SECCION Crisis monetaria: US/EURO, dolar vs otras monedas

Gráfico del tipo de cambio del Dólar Americano al Euro - Desde dic 1, 2008 a dic 31, 2008

Evolucion del dolar contra el euro

US Dollar to Euro Exchange Rate Graph - Jan 7, 2004 to Jan 5, 2009

V. SECCION: M. PRIMAS

1. SECCION:materias primas en linea:precios


[Most Recent Quotes from www.kitco.com]


METALES A 30 DIAS click sobre la imagen
(click sur l´image)

3. PRIX DU CUIVRE

  Cobre a 30 d [Most Recent Quotes from www.kitco.com]

4. ARGENT/SILVER/PLATA

5. GOLD/OR/ORO

6. precio zinc

7. prix du plomb

8. nickel price

10. PRIX essence






petrole on line

Find out how to invest in energy stocks at EnergyAndCapital.com.

azucar

azucar
mercados,materias primas,azucar,precios y graficos azucar i otros
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta BAILOUT. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta BAILOUT. Mostrar todas las entradas

6 jul 2015

In depth: The Greek crisis | The Economist

http://www.economist.com/greekcrisis
syriza gana por amplio margen NO




Enviado desde mi Samsung Mobile de Claro

1 may 2015

CHUTE FONDS ACCTIONS EUROPE


.htmlhttp://www.easybourse.com/bourse/financieres/article/30077/les-fonds-actions-domicilies-en-europe-ont-essuye-une-decollecte-de-649-milliards-deuros-en-mars.html

Reenv: Reservas Internacionales Netas se incrementaron en US$ 452 millones desde fines de marzo


Yes

Enviado desde mi Samsung Mobile de Claro


De: BCRP
Fecha:30/04/2015 23:54 (GMT-05:00)

Asunto: Reservas Internacionales Netas se incrementaron en US$ 452 millones desde fines de marzo



<http://www.facebook.com/bcrp.gob.pe>
<http://www.twitter.com/bcrpoficial>
<http://www.youtube.com/user/bcrpoficial>
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/rss/novedades.xml>

<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/publicaciones/nota-semanal.html>

**Nota Semanal N° 16-2015 (descargar documento)
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Nota-Semanal/2015/ns-16-2015.pdf>
**

Reservas Internacionales Netas se incrementaron en US$ 452 millones
desde fines de marzo


<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Nota-Semanal/2015/ns-16-2015.pdf>

Precio del del zinc subió 5,2 por ciento a US$/lb. 1,04 del 21 al
28 de abril


<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Nota-Semanal/2015/ns-16-2015.pdf>

Tasa de interés preferencial corporativa en soles en 4,4 por ciento
Tipo de cambio en S/. 3,13 por dólar

**Nota Semanal: N° 16-2015 (descargar documento)
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Nota-Semanal/2015/ns-16-2015.pdf>
**

Resumen informativo N° 16-2015
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Nota-Semanal/2015/resumen-informativo-16-2015.pdf>
(formato PDF)
Cuadros estadísticos
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/cuadros-de-la-nota-semanal.html>
(formato XLS)
Cuadros estadísticos
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Estadisticas/Cuadros-Estadisticos/2015/cuadros-estadisticos-16-2015.pdf>
(formato PDF)

**Novedades en la página web <http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/>
**

Revista Moneda 161: Importancia de los pagos minoristas
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/publicaciones/revista-moneda/revista-moneda-161.html>

Circular 018-2015-BCRP: Disposiciones de encaje en moneda extranjera
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Transparencia/Normas-Legales/Circulares/2015/circular-018-2015-bcrp.pdf>

Circular 017-2015-BCRP: Disposiciones de encaje en moneda nacional
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Transparencia/Normas-Legales/Circulares/2015/circular-017-2015-bcrp.pdf>

BCRP reduce encaje en moneda nacional a 7% desde mayo
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Transparencia/Notas-Informativas/2015/nota-informativa-2015-04-27.pdf>

XXXIII Encuentro de Economistas - Convocatoria
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/proyeccion-institucional/encuentro-de-economistas.html>

Resultados del Concurso de Investigación para Jóvenes Economistas
2014-2015
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Transparencia/Notas-Informativas/2015/nota-informativa-2015-04-24-2.pdf>

"Los dorados años veinte" de Wilfredo Ardito Vega es la ganadora
del Concurso de Novela Corta del BCRP, 2015
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Transparencia/Notas-Informativas/2015/nota-informativa-2015-04-24.pdf>

Atte,

Departamento de Publicaciones Económicas.

