SECCION Crisis monetaria: US/EURO, dolar vs otras monedas

Gráfico del tipo de cambio del Dólar Americano al Euro - Desde dic 1, 2008 a dic 31, 2008

Evolucion del dolar contra el euro

US Dollar to Euro Exchange Rate Graph - Jan 7, 2004 to Jan 5, 2009

V. SECCION: M. PRIMAS

1. SECCION:materias primas en linea:precios


[Most Recent Quotes from www.kitco.com]


METALES A 30 DIAS click sobre la imagen
(click sur l´image)

3. PRIX DU CUIVRE

  Cobre a 30 d [Most Recent Quotes from www.kitco.com]

4. ARGENT/SILVER/PLATA

5. GOLD/OR/ORO

6. precio zinc

7. prix du plomb

8. nickel price

10. PRIX essence






petrole on line

Find out how to invest in energy stocks at EnergyAndCapital.com.

azucar

azucar
mercados,materias primas,azucar,precios y graficos azucar i otros

9 ene 2008

BCE: INYECCION DE LIQUIDEZ

LOS BANCOS CENTRALES NO DESCARTAN NUEVAS INYECCIONES CONJUNTAS DE LIQUIDEZ
Cinco Días / MADRID (08-01-2008)

El presidente del Banco Central Europeo, Jean-Claude Trichet reconoció ayer que
las tensiones en el mercado de dinero que marcaron el año 2007 están lejos de
desaparecer y no descartó que los bancos centrales realicen nueva inyecciones de
liquidez de forma conjunta si la situación lo requiere. Trichet, tras la reunión
bimensual de los diez bancos centrales de los países más industrializados en
Basilea, se mostró \'muy satisfecho\' de la actuación de las entidades monetarias
para frenar las turbulencias monetarias.

El presidente del BCE aseguró que la histórica inyección de liquidez conjunta
que los bancos centrales más importantes llevaron a cabo el pasado mes de
diciembre -la primera desde los atentados del 11-S- \'ayudó considerablemente a
estabilizar la situación\'. Y se defendió por la pervivencia de las tensiones
monetarias: \'Nunca dijimos que nuestra actuación podría cambiar la situación
global. Esto es un proceso que está en curso\'. De hecho, a día de hoy, el
presidente del Banco Central asegura que aún no está claro cuál será el efecto
de la crisis financiera sobre la economía real.

Aparte del endurecimiento del crédito, el presidente del Banco Central citó el
encarecimiento del petróleo y de las materias primas como las principales
amenazas del crecimiento económico. Un dato relativamente tranquilizador es que
la tasa de paro en la zona euro se mantuvo estable en el 7,2% en el mes de
noviembre, siete décimas menos que en octubre, informó Eurostat, la oficina
estadística de la UE. España, con un tasa de desempleados del 8,2% se sitúa
entre los países con mayor porcentaje de parados.

Con todo, las turbulencias financieras y la desaceleración económica en Europa
son motivos que apuntan a que el BCE no subirá los tipos de interés, actualmente
en el 4%, en la reunión del próximo jueves.
España lidera en la UE la caída de la confianza

La incertidumbre y dudas que ensombrecen a la economía española se han dejado
notar en el Indicador de Sentimiento Económico (ISE). La confianza económica
cayó en España un 1,2 puntos en el mes de diciembre, el mayor descenso entre los
países de la Unión. Según los datos publicados ayer por la Comisión Europea,
para el conjunto de la zona euro, la caída fue sólo de 0,1 puntos y para la
Unión Europea de 0,4 puntos. Este índice aglutina datos sobre la confianza de
los europeos respecto a la industria, los servicios, el comercio, la
construcción, el consumo y los servicios financieros.

BCE: INYECCION DE LIQUIDEZ

LOS BANCOS CENTRALES NO DESCARTAN NUEVAS INYECCIONES CONJUNTAS DE LIQUIDEZ
Cinco Días / MADRID (08-01-2008)

El presidente del Banco Central Europeo, Jean-Claude Trichet reconoció ayer que
las tensiones en el mercado de dinero que marcaron el año 2007 están lejos de
desaparecer y no descartó que los bancos centrales realicen nueva inyecciones de
liquidez de forma conjunta si la situación lo requiere. Trichet, tras la reunión
bimensual de los diez bancos centrales de los países más industrializados en
Basilea, se mostró \'muy satisfecho\' de la actuación de las entidades monetarias
para frenar las turbulencias monetarias.

