GREENSPAN: DECLARACION CRISIS

Veja a notícia: "Mundo sofrerá nova crise financeira, diz ex-presidente do Fed" : http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2009/09/090908_crise_greenspan_np.shtml?s

GREENSPAN: ALERTA EL MAESTRO

Fue bautizado como el "maestro" en la hagiografía perpetrada por Bob Woodward. Tiene el récord de la expansión más larga de la posguerra (1991-2001) y las cruces de su gestión en forma de generador de burbujas financieras (1996-2000) e inmobiliarias (2001-2006) y de ferviente creyente en las tesis sobre la racionalidad y eficacia de los mercados. Alan Greenspan tuvo arrestos para "disculparse" por haber creído que gestores y accionistas eran los mejores responsables de los intereses de las empresas. Jamás imaginó el caos que crearía "diseminar" el riesgo "empaquetando" hipotecas y obligaciones de distinta solvencia. Ayer brindó su análisis sobre la coyuntura y los próximos dieciséis meses.
El que fue presidente de la Reserva Federal entre agosto de 1987 y enero del 2006 considera probable que el año se cierre con dos trimestres de fuerte crecimiento económico. Basa su optimismo en que las empresas se verán forzadas a aumentar sus existencias tras varios trimestres tirando de inventario. Pronostica que el crecimiento del PIB oscilará entre un 2,5% y un 5% en el segundo semestre del año en curso.

"Creo que estamos OK para los próximos seis meses. Estamos iniciando una recuperación en la construcción de viviendas y en vehículos de motor, pero al proceso le faltan piernas para sostenerse". Las ventas de coches y la construcción inmobiliaria suelen ser vértices de crecimiento en una recuperación económica. En el caso de los coches, las ventas se han disparado gracias a un programa de 3.000 millones de dólares (2.126 millones de euros) para promover la sustitución de los vehículos más viejos y que más consumen. En cualquier caso, recuerda Greenspan, el programa ni será eterno ni es sostenible. Antes de recordar crudamente que el mercado automovilístico estadounidense está "saturado" hay que olvidar que los consumidores norteamericanos, el 70% del PIB, gastan más de lo que ingresan y ahora difícilmente consiguen préstamos al consumo. Y en estos momentos, suman ya tres años de caída del valor de su patrimonio inmobiliario (otro motivo para volver a ahorrar).

Respecto a la venta de casas nuevas, Greenspan recuerda que el colapso en la construcción está ayudando a que los promotores se deshagan de sus casas vacías. Esta situación perdurará y Greenspan descarta que se vuelva a una tasa de propiedad como cuando en el 2007 el boom llegó a su cenit.

GREENSPAN: ALERTA AL INMOBILIARIO, LVR

Greenspan alerta sobre el inmobiliario

El ex presidente de la Reserva Federal Alan Greenspan dijo ayer que aunque la recesión de la economía estadounidense no se ha acabado el final está "muy cerca". En una entrevista en el canal ABC, señaló no obstante que los signos de estabilización económica podrían verse afectados por un nuevo descenso del precio de la vivienda. Aunque no consideró que se pueda producir una caída abrupta, dijo que el precio de la vivienda se ha estabilizado sólo temporalmente y es posible otra oleada de descensos. Esta caída podría suponer un "cambio significativo en la confianza subyacente de los consumidores", según afirmó, si las hipotecas suben y los precios de las viviendas caen por debajo de sus niveles de hipoteca.
Greenspan aseguró que la salud del sistema financiero ha mejorado considerablemente tras el colapso que provocó la mayor crisis económica desde la Gran Depresión. En opinión del ex presidente de la Reserva Federal, "el colapso está ahora detrás de nosotros", y agregó estar "casi seguro" de que la economía estadounidense había "tocado fondo" y la recuperación comenzó a mediados de julio. Greenspan cree que el paro, del 9,5%, llegará a los dos dígitos en los próximos meses y continuará, pero a un ritmo más lento.