Envíe sus comentarios mediante el formulario de consultas
<http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/contactenos.html>



-.

24 dic 2012

Fwd: Escándalo manipulación tasa interbancaria LIBOR. Banco suizo UBS



 

UBS despedirá entre 30 y 40 trabajadores por escándalo del Libor

19 de Diciembre de 2012 • 08:50hs  •  actualizado 09:05hs
  1.  
  2.  





El primer banco suizo, UBS, despedirá entre 30 y 40 empleados como consecuencia del escándalo por la manipulación de la tasa interbancaria Libor, informó hoy el director general del organismo, Sergio Ermotti.



El máximo dirigente del organismo se declaró "decepcionado" por el escándalo y por "el comportamiento inaceptable de algunos empleados", razón que justifica plenamente los despidos, señaló.



Hoy se supo que pagará una sanción de más de 1.500 millones de dólares a los reguladores financieros de Estados Unidos, Reino Unido y Suiza por haber manipulado las tasas interbancarias.



Las autoridades acusan al banco de que algunos de sus agentes bursátiles manipularon los cálculos que aportaban para fijar el Libor con el fin de obtener un beneficio económico, y algunos de ellos se aliaron con otros en otras entidades para influir en el tipo interbancario.



Según los reguladores, intentaron manipular la tasa bien para obtener un beneficio o bien para proyectar una imagen de fortaleza financiera durante la crisis crediticia de 2008.



Ermotti afirmó que está totalmente "comprometido" a que este tipo de casos no se reproduzcan en el futuro, y aseguró que el comportamiento de "algunos colaboradores" no se corresponde con los valores fundamentales y éticos de UBS.



Asimismo, el ejecutivo se ha defendido asegurando que, desde que estalló el escándalo, la dirección del banco reaccionó rápidamente y cooperó con las autoridades.



"Es la prueba de nuestra determinación para cambiar hacia mejor", precisó, sin querer dar su opinión al respecto de si encuentra justa la sanción de 1.500 millones de dólares.



El dirigente asumió que, a causa de la multa, en el cuarto trimestre el banco tendrá unas pérdidas de entre 2.000 y 2.500 millones de francos (entre 1.656 y 2.070 millones de euros).



De éste monto, 2.100 millones de francos (1.738 millones de euros) se dedicarán a saldar los litigios y los problemas reglamentarios, otros 500 millones francos (414 millones de euros) en gastos de reestructuración, y unos 400 millones de francos (331 millones de euros) por pérdidas de crédito, indicó el banco.



Hechos todos los descuentos, UBS cree que, en el conjunto del 2012, obtendrá un beneficio antes de impuestos de entre 2.500 y 3.000 millones de francos (2.070 y entre 2.484 millones de euros).
Además, Ermotti está convencido que el establecimiento logrará cumplir con sus objetivos de reforzar su capital para reducir los riesgos y cumplir con las normas Basel III.
Del total de multa anunciada hoy, 1.200 millones de dólares irán al departamento de Justicia y la Comisión de comercio de futuros de materias primas de EEUU; 160 millones de libras (260 millones de dólares) a la FSA y 59 millones de francos suizos (64 millones de dólares) al supervisor bancario suizo FINMA.

UBS es el segundo banco multado por tergiversar el Libor -que se fija a diario en Londres y es referencia para las transacciones financieras en todo el mundo- para su propio beneficio, después de que el pasado junio lo fuera el británico Barclays.

8 dic 2012

systeme monetaire mondial, benassy-coeure

http://www.davidmourey.com/article-le-systeme-monetaire-international-une-introduction-par-agnes-benassy-quere-113244870.html

CRISE ET REGULAATION,ROLE BANQUES,LEMOINE(MOUREY RETR)

Los cuatro videos precedentes recuerdan el origen financiero de la crisis economica mundial, en que los efectos de propagacion se han difundido en el planeta con distinta intensidad segun los canales de propagacion abiertos...

http://www.davidmourey.com/article-video-de-mathilde-lemoine-sur-le-role-de-banques-dans-la-crise-financiere-113259059.html

crise et regulation,rameix (mourey retrans)

http://www.davidmourey.com/article-video-de-gerard-rameix-sur-quelles-regulations-dans-le-futur-113260371.html

De la crise financiere a la crise economique,vallet

http://www.davidmourey.com/article-video-de-pierre-jaillet-cloture-du-colloque-de-la-crise-financiere-a-la-crise-economique-113261217.html

28 ago 2012

Fwd: G20 rectifica, pero, quién paga ahora el cuantioso daño causado - un abrazo GS.



