle of the food crisis, governments implemented export bans and export restrictions in successive rounds of retaliation and counter retaliation. Therefore, a vicious circle of rising protectionism is always a possibility.

But there is one big difference between today's situation and that of 1930; WTO membership means that countries cannot raise tariffs above bound duties, and therefore, an increase in tariff protectionism such as between the two world wars is more implausible today. As Pascal Lamy, director-general of the WTO, stated in a speech in Sydney on March 2, 2009: "The Doha Round is the most effective way to further constrain protectionist pressures by reducing the gap between bound commitments and applied policies." The WTO is an international public good that acts as an insurance scheme against potential trade wars. And the insurance scheme would be even more effective if WTO members would conclude the Doha Round, making new commitments and reducing bound duties.

Because membership in the WTO acts as a deterrent to increased protectionism, the "cyclicity" of protectionism was much more pronounced before the WTO existed. For example, in the US the average tariff on dutiable imports was 50% in 1894, 40% in 1896, and 52.1% in 1899. The next cycle was even more severe; 49.8% in 1902, 16.4% in 1920, and 59.1% in 1932. Similar trends occurred in France (Messerlin 1985) and other European countries (Bairoch 1995; Irwin 1992). What explains this "cyclicity" of protectionism?

The main explanation is that it is linked to business cycles. During periods of sustained economic growth, unemployment is not a national concern and governments are prone to open borders to foreign competition—especially when trading partners are doing the same. During times of economic recession, the job market provides less opportunities, threats to existing jobs are badly perceived, and lobbying for protection increases.

What if Doha failed?

It is possible to evaluate how much trade destruction would occur if the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) were to fail. A recent study using the MIRAGE model of the world economy (Bouet and Labourde 2009) reveals a potential loss of $2,262 billion in volume of annual trade by 2025 (11.8%)—due not only to a failed DDA, but also to the fact that WTO members would increase protection levels to existing bound duties. The study indicates that the costs of rising protection would be almost five times greater than the gains realised from trade creation resulting from the DDA. This result is not surprising because of the asymmetric situation that currently exists; past liberalisation has kept tariffs low and has limited the margin of reduction. But at the same time, the binding overhang is still significant, especially for developing countries.¹ Even a limited increase in protection (such as eliminating the unilateral liberalisation that has taken place since the end of the Uruguay Round) would lead to a potential loss of $1,453 billion (7.6%).

A successfully concluded DDA would not only increase trade, but it would also reinforce binding commitments and reduce existing bound duties, which would make the trade environment more secure and decrease the costs associated with potential trade wars. The study concretised this idea by comparing the application of current bound duties with the application of new bound duties resulting from the DDA; a successful DDA would be worth $809 billion in terms of trade volume and $184 billion in terms of real income.

These conclusions are especially true for poor countries since most unilateral and unbound liberalisations have taken place in the developing world in recent years, and poor countries currently benefit from unilateral preferences granted by developed countries that may be cancelled should the DDA fail. If the real value of the DDA is measured by the insurance role that it plays, then two-thirds of the total global value of $184 billion in terms of real income (or $128 billion) would benefit developing countries. This explains why the DDA should be finally considered as a "Development" Round.

By focusing only on the limited gains of the DDA, many observers have neglected the potential cost of its failure; a failed DDA would send the wrong signal in terms of global governance, and in more pragmatic terms, it could lead to an unravelling of the past 15 years of trade liberalisation. In the current unstable environment, a concrete global agreement will be the proof needed by the private sector that governments can act upon the commitments they make in speeches.

References

Bairoch, P. 1995. Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bouet, A., and D. Labourde. 2009. Assessing the Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round. IFPRI Discussion Paper, Forthcoming, IFPRI.
Irwin, D.A. 1992. Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies in the World Trading System: an Historical Perspective. In New Dimension of Regional Integration, eds. de J. de Melo and A. Panagarya. Cambridge .Center for Economic Policy Research.
Messerlin P. 1985. Les Politiques Commerciales et leurs Effets en Longue Periode. In Le Protectionnisme, eds. B. Lassuderie-Duchene and J.-L. Reiffers. Paris: Economica.
US International Trade Commission, 2006,Value of US Imports for Consumption, Duties Collected and Ratio of Duties to Values, 1891 – 2005, Statistical services Division, March 2006.