El presidente del BCE aseguró que la histórica inyección de liquidez conjunta
que los bancos centrales más importantes llevaron a cabo el pasado mes de
diciembre -la primera desde los atentados del 11-S- \'ayudó considerablemente a
estabilizar la situación\'. Y se defendió por la pervivencia de las tensiones
monetarias: \'Nunca dijimos que nuestra actuación podría cambiar la situación
global. Esto es un proceso que está en curso\'. De hecho, a día de hoy, el
presidente del Banco Central asegura que aún no está claro cuál será el efecto
de la crisis financiera sobre la economía real.

Aparte del endurecimiento del crédito, el presidente del Banco Central citó el
encarecimiento del petróleo y de las materias primas como las principales
amenazas del crecimiento económico. Un dato relativamente tranquilizador es que
la tasa de paro en la zona euro se mantuvo estable en el 7,2% en el mes de
noviembre, siete décimas menos que en octubre, informó Eurostat, la oficina
estadística de la UE. España, con un tasa de desempleados del 8,2% se sitúa
entre los países con mayor porcentaje de parados.

Con todo, las turbulencias financieras y la desaceleración económica en Europa
son motivos que apuntan a que el BCE no subirá los tipos de interés, actualmente
en el 4%, en la reunión del próximo jueves.
España lidera en la UE la caída de la confianza

La incertidumbre y dudas que ensombrecen a la economía española se han dejado
notar en el Indicador de Sentimiento Económico (ISE). La confianza económica
cayó en España un 1,2 puntos en el mes de diciembre, el mayor descenso entre los
países de la Unión. Según los datos publicados ayer por la Comisión Europea,
para el conjunto de la zona euro, la caída fue sólo de 0,1 puntos y para la
Unión Europea de 0,4 puntos. Este índice aglutina datos sobre la confianza de
los europeos respecto a la industria, los servicios, el comercio, la
construcción, el consumo y los servicios financieros.

7 ene 2008

CAE TC: IMPACTO EN EXPORTACIONES

CRISIS EUROPEA:2008

Advierten sobre un nuevo ciclo económico
Temen una pérdida de competitividad del euro frente al dólar; expectativa por lo que pase esta semana
LANACION.com | Economía | Lunes 7 de enero de 2008

PERU:GRADO DE EFICIENCIA PRODUCTIVA

5 ene 2008

NO ESTAN LOCOS, S.RONCAGLIOLO

LA FIRMEZA DEL VOTO ANTISISTEMA
No están locos
Por Santiago Roncagliolo. Escritor
EL COMERCIO 31.12.2007

Durante la campaña electoral del 2006, tuve ocasión de conversar con Gonzalo García, por entonces candidato a vicepresidente con Ollanta Humala. Por esos días, Mario Vargas Llosa había publicado un feroz artículo contra Humala, Evo Morales y Hugo Chávez, a los que acusaba de autoritarios y, sobre todo, de racistas. Yo quería conocer la opinión de García sobre el artículo. Y su respuesta me sorprendió.
-- Excelente artículo. Con eso ganamos por lo menos un punto más.
García debe haber visto la cara de estupor que puse, porque me explicó:
-- Vargas Llosa ha comparado a Humala con Chávez y Evo pensando que son monstruos repugnantes, pero son muchos más populares que Toledo. Y al meterlos a todos en el mismo saco, le ha dado a Humala talla de estadista. Pero lo más interesante es que los acusa de racistas. En el Perú, a nadie se le ocurre que un blanco pueda llamar racistas a un mestizo, un mulato y un aimara. Eso se lee como racismo de él.
Al despedirnos, García me preguntó si yo conocía a Vargas Llosa, y si podía pedirle que les dedicase otro artículo de esos.
García conocía bien a su electorado, concentrado en la paupérrima sierra sur, y sabía que desde ahí las cosas se ven exactamente al revés que desde Lima. Cuando los periodistas acusaban a Ollanta de velasquista, los limeños veían en Velasco el cataclismo económico, pero los campesinos agradecían la reforma agraria. Cuando la prensa acusaba a Humala de antidemócrata, los limeños temblaban y los campesinos lo celebraban. Así, cada vez que la prensa de Lima atacaba a Humala, terminaba haciéndole propaganda.
Incapaces de comprender que el 'comandante' creciese como espuma en las encuestas, muchos peruanos, incluso intelectuales y periodistas, llegaron a la misma conclusión: la mitad del país es estúpida.
Básicamente, es la misma conclusión a la que habían llegado con la primera elección de Fujimori y con la de Alan García en 1985. Pero esta vez tenía un agravante. El sector que votó por Humala es en gran parte el mismo que había votado por Fujimori y antes había apoyado a Sendero Luminoso. Ese segmento de la población es a veces de derecha, a veces de izquierda. Su locura ni siquiera tiene un sello ideológico claro. Es un montón de gente errática que no sabe lo que quiere. Ese análisis es tranquilizador para los demócratas, porque reafirma su seguridad de estar en lo cierto, de ser un oasis racional en medio de la barbarie. Pero falla en un detalle: ¿es posible atribuir un hecho social a la idiotez generalizada?