After two wasted years, the G20 pivots back towards fiscal sanity

The G-20 has come (almost) full circle. In April 2009 in London, the communique set out leaders' commitment to a massive coordinated fiscal stimulus:

            "We are undertaking an unprecedented and concerted fiscal expansion, which will save or create millions of jobs which would otherwise have been destroyed, and that           will, by the end of next year, amount to $5 trillion, raise output by 4 per cent, and      accelerate the transition to a green economy. We are committed to deliver the scale of sustained fiscal effort necessary to restore growth.
            While the degree of coordination was somewhat exaggerated, there was a genuine collective determination to do what was necessary to ensure the financial crisis did      not become a prolonged depression".

And it worked - perhaps too well. By June 2010, in Toronto, it appeared that recovery was indeed underway. The new priority was fiscal consolidation: the communique noted approvingly that:

            "Sound fiscal finances are essential to sustain recovery, provide flexibility to             respond to new shocks, ensure the capacity to meet the challenges of aging       populations, and avoid leaving future generations with a legacy of deficits and debt...    Advanced economies have committed to fiscal plans that will at least halve deficits     by 2013 "

For the UK government, this was a diplomatic triumph; not only did the G20 endorse the UK's approach to fiscal consolidation, it commended it to other countries:

            "I think the British budget has been noticed here in the G20 and has been      appreciated," finance minister George Osborne said. Citing the summit communique,             he said the group had formally recognized that "countries with serious fiscal       challenges need to accelerate the pace of dealing with them, and of course that is             exactly what the budget did."

Others were less positive; Paul Krugman's reaction:

            "The deficit hawks have taken over the G20. The right thing, overwhelmingly, is to do things that will reduce spending and/or raise revenue after the economy has recovered — specifically, wait until after the economy is strong enough that monetary policy can offset the contractionary effects of fiscal austerity.
            But no: the deficit hawks want their cuts while unemployment rates are still at near-record highs and monetary policy is still hard up against the zero bound. Utter folly posing as wisdom".
And indeed it is now clear this premature "pivot" to fiscal consolidation, as the IMF described it, was a huge mistake, both for the G20 as a whole and for the UK. The supposed commitment to halve deficits by 2013 has been quietly (and rightly) forgotten, derailed by weak growth. Indeed, in the UK, most of the deficit reduction so far has come through cutting public investment; belatedly, the government has recognised the folly of this approach, and is trying to think of ways to reverse it without admitting that it got it wrong, as I explain here.

Meanwhile, in the eurozone, matters are even worse. Austerity has proved self-defeating even in its own terms, with fiscal contraction leading to lower growth and higher unemployment, in turn exacerbating deficits and leading to further losses of credibility, both political and economic.

But the good news is that at this week's G20 in Los Cabos the message does seem finally to have got through to world leaders. Although most press attention has focused on the rather inconclusive discussion of the eurozone crisis, it is worth noting the communique text on fiscal policy:

            "All G20 members will take the necessary actions to strengthen global growth and restore confidence. Advanced economies will ensure that the pace of fiscal consolidation is appropriate to support the recovery, taking country-specific circumstances into account and, in line with the Toronto commitments, address concerns about medium term fiscal sustainability. Those advanced and emerging economies which have fiscal space will let the automatic fiscal stabilizers to operate taking into account national circumstances and current demand conditions. Should economic conditions deteriorate significantly further, those countries with sufficient fiscal space stand ready to coordinate and implement discretionary fiscal actions to support domestic demand, as appropriate. In many countries, higher investment in education, innovation and infrastructure can support the creation of jobs now while raising productivity and future growth prospects. Recognizing the need to pursue growth-oriented policies that support demand and recovery, the United States will calibrate the pace of its fiscal consolidation by ensuring that its public finances are placed on a sustainable long-run path so that a sharp fiscal contraction in 2013 is avoided".

As usual, there is something for everyone here. But the change of tone is marked. Instead of the mistaken and damaging view of 2010 that immediate fiscal consolidation was urgent to sustain recovery and boost confidence, there is a recognition that cutting deficits too fast could damage growth; that higher investment would boost both output and jobs now and productivity over the medium term; and that further stimulus may well be necessary, given the continued depressed state of much of the world economy. All this is welcome; it is a pity they didn't say this two years ago. Let us hope it translates into policy.

