Fwd: China’s debt

Chinese debt

The great hole of China

Its debt will not drag down the world economy, but it risks zombifying the country's financial system

Oct 18th 2014 

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OF THE many things that are worrying investors around the world, from tumbling oil prices to the spectre of recession and deflation in Europe, one of the most important, and least understood, is China's debt. For the past few years China has been on a borrowing binge. Its total debt—the sum of government, corporate and household borrowings—has soared by 100% of GDP since 2008, and is now 250% of GDP; a little less than wealthy nations, but far higher than any other emerging market (see article).

Since most financial crashes are preceded by a frantic rise in borrowing—think of Japan in the early 1990s, South Korea and other emerging economies in the late 1990s, and America and Britain in 2008—it seems reasonable to worry that China could be heading for a crash. All the more so because the nominal growth rate, the sum of real output and inflation, has tumbled, from an average of 15% a year in the 2000s to 8.5% now, and looks likely to fall further as inflation hit a five-year low of 1.6% in September. Slower nominal growth constrains the ability of debtors to pay their bills, making a debt crisis more likely.

Reasonable, but wrong. China has a big debt problem. But it is unlikely to cause a sudden crisis or blow up the world economy. That is because China, unlike most other countries, controls its banks and has the means to bail them out. Instead, the biggest risk is complacency: that China's officials do too little to clean up the financial system, weighing down its economy for years with zombie firms and unpayable loans.

Half of China's debt is owed by companies, and most of that, in turn, is owed by state-owned enterprises and property developers. As the economy slows and housing prices fall, many of these loans will prove unpayable. Banks report that bad loans are just 1% of their assets and their auditors insist that the banks are not lying, but investors price banks' shares as if the true level is closer to 10%.

Even if a huge swathe of loans go bad, the consequence is unlikely to be a Lehman-style financial collapse. For that, thank the Chinese regime's vice-like grip on its financial system. Most lending is by state-controlled banks, much of it to state-owned companies. If it faced an economy-wide credit crunch, the government would (as it has in the past) simply order banks to lend more. At the same time the country's vast foreign-exchange reserves mean China need not worry about a sudden drying up of foreign capital, the main cause of many other emerging-economy crises.

This combination of control and buffers gives China the time and headroom needed to tackle its debt problem. Unfortunately, it has also bred complacency. After all, officials began to talk about tackling debt in 2010. They have taken a few baby steps towards cleaning things up: a new budget law, taking effect next year, gives central authorities more power to oversee local governments borrowings. But, in practice, too many officials are content to see bad loans rolled over; too many prefer bail-outs to defaults. Earlier this year, amid much hoopla, Chaori Solar was the first Chinese company to default on a bond. This month its creditors were bailed out.

The long night of the living debt

This process—extending credit to failing and inefficient firms—creates a slow-burn debt crisis, marked by opacity and a misallocation of capital. Japan provides a depressing precedent. It failed to clean up after its asset bubble burst in the early 1990s, preferring to pretend that firms could pay their debts and banks were solvent. The result was zombie firms, ghostly banks and years of stagnation and deflation.

Beijing's officials vow they will not repeat Japan's malaise. To do that they must hold their nerve and let firms fail: a culture of bankruptcy should replace the lifelines and "evergreening" of useless loans. As long as investors think the state will cover their losses, they will plough money into dodgy schemes—and the problem will grow. Not only will that be a huge waste of money; even mighty China cannot cover losses for ever.

MODELAMIENTO y prospectiva

http://www.ifs.du.edu/

Fwd: Macroperu De la Deflación Mundial y la Forma en que puede ser neutralizada.