El ensayista Alberto Vergara cree que no. Su libro "Ni amnésicos ni irracionales" (Solar Central de Proyectos) es un lúcido análisis del último proceso electoral en el contexto histórico del país. Y llega a la conclusión de que este segmento de la población no solo sabe perfectamente lo que quiere, sino que expresa en su historia política una coherencia mucho mayor que cualquier otro grupo. Y lo que quieren es simple: integrarse en un proyecto de Estado.
A la luz de la historia de los estados-nación, Vergara examina las diversas formas de populismo en el Perú y en América Latina, y descubre cómo la idea de nación --de identidad colectiva de un país-- siempre ha sido generada por los estados. Como en el Perú el Estado no ha llegado a amplias capas de la población, los regímenes autoritarios siempre se han podido sustentar en reivindicaciones urgentes de una población que se considera desatendida por la clase política.
Por supuesto, ninguna de esas reivindicaciones es la libertad de expresión, la solidez institucional o la independencia del Poder Judicial. Para que te preocupen esas cosas, debes comer tres veces al día. Debe haber un juez que pueda tomar decisiones. Debe haber instituciones a las que acudir. El país que describe Vergara está dividido entre gente que se beneficia de la democracia y gente que no tiene razones para creer en ella. Y ya que un régimen de derecho no resuelve sus problemas, este grupo prefiere un caudillo. Lo irracional sería lo contrario.
La conclusión más sencilla de la lectura de este libro es, a la vez, la más provocadora: para defender la democracia, habrá que satisfacer las necesidades de quienes no creen en ella. Si los pobres son mayoría, votarán democráticamente por regímenes autoritarios. Y ganarán. Sobran ejemplos en la región andina.
Y, sin embargo, ¿hemos aprendido esa sencilla lección? Me temo que no. Lo que hizo Humala fue introducir en la última campaña el tema de la pobreza, que es el tema que toca de cerca al menos a la mitad de los peruanos. En respuesta, Lourdes Flores habló de redistribuir la riqueza, y García la acusó de ser "la candidata de los ricos". Súbitamente, todos muy preocupados por los pobres. Pero el primer tema que abordó el Gobierno una vez elegido fue la pena de muerte para los pederastas. Hoy en día, la impopularidad de Alan García se concentra en las mismas zonas del voto descontento. Y dentro del espectro político, a su izquierda no queda nada más. Un caldo de cultivo inmejorable para el voto antisistema.
¿Cómo se distribuye la riqueza? Como lo han hecho todos los capitalismos exitosos, y como lo están haciendo Brasil, Chile o Argentina: con reformas fiscales. Durante el gobierno de Toledo, las transnacionales mineras facturaron, según "The Economist", 10.000 millones de dólares. No pagaron en impuestos ni siquiera el 10%. Si hubiesen pagado el 20% --que sigue siendo la mitad de lo que pagan rentas altas en España y la cuarta parte de lo que pagan las transnacionales hoy en día en Bolivia--, el Estado habría dispuesto de mil millones de dólares más para combatir la pobreza precisamente en las zonas de mayor descontento. En el largo plazo, incluso, los intereses de esas transnacionales estarían mejor protegidos. Esos impuestos serían una inversión en seguridad jurídica y estabilidad política.