20 jun 2012

Fwd: Macroperu Bankia, Ratto, bailout




---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Dwight Ordoñez <DWIGHTOR@gmail.com>
Date: 2012/5/9
Subject: Macroperu Bankia, Ratto, bailout





 
El gobierno español acaba de intervenir/ "ayudar" con 7,000 millones de euro a la cuarta entidad bancaria de España, Bankia (que es la primera en términos de sus operaciones dentro del país -Santander y BBVA tienen más de 60% de sus operaciones fuera del país).   La burbuja inmobiliaria se llevó de encuentro a la institutión.
Al tiempo de anunciar nuevos recortes en los sistemas de salud y educación, el gobierno de Rajoy usa dinero público para salvar a un banco privado. 
El Presidente de Bankia, el ex-ministro de economía del PP (de Aznar) y ex-director general del FMI, Rodrigo Ratto, acaba de dimitir/ ser mandado a su casa, con un fuerte bono de compensación, luego de este nuevo fracaso (sobre el paso de Ratto por el FMI en el siguiente link: 
En todos los países las causas de la crisis tienen, aparte de razones, rostros y responsables.  Pero en todas partes, éstos últimos son protegidos y "caen de pie" vez tras vez.
Recuerdo cuando en el Perú se felicitaban de la elección de este señor al FMI y se algunos se apiñaban al pie de la escalinata para saludarlo.
__._,_.___
    

Fwd: Macroperu Los Tres días de Oscuridad



---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Bruno <lbseminario@yahoo.com>
Date: 2012/5/8
Subject: Macroperu Los Tres días de Oscuridad




 

Global Economy Heading Downhill?

Author: Edward Hugh  ·  May 8th, 2012  ·  Comments (2)Share This Print  151  83
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According to the JP Morgan Global Composite PMI report, "Growth of global economic activity eased sharply to a five month low in April." The authors of the report found that on aggregate across the countries surveyed – 30 across the globe – both new order inflows and job creation fell back, leading them to the conclusion  that "the world economy is set for a softer growth patch heading into midyear". Looking at the chart below, this certainly seems to be the case (the composite index is a measure derived from a weighted average of the manufacturing and services findings).
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So momentum is weakening across the entire global economy at the present point, not just in say Europe, or China. Global output is still growing but it is growing at an increasingly weaker pace. What could change that? Well QE3 naturally. Why do I say that?  Well look at the three significant surges in the chart. The first coincides with QE1, the second with QE2, and the third, much weaker one, fits in with the so called Operation Twist.
This tells us a number of things. In the first place these massive liquidity injections are not self sustaining, i.e. they give things a hefty push forward but even so they  don't manage to jump start the various economies, especially in the developed world. They work for a bit, and then run out of steam. The fact that they systematically run out of steam tells me, at any rate, that something somewhere is broken, and that re-iterated injections on their own won't sort the problem out.
In Japan this very same "something" has now been broken since 1992, and continual liquidity injections and mounting government debt have not made it better. This is not the point to go in depth into what the something is, my story on this is scattered here and there across the various pieces of analysis I write. Suffice it to say that excessive debt and rapid population aging have to form part of the picture. Both constitute an important drag on growth. But the principal aim of this post  isn't to add to the debate about what it is that is broken, it is simply to plead for a recognition that something is, and that, as a result, the situation won't simply "right" itself. This time there is no hidden helping hand.
What the various liquidity injections do do is buy time. Some people scorn that, and would rather take their armageddon full face and now. Each to his taste. If I get to die tomorrow rather than today, I am not ungrateful.
Liquidity injections are not quite the same thing as debt generation, although obviously there is a link – injections which involve straight monetisation of government debt (ECB LTRO lending against government guaranteed bank bond collateral in order to enable the bank to buy government bonds, for example) are clearly facilitating the generation of debt. While liquidity provision for its own sake in a deflated economic system is generally positive, debt generation for its own sake isn't necessarily so, since someone, someday, will have to pay it back, and if in the meantime we don't fix the problem (that "something" that is broken) then the somebody may be poorer than we are, in which case we are directly transferring income inter-generationally, from them to us. Debt to buy time for something which won't fix itself is not justified, and the money should be spent structurally, on implementing a fix. Grandiose infrastructure plans which have no real efficiency component were tried in Japan in the 1990sand they didn't work.
"Even today, Japan is having trouble climbing out of its cement pit. At its high, in the mid-1990s, infrastructure spending accounted for 6 percent of its gross domestic product, double what the United States allocated for infrastructure in the '90s and still higher than what politicians are considering spending today. In estimates of national debt, the world's second-largest national economy is near the top of the list, perched between Lebanon and Jamaica. Last year, Japan's public debt was far greater than the size of its economy, a burden that makes its demographic challenges more difficult to address".