Another Summer of Discontent: The Four Factors that Explain Why What We're Doing Isn't Working

Author: Daniel Alpert  ·  July 24th, 2012  · 

Here is what we know about the global economy given the experiences of the past four years:

• There is a global insufficiency of demand relative to the immense oversupply of labor and productive capacity.
• The imbalances between high-wage/current-account-deficit/balance-sheet-indebted nations and lower-wage, surplus nations have produced a glut of savings in the latter, relative to the opportunities offered for profitable investment of those savings in additional capacity, either at home or abroad, given the absence of demand for such additional capacity.
• The excess savings have inexorably reduced the cost of money in the developed world to the historically low levels we again achieved this week. The sole exception to this phenomenon being in the peripheral regions of the Eurozone, owing to the perverse and economically unnatural condition of their being caught in a currency union absent a fiscal union and internal credit support (a subject of many earlier posts on this blog).
• The private sector debt overhang in the advanced deficit economies (including, for this purpose, the portion of the sovereign debts of those countries that was taken on to subsidize internal welfare systems in lieu of, or in addition to, households taking on debt directly) is preventing the recovery of internal demand. Moreover, as the great Irving Fisher wrote during the Great Depression, the very act of attempting to reduce debt has once again ignited the paradox of reduced economic activity, employment and income causing consumers to become even more debt-dependent. Quoting Fisher: "The more debtors pay, the more they owe." We saw this materialize vividly during the second quarter as aggregate consumer debt zoomed past its bubble era highs.
• We are enduring the unfortunate coincidence of the two foregoing phenomenon coincident with a generational (as in, once-in-a-generation) new technological plateau that appears to find an ever expanding number of labor-saving, productivity-increasing, job-obsoleting applications; and
• The developed world has achieved population demographics that force us to confront painful intergenerational economic issues—amidst the historic levels of economic insecurity that impact younger generations as a result of the foregoing issues.

I will hereafter refer to the above as the "Four Factors"—summarized as follows: (i) exogenous oversupply relative to global demand, (ii) classic Fisher-described debt deflation, (iii) excess technological productivity relative to the availability of global labor, and (iv) inter-generational demographic challenges.

Any one of the above Four Factors has a fairly obvious (at least to those of us observers who enjoy salt water and air in the summers) set of solutions that would no doubt be both appropriate and successful if applied in the absence of the remaining three.  The challenge that is confounding all schools of economist—well, not all of them, the "austerian-liquidationists" (who summer by lakes it is said) seem not to be confounded, merely lacking in logical coherence—and the political elements who depend on economists to read the entrails of commerce and provide answers, is the need to address all Four Factors simultaneously (or, if not to address the, at least to consider the impact of each upon the others).

That challenge is not only unmet, it is sadly under-discussed in the context of the Four Factors' impact upon one another.  It also poses a confluence of circumstances that are nearly impossible (or at least extraordinarily difficult) to model quantitatively and approach uniquely within any one of the several macro-theoretical constraints.

Putting aside what I view as theories and models discredited as the result of recent events (in part because they assume away the possibility of all, or some, of the Four Factors—to say nothing of generally assuming-away that which is inconvenient), there would seem to be a resistance even among those disciples of John Maynard Keynes, Fisher and one of my favorite practical thinkers, Hyman Minsky, to put aside their own models and start thinking out-of-the-box, as those latter three gentlemen most certainly would were they to have lived to contemplate our present situation.

In defense of many, this is hard stuff. The world has never experienced anything like this. And all of us considering what is to be done are constrained by political realities that seem stacked against any reasonable progress in considering a unified solution.  But then again, much of our political dysfunction results from a failure to inform and explain, to those in power and to the broader polity, what we are up against—a failure that extends from the economic intelligentsia's inability to agree on what that is.

For example, New Keynesian macroeconomists, as well as some of their post-Keynesian and Hicksian cousins (yes, I am including Paul Krugman in this category, much as he is to be admired for his outspokenness) have posited that gargantuan additional amounts of monetary expansion will succeed in overcoming the debt deflation. If debt deflation were all we were dealing with—it very well might.  It would even take a good shot—albeit a painful one—at addressing the intergenerational imbalances in the advanced economies by making sure that aging savers (who would otherwise prefer to "clip bond coupons") become desperate to make expansionary investments amidst Japanese-style bond yields and panicked fears of inflation.

Yet we now have enough of a post-crisis track record to see that efforts to induce inflation, and efforts to target and forcibly obtain high rates of nominal GDP growth (the hope of all who seek to induce debt-devaluing, and investment-inducing inflation/financial repression—see Christina and David Romer, Kenneth Rogoff, and his collaborator, Carmen Reinhart) are not working.