El libro de Alberto Vergara tiene una lectura inquietante por lo obvia: la responsabilidad del funcionamiento de la democracia recae en las élites políticas y económicas, en su capacidad de crear un proyecto de país que integre a todos los sectores. Si en las próximas elecciones aparece un nuevo outsider prometiendo castigarlas, esas élites lo acusarán de antidemócrata, autoritario y salvaje. ¿Pero ahora que están a tiempo de evitar que aparezca, están dispuestas a pagar la factura de la democracia? Hasta el momento, no hay señales de ello.


Enviar






INFLACION EUROPEA:3.1%

3 ene 2008

PETROLEO A 100, NUEVO RECORD 2008


ORO BATE RECORD, 863 ONZA


2 ene 2008

DEL BLOG DE SIMON JOHNSON DEL FMI

COMENTA el libro de brender/pisani..
Oct 22, 2007
Global Imbalances: What Next?

I took part in a frank discussion over global imbalances very early Sunday morning, organized by Anton Brender and Florence Pisani of Dexia. The topic was their book on this issue and -- most important -- what could follow, particularly after the summer's financial turbulence.

My main argument was that the first phase of global imbalances is likely over. In this phase, the primary imbalance was between the US current account deficit on the one hand and current account surpluses in oil producing countries, Japan, China and few other places. The main issue, which Anton and Florence make clear in their book, was one of flows, i.e., how to get capital from countries that were saving "too much" (or at least more than they wanted to invest) to the US, which was saving "too little" (or less than it was investing.)

We should of course keep in mind that during this first phase, a number of things changed. For example, initially -- in the late 1990s -- US firms invested more than they saved and this accounted for most of the US side of the imbalance. More recently, since around 2000-2001, US firms have saved more than they invested but US households have reduced their savings. So things change in the nature of this imbalance, and it has in the past been dangerous to make predictions about behavior.

Still, it now appears likely that US households will save more -- after all, few now expect property prices to continue to rise and other asset prices might also be regarded as high. This doesn't have to be a big, rapid or disruptive change, but it will likely raise savings in the US and help take the current account down to 5 1/2 percent (or smaller?) in 2008.

But if the US current account deficit is smaller, what does that imply for other countries' current accounts? Remember, that savings and investment have to add up around the world. So if the US has a smaller deficit and we want to sustain broadly the same level of world growth, either someone else has to come up with a deficit (which is large enough to make a difference) or the surplus countries have to reduce their surpluses.

But oil prices are now unexpectedly high and oil producers, who are trying hard to spend, will almost certainly have large surpluses in the near term than previously thought. Japan has zero or close to zero inflation and growth is not so very strong, so its interest rates remain appropriately low. This will likely prove consistent with a continued surplus -- although this has been driven by high savings in the corporate sector; they have reduced debt levels over the past 10 years so they are now very similar to other OECD countries, but it is not clear that they will now go out and spend more.

Now, contrary to some impressions, China is actually experiencing an appreciation in its real exchange rate -- mostly due to high inflation. In its Multilateral Consultation plan, China expressed the intention of rebalancing the economy more broadly (away from investment and exports and towards consumption), but including exchange rate flexibility. Even so, based on what we have seen in the past few months, a robust Chinese current account surplus is the foreseeable future. This is based on very strong performances, profits and savings in the corporate sector -- really the results of successful development. But still, in the near term, this part of the global imbalances is not getting smaller.

So again, if the US current account deficit goes down, and the surpluses do not go down, whose deficit will go up? This is the very big question of the day. How this question is answered is likely to have a first order impact on global growth.

Posted at 06:05 PM in Global Imbalances | Permalink
TrackBack

TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.typepad.com/t/trackback/2663166/22643022

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Global Imbalances: What Next?:
Comments

Simon, the book on imbalances is a great find.

IMHO, you've left the US government's saving out of the equation though as Sg+Sp=I+CA. I am less sanguine in assuming that the US CAD will narrow significantly over the next few years given that the baby boomer generation will start retiring soon and has saved very little. As GAO Comptroller General David Walker has noted, an impending tsunami of entitlement spending will likely assure that America's deficits are here to stay.