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We face a situation which seems neither to have been contemplated in either the Austrian or the Keynesian theoretical frameworks (since both assume some sort of homeostatic corrective mechanism is ultimately at work) or in the any of the various versions of neoclassical growth theory, where some sort of semi-constant equilibrium growth path is assumed to exist, and be recoverable via the application of an appropriate set of structural reforms. Yet the three oldest societies on the planet – Japan, Germany and Italy – have been losing growth momentum for decades now, and it is quite possible will drift into negative average growth rates at some point in a non too distant future. Traditional theory never really contemplated this possibility (for a brief summary of my argument on this, see this recent interview I did with Andrew Pollen).
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Now for my second main point. Where's the missing link? That is, where is the link between the Feds quantitative measures (or those of the other main developed economy central banks for that matter) and global economic momentum? Well, that's a bit of a longer story – although empirically I think it is easy to see the link is there. Basically the story has to do with international "carry" (borrowing cheap in one currency to lend dear in another, preferably with the value of the first currency falling, and the value of the second currency rising, a set of relations which "carry" itself propagates in good circular fashion), and risk sentiment. The liquidity injection makes people more willing to take on risk (think ECB and the 3yr LTROs), and the existence of the carry trade enables them to do it. Nothing new here, banks by their very nature are about intermediation, and leveraging spreads, its just that in an age of financial globalisation that intermediation has a lot more distant geographical reach.
And then of course, all that extra money helps people from Rio to New Delhi and from Ankara to Jakarta borrow up to the hilt to buy themselves a nice new flat, or SUV, or whatever.
Across Latin America's largest economy, record prices for the country's commodities and surging foreign fund inflows – what the International Monetary Fund calls "favourable tailwinds" – are driving a historic boom. Property prices are soaring, consumer credit is booming and bank profits swelling. But there are growing concerns over whether Brazil is becoming addicted to this windfall of easy money. Increasingly, there are fears that Brazil is heading for a bubble.
So excess liquidity which finds no outlet in developed economies floods into emerging markets, provoking unsustainable surges in demand and fueling inflation, which leads the local central banks to penalise borrowing in one way or another, and bring the whole dynamic to a halt again. At which point we get another liquidity injection in one of the major developed economies, and off we go again.
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It is perhaps a sobering thought  that households will be about as indebted in Brazil coming in to the next football World Cup as they were in Spain at the time of the 1992 Olympics, and then remember what happened next in the latter case. Brazil isn't facing a devastating bubble yet, but it could be one day if we don't find a better way of doing things.
Global Manufacturing In LimboLand
Even if it was services activity, rather than manufacturing, that showed the greatest global weakness during April, manufacturing was only able to gouge out a minimal improvement on what was already a weak March performance, and even then what growth there was was  very unevenly distributed.
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Overall output, new orders and employment all continued to rise during the month, but there was a marked divergence between the world's two largest industrial regions, the US and the Eurozone. In fact, the US remained one of the principal spurs of global manufacturing growth in April, with the US PMI rising to a ten-month high, provoking indirectly yet more debate about the desirability of austerity across the EU. Nonetheless, as can be seen from the chart, the surge in manufacturing output remains modest when compared with the two earlier waves, which is why I am among those who think that the arrival of some sort of QE3 is now only a matter of time.
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The Eurozone manufacturing PMI, in contrast, posted its lowest reading in almost three years, as operating conditions deteriorated across all of the  big-four Euro economies (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain). The US PMI is currently 8.9 points above its Eurozone equivalent, the greatest divergence in favour of the US since Eurozone data were first compiled in June 1997.
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Meanwhile the Asia PMIs remained mixed with solid growth being signaled in India against only modest expansions in Japan, Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea. Conditions also remained weak to subdued in China. So at this point in time, even the Asian economies as a group are hardly "powering ahead".
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The most marked feature of the April reports as far as Europe is concerned is certainly the way in which conditions in core Europe continue to worsen. As the monthly report said,"the April PMIs also indicated that manufacturing weakness was no longer confined to the region's geographic periphery. The German PMI fell to a 33-month low, conditions deteriorated sharply again in France and the Netherlands also contracted at a faster rate". The rate of decline in new orders accelerated, and jobs were lost in German manufacturing for the first time in two years.
Indeed it is the state of the once mighty German economy that is now starting to give cause for concern. The economy suffered a mild contraction in the last three months of last year, and the possibility exists that this will be repeated in Q1 2012, in which case Germany will also be technically back in recession. Whether or not this is the case we will know in a week or so, but either way, the fact that it is a close call, and that things are evidently getting worse as we enter the second quarter certainly undermines some of the force in Angela Merkel's argument that austerity leads to growth.