FMI: TRACKING GLOBALIZATION

News del FMI, tracking globalization

GREENSPAN: nacionalisation banque

Greenspan backs bank nationalisation

By Krishna Guha and Edward Luce in Washington

Published: February 18 2009 00:06 | Last updated: February 18 2009 00:06

The US government may have to nationalise some banks on a temporary
basis to fix the financial system and restore the flow of credit, Alan
Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, has told the Financial
Times.

In an interview, Mr Greenspan, who for decades was regarded as the high
priest of laisser-faire capitalism, said nationalisation could be the
least bad option left for policymakers.

CRISE FINANCIERE ET ECONOMIQUE:RESEAUX

El Riesgo Deflacionario

About that deflation risk

Paul Krugmann

There has been a distinct change in tone from the Obama team today, as
they seem to have become suddenly aware that there's a real risk that
the stimulus plan will either fail to pass, or be emasculated to the
point that it doesn't come close to doing the job. Obama himself has
warned of catastrophe if we fail to act, and --- finally!-- denounced
the tax-cut philosophy
<http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/economy/obama-rachets-up-rhetoric-attacks-gop-economic-philosophy/>.
Meanwhile, Larry Summers has finally made the point
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aLqmR5ZB_RYI> I've
been pushing for a while --- that we're at major risk of falling into a
deflationary trap.

I thought it might be useful to present a bit of evidence behind that
concern. The figure above plots an estimate of the output gap --- the
difference between actual and potential GDP, as a percentage of
potential --- and the change in the inflation rate. Both series are
taken from the IMF WEO database
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/index.aspx>,
for convenience, and use data from 1980-2007.

It's not a perfect fit --- this is economics, not physics, and anyway
stuff besides the output gap bounces inflation around from year to year.
But still, there's a clear correlation, driven largely but not entirely
by the deep slump and disinflation of the early 1980s, and an implied
slope of about 0.5 --- that is, every percentage point by which real GDP
fall short of potential tends to reduce the inflation rate by about half
a point over the course of the year.

And right now the CBO is saying
<http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9967/01-27-StateofEconomy_Testimony.pdf>
that
in the absence of a policy action the average output gap will average
6.8 percent over the next two years. Do the math: if anything like the
historical relationship between output and inflation holds, we're
looking at major deflation.

OK, maybe that relationship won't hold --- getting to actual deflation
may take a deeper slump than merely reducing the inflation rate. And
maybe a regression driven in part by 80s data isn't a good guide to
current events. But deflation is a huge risk --- and getting out of a
deflationary trap is very, very hard.

We truly are flirting with disaster.

USA:WACHOVIA ABSORBED

Farewell Wachovia
by Charles B. Wendel

Executive Summary: Wachovia, about to be absorbed by Wells Fargo, was once one of the best and most respected banks in the world. Thinking back on the bank that was offers bankers some clear lessons. More important, it may also provide a path for banks struggling with how to position themselves during and after the current economic crisis.

Over ten years ago, one of my clients commented that his major bank was Wachovia. I remember him saying that they were demanding in their credit requirements, but he felt that having them as your banker was something of a badge of honor, a sign that your company was of quality. It really was the Morgan of the South, when that phrase meant something very positive.

I came to know Wachovia both as a consultant and while conducting research for my first book, The Middle Market in the mid-1990s. Subsequently, I interviewed Bud Baker, then Chairman, for another book, The New Financiers. I felt that I knew the bank as well as any outsider could.

The Wachovia I am writing of is the pre-First Union bank, operating out of its Winston-Salem headquarters. It was a $70 billion bank back then with a reputation for excellence in commercial banking as well as retail.

* Teaming on the commercial customer. Wachovia emphasized a dual management focus for its commercial clients. The Relationship Manager oversaw the customer and was in charge of cross-sell. The Credit Officer shared responsibility for the customer and, basically, approved any credit-related decisions. They were "co-equals," and bankers would often move back and forth between functions during their careers. However, while the RMs and credit bankers were called co-equals, it always seemed that the credit people were a bit more co-equal than the RMs. RMs would certainly complain about a slow and painful credit process, but the portfolio quality was strong.