We are at the zero lower bound of short term interest rates.  Long term rates are certainly being manipulated by central banks—but the mass of excess capital floating about with no sensible investment alternatives given the excesses of supply relative to demand, would keep them low anyway.  The reason the Japanese experience is applicable to the rest of the developed world is not because of their inescapable recession/deflation—it is because it was the first advanced economy to experience a massive private sector debt overhang contemporaneously with a substantial excess of savings relative to opportunities for domestic investment when the "Asian Tiger" economies began to challenge Japan's manufacturing and export hegemony. Then, as now, savings sought the security of hard currency government debt and reasonable equivalents (excluding, in the present iteration, debt of troubled Eurozone countries without control over their own currency) when there is no reason to finance additional capacity.   

In addition to historically low interest rates and a banking/credit system choking on un-lent, and foolish-to-lend, liquidity, we have the subsidizing effect of low interest rates on banks and corporations (and, to a far more limited extent because of the decrepitude of household balance sheets, consumers). We even have, as a result of the household debt crisis and the underwater mortgage crisis, 6.5 million households that are delinquent or in default on their mortgage and essentially living "rent free"—a most insidious form of subsidy.

There is so much cash floating around in the capital markets that money supply long ago ceased to be the metric targeted by the Federal Open Markets Committee of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank—it is now all about interest rates and I would dare say that with 10 year and 30 year U.S. treasury bonds, at below 1.5% and 2.5% respectively, if nominal GDP can't be made to grow, and inflation to ignite under present circumstances there must be something else going on! Something bigger, even, than the classic liquidity trap in which we are very much caught.

I believe that the so-called "doves" at the Fed realize this as well.  Markets may trade on the expectation of further monetary intervention, but the intervene-ors are beginning to conclude that further easing is likely not to be productive—and, worse yet, possibly counterproductive. And with no small irony, this is not because of the typical fears of their inflation-hawk colleagues.  Rather it is because we haven't been able to produce much inflation at all, apart from bouts of commodity inflation that correspond with periods of massive easing and each time only succeed in quashing economic activity at the margin, as consumers cannot keep up.

Wages, unfortunately, refuse to track the rise in those prices that are influenced by more liquidity, lower interest rates, and short-lived fears of inflation-that-is-not-to-be.  And, yes, that is because there is too little aggregate demand for labor relative to a global surplus thereof.

Critics of this view are many.  Some, like Krugman, readily acknowledge that wages are stuck at rigid nominal levels—refusing to grow, but also refusing to fall in the absence of demand. And the truth is that employees aren't given to offering to work for less and employers seldom cut wages—preferring instead to cut workers—so wage rates are, in fact, quite sticky.  As I sat down to write this essay, I noted a blog post by Professor Krugman precisely on this point, written within hours of my putting my own thoughts down. In it, Krugman asserts that falling wages would precipitate "destructive deflation" and maintains that while wage cuts couldtheoretically be thought of as expansionary (because such cuts would notionally increase the demand for workers, thus creating jobs and increasing demand) they would exacerbate the debt problem, as households earning less would have a more difficult time deleveraging and between that, and the downward price adjustments that would need to follow wages, we'd be off on the road to Tokyo before long.

But that view ignores other realities.  Yes, nominal wages are downwardly rigid and, yes, reduced nominal wages would result in reduced nominal prices before too long.  And reduced rents, both real and economic, ultimately reduce asset values that are reflective of the nominal wages and prices. It is hard to argue in the alternative. 

Yet it is, as I see it, similarly hard to argue that further monetary expansion will succeed when wages cannot be forced to rise. It is even harder to argue that wages will rise when we are at the zero lower bound of short term interest rates and long term interest rates imply a near-negative rate of future inflation. And it is—in my judgment at least—impossible to argue that wages will rise now that we have been through multiple rounds of unprecedented monetary intervention, with the only result being that we have stabilized the developed economies a few yards short of descending into full-fledged depression.

And it is particularly difficult to ignore that, measured in terms of headline CPI for Q2 2012, for what it's worth statistically (not much unless it continues)—we actually experienced price deflation (March CPI = 229.018, June CPI = 228.618, subject to revision).  .

Without going too far into a discussion of the emerging economies, the disinflationary patterns we are seeing in China as growth slows, is particularly alarming.  We badly need an overheated Chinese economy to inflate in order to partially offset the supply/wage imbalances and induce cross border currency revaluation to the detriment of the U.S. dollar. Today, the dollar is flying way too high, having risen in recent days to a two year high. Too high to be helpful (indeed, it will soon be the opposite) in addressing trade and current account balances.