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As Tim Moore, senior economist at Markit and author of the German manufacturing report put it:
"Germany started the second quarter of 2012 with its worst manufacturing performance for almost three years, as another month of weaker order inflows finally brought production levels back into contraction. With backlogs of work failing to support output volumes in April, manufacturers cut their staffing numbers for the first time since March 2010.
"The investment goods sector was at the forefront of the downturn in April, as jitters about global economic conditions meant clients in export markets sought to delay large scale spending decisions. Investment goods producers saw export orders fall at the steepest pace in nearly three years, and in turn job losses were the most pronounced of the three main market groups monitored by the survey.
Germany's economy is export dependent. This export dependency comes from having a very high median population age. It is not a cultural quirk of the Germans. There is no fundamental issue with German competitiveness, there is not some major structural reform that is missing, there is not even over indebtedness in the public or private sectors. The only reason the German economy has fallen back into recession is that demand for its products among customers has dropped off, while the long awaited second pillar of domestic demand has once more failed to appear. It is as simple as that.
With the results of the recent French elections in the forefront of their minds, people are now starting to ask themselves just how Germany will respond to a Francois Hollande Presidency, forgetting that elections are also looming in Germany next year, and that the CDU is busily loosing ground. Whether or not Germany technically confirms a recession when the results for the first three months of the year are out in a week or so, the performance of the economy is visibly worsening and German leaders are under pressure to show they are willing and able to respond. Otherwise Angela Merkel may face wrath not only from those irritated by the having to contribute towards the bailouts, she will also have to contend with  those irritated by her economic ineffectiveness back home. And in any event, the party which would gain from a Merkel electoral defeat – the SPD – are not that far from seeing things the way Monsieur Hollande does.
Which is why Angela Merkel's approach was always far too simplistic. As I have said a number of times, I think she is right to search for some sort of financial stability in the face of the aging population issue, but the best way to get from here to there is not necessarily to walk in a straight line.  Naturally, austerity is a relative concept, but whether you are cutting your deficit from 10% to 9%, or from 3% to 2% as you go into a recession you still hit short term growth with a double whammy, as Italy is currently discovering. As can be seen in the chart below (which is the April Italian services PMI) domestic demand is plummeting on the back of the latest round of austerity, and this is leading the main centre left party in the government to at least cry ouch!
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At the very least European fiscal policy needs to allow for a counter cyclical component, even as you pull back from a very high deficit level, and not, as at present, insist on an entirely pro-cyclical one in a recessionary environment, thus magnifying the amplitude of the demand swings. If an economy needs more than 5% deficit (or more than 10% for that matter) simply to get meaningful GDP growth, then you need to understand why this is and find solutions, since as I say above debt itself doesn't cure anything, and arguably as our populations age accumulated debt only makes things worse. But if one of the engines on the plane starts to malfunction, the objective needs to be to get the passengers to the ground safely, and not necessarily by the most direct route.
Naturally infrastructure work on the periphery which needed German technology would help German export companies, so it wouldn't be that hard to sell in the heimat. But what use would it be to the receiving countries? That we won't know until we see the proposals in detail, and discover how it is going to be financed. If such infrastructure would help exports, both within and outside Europe, then it could be a plus. If it is only to build high speed train networks that lead to nowhere (or as is currently under discussion in Spain up to a frontier with Portugal across which there will be no connection waiting on the other side) then we are simply falling into the Japan trap, and applying a simplistic 1930s version of Keynesianism that doesn't work in the present context. But at the end of the day, the fact we are having this debate in the first place only serves to highlight the fact that we still don't have a roadmap for coming out of the crisis in Europe, and we still don't know what our future is going to look like.
And meanwhile, of course, there is Greece, and that blasted ongoing economic contraction to think about.
320
As Paul Smith, Senior Economist at Markit and author of the Greece Manufacturing PMI report commented:
"April proved to be another difficult month for Greek manufacturers, with latest data again showing steep contractions across a number of key variables measured by the survey. "In line with recent reports, the issues facing manufacturers – and the Greek economy as a whole – remain deep rooted. Panelists again noted problems in accessing working capital and a culture of cash payments, implying that credit lines remain either closed or that agreements will come with restrictive terms.
"At present, it remains hard to see how these issues can be solved suggesting that the manufacturing sector is set for continued struggle in the months ahead."
Following his cue, and looking over at the latest election results in that unfortunate country, it remains hard to see how the issues arising can be solved, and it isn't clear what is going to happen next.
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19 nov 2011