G20: COMERCIO ABIERTO

Stimuler le commerce et rejeter le protectionnisme

A. R.
03/04/2009 | Mise à jour : 08:49 | Commentaires 3 | Ajouter à ma sélection

Pascal Lamy va pouvoir profiter d'un sommet de crise pour relancer les négociations du cycle de Doha sur le commerce international. Crédits photo : Le Figaro

250 milliards de dollars en deux ans pour soutenir le commerce mondial.

L'OMC est priée de mener à bien les négociations du cycle de Doha. «À quelque chose malheur est bon.» Le proverbe n'aura pas menti à Londres.

Pascal Lamy, le directeur général de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) va pouvoir profiter d'un sommet de crise pour relancer les négociations du cycle de Doha sur le commerce international, dans l'impasse depuis l'échec de la réunion de Genève, fin juillet 2008.

Pas moins de 250 milliards de dollars vont être débloqués dans les deux ans à venir pour financer le commerce mondial. Cette décision confirme le rôle moteur de ce dernier pour soutenir la croissance, alors même que l'OMC prédit une baisse de 9 % des échanges cette année.

Pascal Lamy, surtout, voit réaffirmée haut et fort la nécessité de «résister au protectionnisme» et de «ne pas élever de nouvelles barrières à l'investissement et au commerce dans les biens et les services».

Le mois dernier, l'OMC pointait du doigt une dérive vers des mesures défensives, qui visaient, sans les nommer, les États-Unis et certains pays d'Europe, dont la France.

Cerise sur le gâteau, le directeur général de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce se retrouve en position de force pour conclure Doha. La réussite de ce cycle, affirme le communiqué final, est une «urgente nécessité». Il peut, insiste-t-il, permettre d'insuffler «au moins 150 milliards de dollars par an» dans l'économie mondiale.