If all we were experiencing was a debt deflation, the easing by the Fed, ECB, BOE and BOJ would have actually accomplished something. If that were the case, than central banks would have the ability to force growth in nominal GDP. But, as demonstrated via consideration of the Four Factors, such is not the case. Not even close.

Note that I am not saying that the presence of a global supply glut knocks into the gutter all economic theory that says such a thing can never occur. Markets and economies do of course tend towards Walrasian equilibrium. But I am saying that the magnitude of present imbalances, especially if not properly addressed, would take quite some time to rebalance.

As an analogy, consider that we have, since the Renaissance, generally understood that the earth always turns daily on its axis from west to east. A giant meteor slamming into its surface might alter that rotation with the result that its restoration would take considerable time, during which costs to the residents of the planet would undoubtedly be severe.  In the case of global macroeconomics, it was no meteor that hit us. We were hit by a ton of BRICs.

Irving Fisher taught that to prevent a deepening slump amidst a debt deflation we must stabilize economies and then go all-out to reflate them. The monetary authorities in the developed world have engaged in massive coordinated action to stabilize their financial systems and economies to prevent depression (at least so far). But they have not succeeded in being able to reflate the advanced economies—and will not be able to do so through a singular reliance on the blunt instrument of further monetary easing. Fisher would certainly have seen this.

We must move from stabilize and reflate, to stabilize and recalibrate:

• It is time for creditors throughout the developed world to finally take the write downs that have long been coming their way in connection with the trillions of dollars of truly un-payable household and sovereign debts that resulted from the credit bubble of the 2000s.  Yes, this will pressure lenders and, yes, they will need to be recapitalized to the detriment of their existing stakeholders.  But there is presently no shortage of capital seeking reasonable risk-adjusted returns, and I have every confidence that it will flow eagerly into the financial sector—if only the balance sheets of our institutions were honestly reckoned by having the currently unrecoverable carrying value of assets written down to that which can be recovered today from borrowers and/or underlying collateral.
• As I have been saying and writing about for years, we must accept the reality of what the credit markets are telling the planet's most creditworthy governments, particularly that of the U.S.  The message is "please, here, take our money…take it cheaply and keep it safe…we have no fear of lost purchasing power, the trend is not inflationary…now take it (and use it to fix your  economy)." And that is what we must do. We must take as much 30-year money at these depression level interest rates as we need to re-employ our underemployed workers directly, on public infrastructure projects that return benefits to the economy more than sufficient to repay the sums borrowed when the time comes.  The private sector will not hire until it sees a recovery in demand—so the only agent for re-employment of workers and regeneration of demand may, for an extended time until the imbalances at least decline somewhat, be our governments.  It is long past time to pack away austerity agendas.
• And yes, we must address and manage the process of nominal price, wage and asset value declines. The advanced economies are experiencing the effects of a supply glut, a debt overhang, massive technology-induced productivity (soon to transfer to the emerging economies, worsening the glut), and aging populations. These are all disinflationary factors. And the aggregate effect of their contemporaneous existence is deflationary—full stop. Yet in relying on monetary intervention alone we are fighting the battle to control the pace of deflation (forget about reflation) with one hand tied behind our back.n  Instead of targeting growth in nominal GDP, which I am proclaiming here to be a futile endeavor, we must target renewed global competitiveness and, at the very least, growth in real GDP. That means both allowing our price and wage structures to align themselves with global supply and demand and, more importantly, feeding and nurturing investment in those areas of the private sector that can employ large numbers of people at market clearing wage rates. Especially in those sectors that are more readily protected by geography from global competition.

I am convinced that if our economic policy had more closely acknowledged and addressed the challenges posed by the Four Factors, we would have made far more progress over the past five years. Let's not waste the next five years ignoring the reality thereof.

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Quiebran los gobiernos de Occidente?