El Perú supera a UK en el ranking crediticio


¿Les provoca sorpresa esta curiosa nota periodística que apareció el día de hoy en el Telegrafo de Londres y que ilustra bastante bien cuan absurdos pueden ser los ranking crediticios? ¿Britain ranks below Peru in new `sovereign risk' world order

By Your Money Last updated: November 7th, 2011

13 Comments Comment on this article

Peru: not as risky as Britain

Peru: not as risky as Britain

Britain ranks below Peru in a new analysis by one of the world's biggest fund managers of the risk to investors who buy government bonds. Norway, Sweden and Switzerland are the least risky bond issuers among 44 countries analysed in the BlackRock Sovereign Risk Index. At the other end of the scale, also in descending order, Egypt, Portugal and Greece are reckoned to be the most risky.

Britain falls near the middle of this new world order, ranking directly below Russia, China, Czech Republic, Israel and Peru. Some small comfort may be taken from the fact that gilts issued by the British Government are reckoned to be a better bet than bonds issued by France, the Philipines and Poland; which rank directly below Britain.

Dissatisfaction with credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's,Fitch and Moody's – which have issued nearly 100 sovereign risk downgrades since the global credit crisis began – prompted BlackRockto begin collating its own analysts' views earlier this year. It claims back-testing of this analysis suggests it is more accurate than the credit rating agencies' and that the current crisis will continue with more government's getting into trouble with excess debt.

Benjamin Brodsky, managing director of fixed interest at BlackRock said: "Our initial analysis was judgmentally based, and contemporaneously validated by a high correlation with sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market spreads. Over recent months we have constructed the back history of this approach running from, taking care to use `real-time' data.

"In this quarterly update for the index, we complement our earlier analysis, showing how the BlackRock Sovereign Risk Index (BSRI) has outperformed both ratings agencies and sovereign credit default swap spreads in highlighting downgrade risks.

"Considering heightened activity within the Eurozone periphery in recent years, we present a case study that focuses on Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. We show how the BSRI would have led agency activity over the span of these countries, while leading markets in their shift from complacency."

As independent analysis from the Centre for Economics and Business Research suggests Britain might be better off if the eurozone breaks up, Ewen Cameron Watt, managing director of investment strategy at BlackRock, said: "Driven by multiple fundamental insights to the nature of sovereign credit risk, the BSRI presents a useful tool for profiling the strengths and weaknesses of countries against one another.

"Our research suggests these insights can lead rating agency activity, with an excellent track record at preceding downgrades, and historically would have highlighted areas of market complacency.

"As a backdrop for the future, we believe the multi-decade compilation of sovereign and banking crises by Reinhart and Rogoff presents a compelling case that in recent years financial markets have been complacent about risks that have always been present and, as more countries approach their upper limits of sustainable leverage, a return to a higher incidence of crises seems likely."

A fundamental shift of economic wealth from West to East is underway and relative valuations of international bonds reflect that transition. Mark Dampier of wealth managers Hargreaves Lansdown put it most succinctly: "The emerging markets have the savings; the developed world has the debt. Sooner or later, prices will reflect those facts."


7 sept 2011

BANCO EN PROBLEMAS

CHARLOTTE, EEUU (Reuters).- Bank of America Corp, que ha perdido casi la mitad de su valor de mercado este año, anunció una reorganización que incluye la salida de dos ejecutivos de alto rango.