Posted by: Emmanuel | Oct 22, 2007 at 10:57 PM

Dear Simon,
I am not quite sure of how high inflation can lead to appreciation in real exchange rate. I would appreciate if you can enlighten me on this matter. Thanks.
"Now, contrary to some impressions, China is actually experiencing an appreciation in its real exchange rate -- mostly due to high inflation... "

Posted by: Hai Rick | Oct 23, 2007 at 04:27 AM

Simon, will the appreciation of Canadian dollar and Euro reduce their current account surpluses? As in China, the pressure of currency revaluation is mounting in the oil-exporting Gulf economies. May be we would see some rebalancing from their part.

Posted by: Syed Basher | Oct 23, 2007 at 11:58 AM

Hai, a real apreciation is a rise in the cost of local chinese goods vis a vis those of external goods. That can happen either with a rise in the price of local goods expressed in local currency (local inflation being higher than external) or with a rise in the local currency vs foreign currency (a nominal appreciation). China is now doing both, at least vs. US.

Dear Simon, as an argentine citizen, can you list us in the "CA surplus down, future deficit risinng" column? We can help solving Global Imbalances.

Posted by: raft | Oct 23, 2007 at 03:02 PM

Excellent post. I tend to agree with Simon and have written a little piece commenting on this article and welcoming Simon to the blogging world (kind of) ;-)

http://china-economics-blog.blogspot.com/2007/10/imf-on-global-imbalances-what-next.html

Posted by: China Economist | Oct 24, 2007 at 06:17 AM

DEL BLOG DE SIMON JOHNSON

Oct 22, 2007
Global Imbalances: What Next?

I took part in a frank discussion over global imbalances very early Sunday morning, organized by Anton Brender and Florence Pisani of Dexia. The topic was their book on this issue and -- most important -- what could follow, particularly after the summer's financial turbulence.

My main argument was that the first phase of global imbalances is likely over. In this phase, the primary imbalance was between the US current account deficit on the one hand and current account surpluses in oil producing countries, Japan, China and few other places. The main issue, which Anton and Florence make clear in their book, was one of flows, i.e., how to get capital from countries that were saving "too much" (or at least more than they wanted to invest) to the US, which was saving "too little" (or less than it was investing.)

We should of course keep in mind that during this first phase, a number of things changed. For example, initially -- in the late 1990s -- US firms invested more than they saved and this accounted for most of the US side of the imbalance. More recently, since around 2000-2001, US firms have saved more than they invested but US households have reduced their savings. So things change in the nature of this imbalance, and it has in the past been dangerous to make predictions about behavior.

Still, it now appears likely that US households will save more -- after all, few now expect property prices to continue to rise and other asset prices might also be regarded as high. This doesn't have to be a big, rapid or disruptive change, but it will likely raise savings in the US and help take the current account down to 5 1/2 percent (or smaller?) in 2008.

But if the US current account deficit is smaller, what does that imply for other countries' current accounts? Remember, that savings and investment have to add up around the world. So if the US has a smaller deficit and we want to sustain broadly the same level of world growth, either someone else has to come up with a deficit (which is large enough to make a difference) or the surplus countries have to reduce their surpluses.

But oil prices are now unexpectedly high and oil producers, who are trying hard to spend, will almost certainly have large surpluses in the near term than previously thought. Japan has zero or close to zero inflation and growth is not so very strong, so its interest rates remain appropriately low. This will likely prove consistent with a continued surplus -- although this has been driven by high savings in the corporate sector; they have reduced debt levels over the past 10 years so they are now very similar to other OECD countries, but it is not clear that they will now go out and spend more.

Now, contrary to some impressions, China is actually experiencing an appreciation in its real exchange rate -- mostly due to high inflation. In its Multilateral Consultation plan, China expressed the intention of rebalancing the economy more broadly (away from investment and exports and towards consumption), but including exchange rate flexibility. Even so, based on what we have seen in the past few months, a robust Chinese current account surplus is the foreseeable future. This is based on very strong performances, profits and savings in the corporate sector -- really the results of successful development. But still, in the near term, this part of the global imbalances is not getting smaller.