Are Western Governments Going Broke? Are the Western Welfare States (the U.S., Japan, and EU nations) really going bankrupt? Things were headed that way before the credit crisis began. The Global Financial Crisis may be becoming a sovereign debt crisis and that will worsen an already bad situation. First, let's check out the chart below from the 2008 annual budget audit by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. It shows that the U.S. government must roll over $3.4 trillion in debt over the next four years. This $3.4 trillion does not include any additional borrowing that may be required for other government programs (wars, healthcare, wars, school lunches). What's the big deal? $3.4 trillion is a small number by today's standards, isn't it? Not exactly. The chart shows how incredibly interest-rate sensitive U.S. government borrowing now is. Not only is it a big ask to ask the world's creditors to continue funding such large deficits (there are only so many savings available to borrow, after all), but the interest expense on that debt is likely to go up as the fiscal position of America deteriorates. And if America can't find anyone willing to finance its deficits, what then? Well, the luxury of issuing debts in the currency you also print is that you can print money to pay for them. Technically, you can never become insolvent when you enjoy this privilege. The Fed, for example, can create new money to buy debt issued by the Treasury, funding deficits ad infinitum. But this monetisation of the debt is another way of saying that international creditors are no longer willing to pick up America's spending tab. They will be betting against the American economy, not on it. Even if the Fed takes the unusual step of moving out further along on the yield curve to set interest rates (and keep the bond vigilantes from sending yields to the moon) this is a clear signal to owners of dollar-denominated assets and holders of dollar currency reserves to get out. Another scenario to watch for is when creditors begin asking the U.S. to issue debts in currencies other than its own (Yuan, Euros). That would be something. In the meantime, they will look to lessen their dollar reserves. That may not be such an orderly process. And the urgency to get out of the greenback and into something better will only pick up pace as it becomes clear the politicians in America (along with the Fed) are not likely to suddenly rediscover fiscal prudence. You never know. The Fed may assert its independence and baulk at more quantitative easing. But we wouldn't count on it. And we reckon tangible assets and possibly emerging market equities would be the biggest beneficiaries of capital flows out of the dollar...and into anything else. The next chart is for you, Paul Krugman. Krugman, among others, continues to insist that larger public sector deficits are necessary if the Western world is to avoid a Japanese-style deflationary "Lost Decade." He claims the government must increase spending as households and businesses deleverage and reduce debts. Advocates of this idea claim that public sector deficits, as a percentage of GDP, have no real limits. And the example they cite is Japan. As you can see from the chart below, Japan's debt to GDP ratio is nearing 200%. America's isn't even half of that yet (it's about 98%, or $13 trillion). If Japan can finance a deficit at 200% of GDP, then why are we worried that U.S. deficits half that size would threaten interest rates or the dollar? First off, it's worth pointing out that high public sector-debt-to GDP ratios haven't worked in Japan, if by work you mean pave the way to a stable recovery. Advocates might say-as advocates of the stimulus here in Australia often say-that the public spending made things less worse. But the opposite is true. It's made things more bad! Or just worse, if you prefer. We mean that the public spending has done two things, neither of which is productive, and both of which, in fact, waste capital and resources. First, public sector spending to prop up financial firms with dodgy assets prevents the needed reckoning in asset prices that would produce market clearing prices for commercial and residential real estate. You get zombie banks and a zombie economy and zombie house prices. Secondly, there's no indication that all the infrastructure spending in Japan has produced any kind of lasting growth for the economy. It may have built some great roads and bridges. But we wonder if it solved any of the underlying problems? What's more, the capital and resources that went into those projects was directed by political considerations and not available for the private sector, which could have put them to some use at least designed to produce a return on the capital. The underlying problem which deficit spending does not solve is compounded by demographics. Japan's government is hoping that continued borrowing can be financed at low rates by pensioners who will be cashing out of their pensions but seeking safety. However, we suspect that Japanese pensioners will begin to consume their savings as they downsize their lives into their twilight years (which tend to last much longer in Japan, as the number of Japanese centenarians shows). That means interest on Japanese bonds-which already one fifth of the Japanese budget-will consume even more of the nation's resources, if the older population clams up with its money. And like in the U.S., you'll see the government borrowing more and more of every new yen spent, with more of that borrowed yen going to pay a previous creditor. That's bordering on Ponzidom. Japan has been able to run a higher-than-average public debt-to-GDP ratio because it has had such a high personal savings rates. This kept borrowing costs low for the government. But we'd expect that to change soon. A debt-to-GDP ratio of 200% will be very difficult to finance in the world as it is-much less in a world where those rates begin to rise and when Japanese savers begin to consume their savings. Finally, what about Europe? Our argument here is simple: Europe's monetary union is going to come unstuck. Why? Europe has one interest rate for twelve different economies. That does not leave national governments with the flexibility to print money and inflate away political problems. This will be intolerable, the monetary union will break up. The sign to watch for is a spike in the yields on euro-denominated debt. As the chart below (from Stratfor) shows, earlier this year bond yields did in fact begin to widen. Germany Bunds have the most stable rates, as Germany has traditionally the most stable fiscal and monetary policies in Europe (they did not go hog wild for stimulus). But for Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Austria (whose banks lent large for real estate in Eastern Europe), another round of falling asset values really would show that the GFC has become a sovereign debt crisis. And will Germany bail out these nations? Can it afford to? We don't know the answer to those questions. But it is worth pointing out that by assuming or guaranteeing the liabilities of the financial sector, national governments have also assumed the risk. And the bond markets will be left to decide how to price this risk. How it ends is anyone's guess. But our take is that the Super Cycle in fiat money is at its peak. And as it unwinds, it's going to take national governments and their financing model with it. They will be forced to adopt a new model and take a new form to survive. This means a great deal of political and economic upheaval. It's no coincidence that the last time the world faced such monetary upheaval was when it went off the gold standard and straight into essentially thirty-two years of military and economic conflict (1913-1945). If the world is about to become that disordered again, you'll need a plan to deal with it. Regards, Dan Denning www.dailyreckoning.com.au