El mayor banco estadounidense dijo tras el cierre del mercado el martes que Joe Price, jefe de banca de consumo, y Sallie Krawcheck, jefa de gestión global y de inversión, han dejado sus cargos.



Price fue presidente financiero de la compañía y Krawcheck era presidente financiero de Citigroup, líder de su unidad de correduría Smith Barney y era mencionada frecuentemente como la mujer en el puesto más alto de la industria de servicios financieros.



El presidente ejecutivo, Brian Moynihan, nombró al jefe de banca comercial David Darnell y al jefe de banca de inversión Tom Montag, ex ejecutivo de Goldman Sachs, en nuevos cargos como copresidentes operativos.



Los inversores no se mostraron convencidos de que la reorganización indique que Moynihan ahora tenga una mano firme en las riendas de una compañía que lidia con multimillonarios litigios y pérdidas en créditos.



Las acciones de BofA treparon hasta 7.03 dólares en las operaciones tras el cierre del mercado, habiendo cerrado a 6.99 dólares en la Bolsa de Nueva York el martes.



“Parece aparente que Moynihan está presionado a tomar algunas decisiones audaces”, dijo David Dietze, jefe de estrategia de inversión de Point View Financial Services en Summit, Nueva Jersey, que posee títulos de BofA.



7/9/11

24 ago 2011

Anticorrida bancaria en USA

Cuando ocurre una corrida bancarios, los  clientes de un banco hacen cola para convertir sus depósitos en moneda estatal , pero  ahora ocurre lo in verso en Estados Unidos porque los bancos de USA no saben que hacer con la enorme cantidad de dinero que reciben de los inversionistas. Aunque no hay nombre para denonomianr al curisos fenómeno, el comenatrista que adjunto lo llama una caorrida banacaria aal reveés, una anti-corrida bancaria. La locura se extiende .....

A Problem for US Banks: A Reverse Run

Published: Thursday, 18 Aug 2011 | 2:30 PM ET
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By: John Carney
Senior Editor, CNBC.com
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Banks in the U.S. are experiencing a very strange problem.
There's a bank run underway...but in reverse.
All the major U.S. banks are seeing an influx of deposits. Reserve levels at the Federal Reserve  are climbing to astronomical levels.
Balance sheets are expanding as never before.
Imagine that this is that scene from "It's A Wonderful Life," but played in rewind. The depositors are rushing in with their money, nearly toppling George Bailey as they try to get their money in the bank.
When the U.S. dollar reserve in the Fed accounts of European banks decline, it necessarily means that the dollar reserves of the U.S. banks are increasing. As a result of various transactions, the Fed is moving money across the digital spreadsheet from European banks to U.S. banks.
This sounds like a good problem to have...but it isn't.
Remember, a deposit at the bank creates a liability for the bank.
Banks must pay the FDIC fees equal to around 10 basis points, or about 0.1 percent, for their total liabilities. So the influx in deposits are costing the banks money. What's more, banks begin to press up against regulatory limits on leverage as the deposits grow.
There isn't much the banks can do with the hot money flowing in. They cannot commit the funds to longer-term loans, because it could come out of the banks as quickly as it can come in. Short-term and safe assets—such as a Treasury bond maturing in one month—pay less than nothing.
Banks can keep the money on reserve at the Fed, where they will earn 25 basis points, or 0.25 percent. They'll earn some money on the 10-point spread, but not much.
Some banks, such as Bank of America [BAC  Loading...      ()   ], have actively been trying to shrink their balance sheets in order to comply with stricter capital and leverage rules. The growth of their deposit base does not help—and may even undermine this effort at the margin.
Some banks are actually doing the running. Bank of New York Mellon [BK Loading...      ()   ] recently began charging customers with large cash deposits.
"It used to be that banks barred the door to prevent a run of cash out. Now they'd love to bar the door to prevent the run of cash in," one banking source told me.
Questions? Comments? Email us at NetNet@cnbc.com
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ENTREVISTAS TV CRISIS GLOBAL

NR.: Director, no presidente ---------------------------------------------- Bruno Seminario 1 ------------------------- Bruno Seminario 2 -------------------- FELIX JIMENEZ 1 FELIZ JIMENEZ 2 FELIX JIMENEZ 3, 28 MAYO OSCAR DANCOURT,ex presidente BCR ------------------- Waldo Mendoza, Decano PUCP economia ---------------------- Ingeniero Rafael Vasquez, parlamentario 24 set recordando la crisis, ver entrevista en diario

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