Banco Mundial: COMERCIO YPROTECCIONISMO

Preocupante aumento de las medidas proteccionistas desde el inicio de la crisis financiera
En un estudio se señala que 17 miembros del G-20 han implementado medidas de restricción del comercio
CIUDAD DE WASHINGTON, 17 de marzo de 2009. En una nueva investigación del Banco Mundial se señala que, desde noviembre de 2008, cuando los líderes del Grupo de los Veinte (G-20) suscribieron un acuerdo mediante el cual se comprometían a evitar medidas proteccionistas, varios países, entre ellos 17 miembros del G-20, han adoptado 47 medidas que restringen el comercio a expensas de otros países. De acuerdo con la lista de seguimiento de las medidas comerciales y relacionadas con el comercio, elaborada por el Banco Mundial, los funcionarios han propuesto o adoptado unas 78 medidas comerciales desde el inicio de la crisis financiera. De ese total, 66 medidas entrañaban restricciones al comercio. Finalmente, entraron en vigor 47 medidas de restricción del comercio y, si bien es probable que sus efectos sean insignificantes en comparación con el tamaño de los mercados no afectados, también es cierto que tienen un marcado impacto negativo en los exportadores que quedaron fuera de los mercados. "Los líderes no deben escuchar el canto de las sirenas que los impulsa a aplicar medidas proteccionistas, ya sea en el comercio, en los paquetes de reactivación económica o las operaciones de rescate", señaló el presidente del Grupo del Banco Mundial, Robert B. Zoellick. "El aislamiento económico puede generar una espiral de acontecimientos negativos como los que ocurrieron en los años treinta, que profundizaron la gravedad de una situación que, de por si, ya era mala". El Banco Mundial advierte que el costo de la falta de acción en el marco del Programa de Doha está aumentado. Hasta la fecha, en la mayoría de los países no se han aumentado los aranceles hasta los niveles consolidados y tampoco se ha aprovechado plenamente el margen de maniobra con respecto a las subvenciones agrícolas. Empero, a medida que la recesión se profundice, muchos países podrían verse tentados a hacerlo. Esta amenaza subraya la importancia de avanzar rápidamente para concluir la Ronda de Doha. En el estudio se sugiere que el G-20, por su parte, podría adoptar medidas adicionales orientadas a fortalecer el frágil consenso contra la profundización del proteccionismo. Por ejemplo, los países del G-20 podrían: Poner empeño en incrementar la transparencia y, con ese fin, comprometerse a presentar a la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) informes trimestrales sobre nuevas restricciones al comercio y subvenciones industriales y agrícolas, así como un análisis obligatorio del impacto de la restricción del comercio en el empleo (pues ello brindaría nuevas oportunidades para el análisis técnico y el debate político en los propios países); Promover un aumento de la ayuda para el comercio destinada a los países de ingreso bajo, y Aprovechar la oportunidad de respaldar el comercio mundial en momentos en que ese apoyo es de vital importancia, así como realizar progresos en la Ronda de Doha a nivel técnico, aun mientras las negociaciones formales estén suspendidas. Información adicional En el estudio del Banco Mundial se señala que, si bien es probable que, por ahora, los efectos de estas medidas proteccionistas sean insignificantes en comparación con el tamaño de los mercados no afectados, también es cierto que tienen una gran importancia para los exportadores que han quedado fuera de los mercados protegidos. Los aumentos de los aranceles representan escasamente un tercio de estas medidas y la mitad en el caso de los países en desarrollo. Por ejemplo, Rusia aumentó los aranceles sobre automóviles usados y Ecuador hizo lo propio respecto de 600 productos. Las medidas no arancelarias incluyen políticas tales como la exigencia de licencias no automáticas para la importación de autopartes, textiles, televisores, juguetes, calzado y productos de cuero en Argentina, o la decisión de Indonesia de permitir el ingreso de cinco categorías de productos (prendas de vestir, calzado, juguetes, productos electrónicos, alimentos y bebidas) únicamente a través de cinco puertos y aeropuertos. Para reducir el ingreso de importaciones, en algunos países se han endurecido las normas, según se indica en el estudio del Banco Mundial. China, por ejemplo, prohibió las importaciones de carne de cerdo irlandesa y rechazó el ingreso de chocolates belgas, coñac italiano, salsas británicas, huevos holandeses y productos lácteos españoles, mientras que India prohibió las importaciones de juguetes chinos. Las subvenciones a la exportación son especialmente nocivas porque contravienen el proyecto de modalidades de Doha. La Unión Europea anunció nuevas subvenciones a las exportaciones de manteca, queso y leche en polvo. Utilizando un método menos explícito, tanto China como India han aumentado el monto que se reembolsa a los exportadores a través del sistema de reintegro de derechos y, si bien el componente de subvención es tema de debate, el momento elegido para aplicar estas medidas plantea dudas. Las subvenciones propuestas para la industria automotriz han proliferado —en total, ascienden a unos US$48.000 millones a nivel mundial—, principalmente (US$42.700 millones) en los países de ingreso alto. Además de la subvención directa por valor de US$17.400 millones proporcionada por Estados Unidos a sus tres empresas nacionales, Canadá, Francia, Alemania, Reino Unido, China, Argentina, Brasil, Suecia e Italia también han proporcionado subvenciones directas o indirectas, sin incluir el apoyo proporcionado por Australia a sus concesionarios de automóviles ni el apoyo de Corea del Sur y Portugal a sus proveedores de componentes. Dado que la industria sufre las consecuencias de un exceso de capacidad, estas subvenciones obstaculizan la salida y retrasan el ajuste. Peor aún, las subvenciones pueden estar vinculadas a imposiciones que obligan a las empresas a preservar el empleo interno, incluso a costas de cerrar plantas externas más eficientes situadas en países en desarrollo. Por otra parte, para evitar que esto suceda, los gobiernos han tenido que adoptar medidas para responder a las políticas de los países vecinos, como Canadá, por ejemplo, que otorgó subvenciones equivalentes a las que Estados Unidos proporcionó a las empresas automotrices de Detroit, para asegurarse de que las fábricas estadounidenses no cierren sus plantas en Canadá. En el estudio se señalan varios factores que claramente han atenuado las presiones proteccionistas, y se marcan las diferencias entre esta contracción de la economía mundial y las presiones de los años treinta. Los países son mucho más interdependientes a través de las cadenas de suministro, los insumos importados e inclusive los servicios. Actualmente, los intereses de exportación superan ampliamente a las industrias que sólo producen productos que compiten con las importaciones. Las empresas que producen para el mercado interno dependen en mayor grado de insumos importados y las cadenas de producción vinculan a los mercados mundiales a través de una red de intercambio de partes y componentes. El promedio simple de la participación del comercio en el producto interno bruto (PIB) asciende actualmente al 96%, en comparación con el 55% en 1970, y el intercambio de partes y componentes —un indicador de las cadenas de suministro— ha superado el doble en cuanto proporción del comercio total. Por otra parte, los sucesivos acuerdos en el seno del Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio (GATT) y la OMC han incrementado marcadamente la estabilidad legal de las relaciones comerciales. A raíz de esta gran diferencia en la política económica actual, algunas de las restricciones propuestas fueron rechazadas o no se sancionaron. En Brasil, por ejemplo, la burocracia intentó imponer licencias generalizadas y controles a las importaciones semejantes a los aplicados en los años setenta, pero la medida fue dejada sin efecto de inmediato debido a la firme oposición del sector privado. En forma similar, todo parece indicar que se han evitado las formas más nocivas de la disposición en materia de "compre productos estadounidenses". Asimismo, de los 77 cambios propuestos y aplicados en relación con la política comercial, unos 10 entrañaron medidas en pro de una mayor liberalización, en su mayoría relacionadas con acuerdos de libre comercio. Para más información sobre el informe, consulte el documento: Elisa Gamberoni y Richard Newfarmer, "Trade Protection: Incipient but Worrisome Trends" (Protección al comercio: Tendencias incipientes pero preocupantes), Trade Notes, Departamento de Comercio Internacional del Banco Mundial. Estudio del Banco Nundial muestra el aumento del proteccionismo. Estudio completo descargarlo en: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Trade_Note_37.pdf