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papiers keynesiens, jean paul simonnet,accelerateur

Mécanisme de l’accélérateur

Créé le : samedi 1er novembre 2008 - Dernière mise à jour : samedi 21 mars 2009 par Simonnet Jean-Paul

Dans un article publié en 1909, puis dans "Les crises périodiques de production" (1913), Albert Aftalion (1874-1956) montre que l’investissement réagit fortement aux variations de la demande et cela d’autant plus que "le détour de production" est plus long.
Le cycle (enchaînement expansion-récession) est le résultat d’un décalage entre les décisions d’investissement qui produisent leurs effets durablement (le capital installé est productif pour longtemps) et les décisions des consommateurs qui sont indépendantes. Les périodes de sur-accumulation succèdent ainsi à des périodes de sous-accumulation.
John-Maurice Clark (1883-1963) publie en 1917 un article exposant le principe de l’accélérateur.
Ce principe repose sur l’existence d’une liaison technique entre quantité de capital nécessaire pour produire et demande de produits à satisfaire. Il considère que cette liaison est stable à court terme ce qui veut dire que le coefficient de capital (rapport capital / Production) est constant.
Par ailleurs il prend en compte le fait qu’une partie de l’investissement est destinée à remplacer les équipements usés. L’investissement de remplacement dépend du taux de déclassement (taux d’amortissement) et du volume de capital.
Ainsi le flux d’investissement à chaque période est constitué de deux composantes : l’investissement net destiné à répondre aux variations de la demande et l’investissement de remplacement.
Le coefficient moyen de capital est le rapport du stock de capital utilisé pour produire (la valeur totale des équipements) à la valeur produite, il est généralement noté v donc v = K / VA. Un coefficient moyen de capital valant 3 cela signifie qu’il faut 3 euros de capital fixe pour produire 1 euro.
Le coefficient marginal de capital est le rapport de l’augmentation du stock de capital nécessaire pour obtenir un supplément donné de valeur produite, il s’écrit donc dK / dV si "d" indique qu’il s’agit d’une variation. Un coefficient marginal de capital valant 3 cela signifie qu’il faut acheter 3 euros de capital fixe en plus pour produire 1 euro de plus.
Si on suppose que ce coefficient moyen de capital est constant égal à "v" alors le coefficient marginal de capital dK / dV est lui aussi constant et égal à v.
K / VA = v et dK = v.dVA
La formation brute de capital fixe pour une période donnée comporte deux parties :

• la formation nette (l’augmentation du stock de capital fixe), cette variation du stock de capital c’est dK
• la consommation de capital fixe (il faut remplacer les équipements usés pour maintenir le stock de capital fixe à son niveau initial, et cette consommation de capital fixe est notée a.K expression dans laquelle "a" est le taux d’amortissement (si le stock de capital vaut 100.000 euros et si le taux d’amortissement est égal à 10 % alors il faut remplacer à chaque période une valeur de 10.000 euros de capital (100.000 x 10 %).