So again, if the US current account deficit goes down, and the surpluses do not go down, whose deficit will go up? This is the very big question of the day. How this question is answered is likely to have a first order impact on global growth.

Posted at 06:05 PM in Global Imbalances | Permalink
TrackBack

TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.typepad.com/t/trackback/2663166/22643022

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Global Imbalances: What Next?:
Comments

Simon, the book on imbalances is a great find.

IMHO, you've left the US government's saving out of the equation though as Sg+Sp=I+CA. I am less sanguine in assuming that the US CAD will narrow significantly over the next few years given that the baby boomer generation will start retiring soon and has saved very little. As GAO Comptroller General David Walker has noted, an impending tsunami of entitlement spending will likely assure that America's deficits are here to stay.

Posted by: Emmanuel | Oct 22, 2007 at 10:57 PM

Dear Simon,
I am not quite sure of how high inflation can lead to appreciation in real exchange rate. I would appreciate if you can enlighten me on this matter. Thanks.
"Now, contrary to some impressions, China is actually experiencing an appreciation in its real exchange rate -- mostly due to high inflation... "

Posted by: Hai Rick | Oct 23, 2007 at 04:27 AM

Simon, will the appreciation of Canadian dollar and Euro reduce their current account surpluses? As in China, the pressure of currency revaluation is mounting in the oil-exporting Gulf economies. May be we would see some rebalancing from their part.

Posted by: Syed Basher | Oct 23, 2007 at 11:58 AM

Hai, a real apreciation is a rise in the cost of local chinese goods vis a vis those of external goods. That can happen either with a rise in the price of local goods expressed in local currency (local inflation being higher than external) or with a rise in the local currency vs foreign currency (a nominal appreciation). China is now doing both, at least vs. US.

Dear Simon, as an argentine citizen, can you list us in the "CA surplus down, future deficit risinng" column? We can help solving Global Imbalances.

Posted by: raft | Oct 23, 2007 at 03:02 PM

Excellent post. I tend to agree with Simon and have written a little piece commenting on this article and welcoming Simon to the blogging world (kind of) ;-)

http://china-economics-blog.blogspot.com/2007/10/imf-on-global-imbalances-what-next.html

Posted by: China Economist | Oct 24, 2007 at 06:17 AM

world economic outlouk april 2007

world economic outlouk april 2007

PERU: APRECIACION CAMBIARIA CASI 7%

CHINA 2008: BAJARIA A 10.4%

SUBE EL PETROLEO A 95

PETROLEO sube 58% en el año..(ver)

INFLACION PERUANA

inflacion 3.94% duplica meta..(sigue)

29 dic 2007

nouriel roubini : Recesion 2008

The Latest Macro and Financial News Strongly Signal Recession Ahead

Nouriel Roubini | Dec 27, 2007
The latest macro and financial news confirm that the US is headed towards a hard landing – specifically a serious recession - as a vicious circle of worsening real fundamentals is perversely interacting with severely worsening financial fundamentals and a severe liquidity and credit crunch: Initial claims for unemployment benefits now at their recession level (i.e. level they had during the 2001 recession) and continued claims for unemployment benefits sharply up (signaling that workers losing jobs have a harder time finding new ones and are thus unemployed longer). This is now persistent trends for weeks signaling the beginning of a serious slack in the labor market.

Durable goods order falling – excluding transportation – for four months in a row; and non-defense capital goods orders and shipment falling too signaling that non-residential capex spending will show negative growth in Q4. No wonder as a slowing economy, economic/financial uncertainties and much higher corporate yield spreads (junk bond yields spreads now above 500bps compared to 200bps before the summer crisis) are taking a toll on capex spending by the corporate sector.
Consumer confidence still plunging (ABC/WaPo index) or sharply depressed even in December (Conference Board measure) in spite of a minor pick up in last survey. Consumer confidence close to recession levels. Polls showing that a majority of Americans expect a recession in the next 12 months.
Oil prices in the $90 to 100 range and now closer to the upper part of this range; significant negative real income effect of this increase in oil and energy prices. And overall headline and core inflation increasing.
Retail sales falling in real terms during the holiday seasons (as mediocre nominal growth was lower than inflation) and all the other indicators of holiday sales – including retailers' earnings and equity valuations showing serious gloom ahead. With consumption spending being over 70% of GDP a saving-less and debt burdened consumer that is buffeted by several shocks - falling home values, falling home equity withdrawal, rising debt servicing ratios with ARM resets, rising debt ratios, oil above $96, plunging consumer confidence, slack in the labor market - decided to throw in the towel in December and cut spending in real terms, for the first time since 2002.