My memory is that it was unusual for a credit officer to visit a client; that was the RM's job. Instead, the credit officer was focused on the numbers and rigorously analyzing a company's current and pro forma performance as well as pushing the RM for more information. Bank management seemed concerned that a credit person spending too much direct time with the customer could cause that banker to "go native" and lose objectivity.

* Fees, please. The bank was also one of the first to give prominence to the role of cash management and the fees it generated. Many banks are only now focusing on this critical area; Wachovia saw this as an area of distinction and began to exploit cash management and trade finance early on.

In addition, Wachovia was among the first banks to position its Treasury Services Officers as the leads on certain relationships. Some commercial accounts that had little borrowing requirements were assigned to the cash management group; cash management became the fulcrum of the relationship rather than an add-on. While this approach is being pursued at more banks, it was very rare ten years ago.

* The customer really was first. One example: the bank followed the "sundown rule" with its customers. When a customer contacted the bank with an issue, Wachovia pledged to revert to the customer (albeit not necessarily with a full solution) by end of day. Ensuring high customer satisfaction permeated the bank in this and other ways.

On the retail side, the bank was probably the first large player to offer each consumer a private banker. That banker was expected to build a trusted advisor position with the customer, long before that shopworn phrase existed.

* Selectivity/segmentation. Certainly on the commercial side, it was a bank that did not view itself as right for everyone. Credit-only customers probably did not fit in and management expected RMs to diagnose and achieve significant cross-sell. I remember a senior credit banker on the commercial side telling me that he was not interested in increased risk assets for their own sake but the cross-sell they facilitated.

* Culture, culture, culture. While I came to have insider knowledge of the bank, there was no way I could take that knowledge across the street and help another bank become a Wachovia clone. That was because a unique and positive culture permeated that institution. It took decades to create but, frankly, very little time to destroy.

From an outsider's perspective, elements of that culture seemed to include putting credit quality first, a focus on relationships not just lending, a strong respect for colleagues but a willingness to disagree with them, and an acceptance of sometimes laborious internal processes.

Lessons from Wachovia
Heritage Wachovia was a strong and focused institution operating in a time that seems both simpler and long ago. However, many of its best characteristics (beyond its emphasis on credit quality) remain relevant today:

1. Relationships rather than one-off transactions. Everyone says they want this, but few banks operate with the discipline to become true relationship banks.

2. Fees given at least as much prominence as net interest income. Wachovia made this focus part of its marrow, rather than the afterthought it is for so many banks even today.

3. Selectivity/segmentation. Wachovians could define who their target customer was and was not. Most banks cannot do this beyond a few canned phrases. The bank seemed to know what it stood for. Few banks appear to operate with that type of clarity today.

Concluding Thought
I have very fond memories of my consulting time at Wachovia. Wachovians were smart, analytically strong, and well-intentioned professionals who really were trying to do the right thing for their customers. The good news is that their acquirer possesses many of the positive qualities that made Heritage Wachovia so successful and unique.

GREENSPAN, BANKS NEED MORE CAPITAL

-BANKS NEED MORE CAPITAL

Dec 18th 2008

In a guest article, Alan Greenspan says banks will need much thicker
capital cushions than they had before the bust

GLOBAL financial intermediation is broken. That intricate and
interdependent system directing the world's saving into productive
capital investment was severely weakened in August 2007. The disclosure
that highly leveraged financial institutions were holding toxic
securitised American subprime mortgages shocked market participants.
For a year, banks struggled to respond to investor demands for larger
capital cushions. But the effort fell short and in the wake of the
Lehman Brothers default on September 15th 2008, the system cracked.
Banks, fearful of their own solvency, all but stopped lending. Issuance
of corporate bonds, commercial paper and a wide variety of other
financial products largely ceased. Credit-financed economic activity
was brought to a virtual standstill. The world faced a major financial
crisis.