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Macroperu Buy American Act = Proteccionismo

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Subpart 25.2—Buy American Act—Construction Materials

25.200 Scope of Subpart.

(a) This subpart implements—

(1) The Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. 10a - 10d);

(2) Executive Order 10582, December 17, 1954; and

(3) Waiver of the component test of the Buy American Act for acquisitions of commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) items in accordance with 41 U.S.C. 431.

(b) It applies to contracts for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public work in the United States.

25.201 Policy.

Except as provided in 25.202, use only domestic construction materials in construction contracts performed in the United States.

25.202 Exceptions.

(a) When one of the following exceptions applies, the contracting officer may acquire foreign construction materials without regard to the restrictions of the Buy American Act:

(1) Impracticable or inconsistent with public interest. The head of the agency may determine that application of the restrictions of the Buy American Act to a particular construction material would be impracticable or would be inconsistent with the public interest. The public interest exception applies when an agency has an agreement with a foreign government that provides a blanket exception to the Buy American Act.

(2) Nonavailability. The head of the contracting activity may determine that a particular construction material is not mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States in sufficient and reasonably available commercial quantities of a satisfactory quality. The determinations of nonavailability of the articles listed at 25.104(a) and the procedures at 25.103(b)(1) also apply if any of those articles are acquired as construction materials.

(3) Unreasonable cost. The contracting officer concludes that the cost of domestic construction material is unreasonable in accordance with 25.204.

(b) Determination and findings. When a determination is made for any of the reasons stated in this section that certain foreign construction materials may be used, the contracting officer must list the excepted materials in the contract. The agency must make the findings justifying the exception available for public inspection.

(c) Acquisitions under trade agreements. For construction contracts with an estimated acquisition value of $7,443,000 or more, see Subpart 25.4.