The worst housing recession since the Great Depression getting worse and uglier with starts, permits, sales, prices, mortgage applications all sharply down and falling more; the only thing going up in housing is defaults, foreclosures and delinquencies.

Non-residential commercial real estate in serious trouble as a series of press reports and data suggest; CMBX index now at recession spreads.

Forward looking indicators of economic activity (Richmond Fed, Philly Fed manufacturing surveys, Index of Leading Indicators, ECRI leading indicators index) signaling weakness ahead and manufacturing ISM likely to fall below 50 (contraction level).

Corporate earnings falling 8.5% (y-o-y) in Q3 and expected to fall more in Q4 and ahead. And plunge in earnings are now spreading from home builders, to financial sector firms, to retail sector, to housing-related manufacturing and services, and overall business-cycle sensitive consumer discretionary firms. Stock market volatility still high and high nervousness and pessimism of investors (based on a variety of gauges of investors risk aversion – Vix, risk spread, etc.)

Interbank spreads (Libor vs. policy rates, TED spreads, BOR/OIS spreads, etc.) still at very elevated levels in spite of massive central bank injections and policy rate easing by Fed, BoE and BoC.

Bond yields curve and credit spreads pricing recession ahead.

Credit markets dead (subprime and subprime-related RMBs issuabce, subprime related CDOs issuance, and SIVs), comatose (near prime and prime and most of CDO and ABS issuance) or frozen (LBO deals cancelled, postponed, restructured, hundreds of leveraged loans on the balance sheet of banks, CLO issuance sharply down).

Unraveling of the $350 billion SIVs and collapse of the Super-Siv scheme forcing banks to bring back on balance sheet SIVs assets (re-intermediation), thus absorbing significant capital and liquidity and thus exacerbating the liquidity and credit crunch.

Signs of sharply increasing default rates on credit cards, auto loans and student loans leading the spreading of the credit crunch from mortgages to overall consumer credit. Banks and financial institutions have only recognized a small fraction of the total losses.
Corporate risk spreads sharply up – over 500bps – for junk bonds that were issued in massive amounts by the corporate sector in the last few years.

Monoliner bond insurance firms all under review for downgrade and one – ACA – already downgraded to C and on the verge of bankruptcy. Risk of hundreds of billions of losses for the underlying securities and issuers of insured bonds.

Massive further losses and writedowns by financial institutions that will increase as the crisis moves from subprime to near prime, prime, credit cards, auto loans, student loans, commercial real estate loans, leveraged loans, losses on ABS instruments, corporate loans. Unraveling of the Minsky credit cycle with losses reducing capital, reducing credit and exacerbating the credit crunch.

Pressures, losses and runs on non-bank financial institutions "the shadow banking system" (hedge funds, money market funds, state funds, investment banks, SIVs and conduits) that borrowed short and illiquid and lent long and illiquid that do not have direct or indirect access to the central banks' lender of last resort support.

Overall the most severe financial crisis in the Anglo-Saxon financial system in the last 20 years: crisis of insolvency and not just illiquidity; crisis of the "originate and distribute" model of securitization as wrong incentives and asymmetric information have led to a massive lack of confidence/trust in counterparties; rise of a disintermediated non-bank shadow financial system that is now in serious trouble. Need for massive reforms and regulations of the financial system.

US dollar falling and most of the financing of the still massive US current account deficit coming from central banks and SWFs, not private sector investors.

Geostrategic risks rising (being the assassination of Bhutto; unstable petro-states; high energy insecurity; political and policy uncertainty in the US as 2008 will be an election year).