For decades, holders of the liabilities of banks in the United States
had felt secure with the protection of a modest equity-capital cushion,
allowing banks to lend freely. As recently as the summer of 2006, with
average book capital at 10%, a federal agency noted that "more than 99%
of all insured institutions met or exceeded the requirements of the
highest regulatory capital standards."

Today, fearful investors clearly require a far larger capital cushion
to lend, unsecured, to any financial intermediary. When bank book
capital finally adjusts to current market imperatives, it may well
reach its highest levels in 75 years, at least temporarily (see chart).
It is not a stretch to infer that these heightened levels will be the
basis of a new regulatory system.

The three-month LIBOR/Overnight Index Swap (OIS) spread, a measure of
market perceptions of potential bank insolvency and thus of extra
capital needs, rose from a long-standing ten basis points in the summer
of 2007 to 90 points by that autumn. Though elevated, the LIBOR/OIS
spread appeared range-bound for about a year up to mid-September 2008.
The Lehman default, however, drove LIBOR/OIS up markedly. It reached a
riveting 364 basis points on October 10th.

The passage by Congress of the $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief
Programme (TARP) on October 3rd eased, but did not erase, the
post-Lehman surge in LIBOR/OIS. The spread apparently stalled in
mid-November and remains worryingly high.

How much extra capital, both private and sovereign, will investors
require of banks and other intermediaries to conclude that they are not
at significant risk in holding financial institutions' deposits or
debt, a precondition to solving the crisis?

The insertion, last month, of $250 billion of equity into American
banks through TARP (a two-percentage-point addition to capital-asset
ratios) halved the post-Lehman surge of the LIBOR/OIS spread. Assuming
modest further write-offs, simple linear extrapolation would suggest
that another $250 billion would bring the spread back to near its
pre-crisis norm. This arithmetic would imply that investors now require
14% capital rather than the 10% of mid-2006. Such linear calculations,
of course, can only be very rough approximations. But recent data do
suggest that, while helpful, the Treasury's $250 billion goes only
partway towards the levels required to support renewed lending.

Government credit has in effect acted as counterparty to a large
segment of the financial intermediary system. But for reasons that go
beyond the scope of this note, I strongly believe that the use of
government credit must be temporary. What, then, will be the source of
the new private capital that allows sovereign lending to be withdrawn?
Eventually, the most credible source is a partial restoration of the
$30 trillion of global stockmarket value wiped out this year, which
would enable banks to raise the needed equity. Markets are being
suppressed by a degree of fear not experienced since the early 20th
century (1907 and 1932 come to mind). Human nature being what it is, we
can count on a market reversal, hopefully, within six months to a year.

Though capital gains cannot finance physical investment, they can
replenish balance-sheets. This can best be seen in the context of the
consolidated balance-sheet of the world economy. All debt and
derivative claims are offset in global accounting consolidation, but
capital is not. This leaves the market value of the world's real
physical and intellectual assets reflected as capital. Obviously,
higher global stock prices will enlarge the pool of equity that can
facilitate the recapitalisation of financial institutions. Lower stock
prices can impede the process. A higher level of equity, of course,
makes it easier to issue debt.

Another critical price for the return of global financial stability is
that of American homes. Those prices are likely to stabilise next year
and with them the levels of home equity--the ultimate collateral for
global holdings of American mortgage-backed securities, some toxic.
Home-price stabilisation will help clarify the market value of
financial institutions' assets and therefore more closely equate the
size of their book capital with the realities of market pricing. That
should help stabilise their stock prices. The eventual partial recovery
of global equities, as fear inevitably dissipates, should do the rest.
Temporary public capital injections into banks would facilitate this
process and arguably provide far more benefit per dollar than
conventional fiscal stimulus.

Even before the market linkages among banks, other financial
institutions and non-financial businesses are fully re-established, we
will need to start unwinding the massive sovereign credit and
guarantees put in place during the crisis, now estimated at $7
trillion. The economics of such a course are fairly clear. The politics
of draining off that much credit support in a timely way is quite
another matter.

For a discussion of this article, see www.economist.com/freeexchange[1]

See this article with graphics and related items at http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12813430&source=hptextfeature

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