25.203 Preaward determinations.

(a) For any acquisition, an offeror may request from the contracting officer a determination concerning the inapplicability of the Buy American Act for specifically identified construction materials. The time for submitting the request is specified in the solicitation in paragraph (b) of either 52.225-10 or 52.225-12, whichever applies. The information and supporting data that must be included in the request are also specified in the solicitation in paragraphs (c) and (d) of either 52.225-9 or 52.225-11, whichever applies.

(b) Before award, the contracting officer must evaluate all requests based on the information provided and may supplement this information with other readily available information.

25.204 Evaluating offers of foreign construction material.

(a) Offerors proposing to use foreign construction material other than that listed by the Government in the applicable clause at 52.225-9, paragraph (b)(2), or 52.225-11, paragraph (b)(3), or covered by the WTO GPA or a Free Trade Agreement (paragraph (b)(2) of 52.225-11), must provide the information required by paragraphs (c) and (d) of the respective clauses.

(b) Unless the head of the agency specifies a higher percentage, the contracting officer must add to the offered price 6 percent of the cost of any foreign construction material proposed for exception from the requirements of the Buy American Act based on the unreasonable cost of domestic construction materials. In the case of a tie, the contracting officer must give preference to an offer that does not include foreign construction material excepted at the request of the offeror on the basis of unreasonable cost.

(c) Offerors also may submit alternate offers based on use of equivalent domestic construction material to avoid possible rejection of the entire offer if the Government determines that an exception permitting use of a particular foreign construction material does not apply.

(d) If the contracting officer awards a contract to an offeror that proposed foreign construction material not listed in the applicable clause in the solicitation (paragraph (b)(2) of 52.225-9, or paragraph (b)(3) of 52.225-11), the contracting officer must add the excepted materials to the list in the contract clause.

25.205 Postaward determinations.

(a) If a contractor requests a determination regarding the inapplicability of the Buy American Act after contract award, the contractor must explain why it could not request the determination before contract award or why the need for such determination otherwise was not reasonably foreseeable. If the contracting officer concludes that the contractor should have made the request before contract award, the contracting officer may deny the request.

(b) The contracting officer must base evaluation of any request for a determination regarding the inapplicability of the Buy American Act made after contract award on information required by paragraphs (c) and (d) of the applicable clause at 52.225-9 or 52.225-11 and/or other readily available information.

(c) If a determination, under 25.202(a), is made after contract award that an exception to the Buy American Act applies, the contracting officer must negotiate adequate consideration and modify the contract to allow use of the foreign construction material. When the basis for the exception is the unreasonable price of a domestic construction material, adequate consideration is at least the differential established in 25.202(a) or in accordance with agency procedures.

25.206 Noncompliance.

The contracting officer must—

(a) Review allegations of Buy American Act violations;

(b) Unless fraud is suspected, notify the contractor of the apparent unauthorized use of foreign construction material and request a reply, to include proposed corrective action; and

(c) If the review reveals that a contractor or subcontractor has used foreign construction material without authorization, take appropriate action, including one or more of the following:

(1) Process a determination concerning the inapplicability of the Buy American Act in accordance with 25.205.

(2) Consider requiring the removal and replacement of the unauthorized foreign construction material.

(3) If removal and replacement of foreign construction material incorporated in a building or work would be impracticable, cause undue delay, or otherwise be detrimental to the interests of the Government, the contracting officer may determine in writing that the foreign construction material need not be removed and replaced. A determination to retain foreign construction material does not constitute a determination that an exception to the Buy American Act applies, and this should be stated in the determination. Further, a determination to retain foreign construction material does not affect the Government's right to suspend or debar a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier for violation of the Buy American Act, or to exercise other contractual rights and remedies, such as reducing the contract price or terminating the contract for default.

(4) If the noncompliance is sufficiently serious, consider exercising appropriate contractual remedies, such as terminating the contract for default. Also consider preparing and forwarding a report to the agency suspending or debarring official in accordance with Subpart 9.4. If the noncompliance appears to be fraudulent, refer the matter to other appropriate agency officials, such as the officer responsible for criminal investigation.