Are there goods news out there? Of course there are some but many are old – relative to months before December - and backward looking:

Q3 growth being strong (but almost half of it was due to an inventory build-up and Q4 forecasts are now signaling growth below 1%);

non farm payrolls holding up in November (but initial claims for December are up and up);

personal real spending being strong in November after a weak September and October (but now December retail sales appear falling in real terms);

stock markets recovering being boosted by expectations of a Fed ease (but homebuilders, financials, retail and consumer discretionary being beaten up);

net exports improving modestly (but slowdown in global growth from re-coupling ahead will dampen the improvement in the trade balance);

hopes that a more aggressive Fed easing ahead will avoid a hard landing (but limited effects of such Fed cuts in a situation where you have a massive housing, consumer durables and auto glut; also Fed ability to ease aggressively limited by its inflation concerns and risks of a sharp inflationary fall of the dollar that may reduces foreigners investors' willingness to finance the US current account deficit);

financial institutions recapitalizing (but almost all of that recapitalization coming not from the private sectors but rather by government owned institutions – SWFs – in the Gulf, China and Singapore).

etc.: please add in the comments section any other major good news that I may have missed; I am not sure there is any.

It is thus pretty clear that the balance of the macro and financial news is strongly bearish. Thus, the most likely scenario is one of a serious US recession in 2008; the main issue now is not whether we will have a recession or not but rather how mild or severe such a recession will be.

26 dic 2007

yahoo inflacion

INFOBAE


INFLACION BCE

Mail.com the best personalized free web-based email

INFLACION ARGENTINA

El costo de vida: relevamientos privados sobre artículos de primera necesidad
Algunas mediciones registraron una baja de precios en las últimas semanas por la caída de los productos estacionales
LANACION.com | Economía | Miércoles 26 de diciembre de 2007

24 dic 2007

22 ago 2007

PRUEBAS PRE LANZAMIENTO

Seguimos recibiendo las ideas y sugerencias

ENTREVISTAS TV CRISIS GLOBAL

NR.: Director, no presidente ---------------------------------------------- Bruno Seminario 1 ------------------------- Bruno Seminario 2 -------------------- FELIX JIMENEZ 1 FELIZ JIMENEZ 2 FELIX JIMENEZ 3, 28 MAYO OSCAR DANCOURT,ex presidente BCR ------------------- Waldo Mendoza, Decano PUCP economia ---------------------- Ingeniero Rafael Vasquez, parlamentario 24 set recordando la crisis, ver entrevista en diario

Etiquetas

Peru:crisis impacto regional arequipa,raul mauro

Temas CRISIS FINANCIERA GLOBAL

QUIEN SOY?
claves para pensar la crisis

MATERIAS PRIMAS
-Metales
-Cobre
- plata
- oro
- zinc
- plomo
- niquel
- petroleo

-Tipo de cambio

- LA CRISIS

- BOLSA VALORES
- BANCOS
- PBI PAISES
- USA: DEFICIT GEMELOS
- UE: RIEN NE VA PLUS

CONTAGIO: CANALES

- PERU: DIAGRAMA DE CONTAGIO
- PERU: IMPACTO EN BOLSA
- MEXICO: HAY CRISIS?

LA PRENSA
COMENTARIO DE HOY

- DIARIOS DE HOY
NLACES

Coyuntura
Bancos centrales
Paginas Recomendadas

BLOGS

economiques
Interes

VIDEO

- Economia videos
- Crisis financiera global

TRICONTINENTAL

- AFRICA: daniel
- EUROPA: helene
- ASIA:
- AMERICA

COLUMNAS AMIGAS

Chachi Sanseviero

ETIQUETAS
por frecuencia de temas
por alfabetico

EVENTOS

FOTOS DEL PERU

GONZALO EN LA RED

JOBS
VOZ ME CONVERTIDOR
CLIMA
SUDOKU
PICADURAS

LOGO

LIBRO de GONZALO

La exclusion en el Peru

-Presentacion

- introduccion

- contexo economico

- crisis de la politica

- excluidos de las urbes

- excluidos andinos

- contratapa

VIDEOS ECONOMICOS
Crisis Enero 2009
Krugman
Globalizacion 1
Globalizacion 2
Crisis Brasil
Crisis bancaire
Karl marx revient

TODOS LOS DERECHOS RESERVADOS

GOOGLE INFORMA


PRESS CLIPPINGS-RECORTES PRENSA-PRESSE..

ETIQUETAS alfabetico