Donc FBCF = dK + a.K
En utilisant les notations précédentes, on a
FBCF = dK + a.K = v. dVA + a.K
ce qui peut aussi s’écrire

FBCF / VA	=	v (dVA / VA)	/	a . (K / VA)
Taux d’investissement		Coefficient de capital x Taux de croissance de la production		Taux d’amortissement x Coefficient de capital
I /VA	=	v . g	/	a . v

Le taux d’investissement (effort d’investissement relativement à la production) contient une partie variable en fonction du taux de croissance de la production et une partie constante (le second terme dépendant du taux d’amortissement et du coefficient de capital).
Comme le coefficient de capital est généralement supérieur à 1 on voit que cette partie variable amplifie la croissance de la production. Le taux d’investissement sur-réagit à la croissance de la production.
On constate aussi que ce n’est pas le niveau de la production qui est importante dans ce mécanisme, c’est la croissance et c’est pour cela qu’on parle d’accélérateur (la croissance de la production est amplifiée pour ses effets sur l’investissement, elle est accélérée).
Les hypothèses nécessaires pour que ce mécanisme soit vérifié sont les suivantes :

• les producteurs ajustent instantanément leur capacité de production aux variations de la demande
  • ils n’ont pas de stocks permettant de répondre au supplémént de demande et ils ne font pas de stocks quand la demande augmente moins vite
  • ils considèrent que la variaition de la demande sera durable
  • les équipements sont pleinement utilisés, le taux d’utilisation du capital est égal à 100%
  • les biens d’équipement sont produits sans délais
  • ils ne répondent pas à la variation de la demande par une variation des prix, l’ajustement se fait par les quantités ce qui correspond à l’hypothèse des marchés concurrentiels
• la décision d’investissement n’est soumise à aucune autre contrainte que celle des débouchés
  • pas de problème de financement
  • rentabilité assurée.

On comprend que ces hypothèses sont fortes, cependant elles correspondent assez bien à une situation de croissance économique régulière et soutenue. Le mécanisme fonctionnera logiquement beaucoup mieux en période d’expansion qu’en période de ralentissement particulièrement si ce dernier est assez durable pour fragiliser financièrement les entreprises.

Pour aller plus loin

Les enrichissements du mécanisme consistent à introduire des réserves sur ces hypothèses. Par exemple il est possible que les producteurs n’ajustent pas complètement leur capacité de production à l’évolution de la demande soit parce qu’ils ne sont pas convaincus de son caractère durable, soit parce qu’il faut du temps pour réaliser les changements désirés.
L’ajustement entre la capacité de production installée et celle qui est désirée sera alors partiel.
Si le capital désiré à la date (t) est noté K*(t) on a toujours une relation technique entre ce capital désiré et la demande de produits
K*(t) = v . VA(t)
le caractère partiel de l’ajustement est représenté par le coefficient "m" avec 0 < m < 1
I(t) = K(t) - K(t-1) = m [K*(t) - K(t-1)] + a . K(t-1)
I(t) = K(t) - K(t-1) = m [v . VA(t) - K(t-1)] + a . K(t-1) = [m . v . VA(t)] + [(a - m) . K(t-1)]

I(t) = [m . v . VA(t)] + [(a - m) . K(t-1)]

L’investissement dépend positivement

• de la vitesse d’ajustement (m),
• du niveau de la demande (et non plus de la variation de la demande)
• du taux d’amortissement

Il dépend négativement du stock de capital déjà installé.
Il y a toujours un mécanisme accélérateur mais il est amorti, c’est pourquoi les économistes parlent d’accélérateur flexible par opposition à l’accélérateur simple.
L’amortissement provient des délais d’ajustement qui se répercutent de période en période.
On montre facilement que

I(t) = m . v. [VA(t) - VA(t-1)] + (1 + a - m) . I(t-1)